TAFS
INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR TRANSMISSIBLE ANIMAL DISEASES AND FOOD SAFETY a non-profit Swiss Foundation
TAFS1 Position Paper on Position Paper on Relaxation of the Feed Ban in the EU
© TAFS, Berne, 2010
Epidemiological evidence implicated contaminated rendered meat and bone meal as the source of the BSE epidemic in the United Kingdom, continental Europe as well as a few other countries around the world. With the overall global decline of BSE cases, national governments are beginning to explore the possibility of relaxing some of the measures taken to bring the disease under control. This paper will examine the current scientific knowledge and other facets that may impact decisions regarding the feed bans.
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Countries outside of Europe
After confirming BSE in September 2001, the government of Japan enacted many of the same regulations adopted by the European Union. In regard to feed controls, all meat and bone meal (MBM) is prohibited from being fed to bovines. Porcine and marine mammal derived MBM is banned from the rations of pigs and chickens as well. MBM from poultry produced separately may be fed to pigs and chickens. (Ref. 13)
These feed control measures appear to have been effective in Japan. Japan has detected a total of 36 cases of BSE (2001-2009) that seemingly peaked in 2006. In 2008 and 2009, only one case/year has been found. To date, with the exception of one case born in January 2002, all other BSE cases have been born prior to the feed ban.
BSE has also been identified in both Canada and the United States (US). The first case of BSE in Canada was reported in May 2003 and the first native-born case in the US was identified in 2004. Both Canada and the US prohibited the feeding of most rendered mammalian proteins to ruminants in 1997. It is evident by the Canadian BSE cases born between 2000-04 that this was not 100% effective.
In Canada as of July 12, 2007 SRMs (same list as removed from food for humans) are prohibited from being included in any animal feed including pet food or fertilizer.
As of October 2009, the US expanded the 1997 feed ban to prohibit the feeding of certain high risk cattle materials in all animal feed. This list includes: 1) the entire carcass of BSE-positive cattle, 2) the brains and spinal cords from cattle 30 months of age and older, 3) the entire carcass of cattle not inspected and passed for human consumption, unless the cattle are less than 30 months of age or the brains and spinal cords have been effectively removed, 4) tallow derived from BSE-positive cattle, 5) tallow derived from cattle material prohibited in animal feed (CMPAF) that contains more than 0.15% insoluble impurities and 6) mechanically separated beef derived from CMPAF.
Many countries not reporting BSE have taken some precautionary feed control measures to prevent an internal recycling of the BSE agent if it were to be introduced into the animal feed chain. The measures usually include a ruminant to ruminant or mammalian to ruminant ban. Some countries have also excluded SRMs from animal feed and set parameters for rendering. For example, as of 2001 Australia prohibits the feeding of any material taken from a vertebrate animal other than tallow, gelatin, milk products or oils extracted from poultry and fish. It includes rendered products such as blood meal, meat meal, meat and bone meal, fish meal, poultry meal, feather meal, and compounded feeds made from these products to be fed to ruminants. In 2002 Argentina enacted a mammalian to ruminant ban.
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Evaluation of these possible future developments
Disease considerations
In Europe there seems to be general support for the opinion that feeding any animal proteins to ruminants2 should remain forbidden to ensure that the BSE epidemic will not be revived and to respect the herbivorous nature of cattle and sheep. That particular feed ban was at the core of the hugely successful control of the BSE epidemic in Europe.
2 With the exception of fish meal in milk replacers
The inclusion of non-ruminant feed in the BSE feed ban regulations was not a result of a direct and proven TSE risk to, or arising from, non-ruminants, but rather the consequence of the complexity of the rendering and feed industry and the limited diagnostic capabilities.
Prior to the total feed ban, the production processes for ruminant and non-ruminant feed were not separated completely. During rendering processes, feed production, storage or transportation there was ample opportunity for ingredients of non-ruminant feed to contaminate ruminant feed and vice-versa. Despite previous feed bans, ruminant feed therefore continued to contain ruminant proteins, and crossfeeding of ruminants with non-ruminant feed containing ruminant proteins remained a possibility. The number of BSE cases born after ruminant-to-ruminant feed bans or mammalian-to-ruminant feed bans clearly demonstrates that in practice such feed bans were not sufficiently effective in preventing new infections. This was true for Europe and seems to be the same at least in Canada. Prior to finding the first case of BSE in Japan there was only a voluntary feed ban. After the initial case, Japan adopted more stringent and broader measures than the ruminant to ruminant or mammalian to ruminant ban.
While maintaining the total ban of PAPs in ruminant feed alone would in theory (e.g., under ideal, controlled conditions) be sufficient to protect cattle and sheep from exposure to potentially infected material, erroneous cross-contamination, labeling errors and fraudulent misconduct could lead to some contamination with PAPs in ruminant feed if they were to be allowed for non-ruminants. Inspections and testing (see below) can reduce, but not eliminate such a risk.
Even if PAPs would, unlawfully or unintentionally, end up in ruminant feed, they would pose no known TSE risk under the assumption of two important, jointly sufficient conditions:
1) That the PAPs stem exclusively from non-ruminants. With the complete ban of ruminant material being rendered into feed for farmed animals this assumption is very likely to be met, although pet feed could be a source of contamination.
2) That non-ruminant proteins can under no circumstances trigger the development of TSE diseases in ruminants even if fed to them. According to an EFSA opinion (Ref. 6) there is no evidence to suggest the contrary and EFSA considers the risk of transmitting BSE to pigs utilizing poultry PAPs (and vice versa) as negligible. On the other hand, there is also only weak evidence to actively support the scientific validity of this assumption. Additionally, pigs have been shown to be susceptible to infection with TSE-material of ruminant origin by parenteral challenge, but experimental transmission of BSE to pigs by the oral route has been unsuccessful (Ref 16). Given the current paucity of the experimental evidence, the condition cannot be considered completely satisfied, since the absence of evidence does not constitute evidence of absence.
No spontaneous development of TSE-like disease has been observed in pigs, but it is plausible to assume that pigs can develop such diseases as a very rare event and if left alive long enough. Multiplied by the number of live pigs – close to 1 billion worldwide – that would result in a non-negligible number of pigs with TSE. On the other hand by far most, if not all, pigs slaughtered for human consumption do not live to be even 1 year old.
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If pig-meal is allowed as feed to poultry and vice versa then a closed loop of material could be established provided that undigested pig proteins contained in the gastrointestinal tract of poultry is fed back to pigs or the other way round. This loop can be prevented if all gastrointestinal tracts and their contents are removed and discarded before the rendering of animal by-products. This requirement would be – like all other risk reduction measures – subject to error and fraud, but add to the redundancy of risk management.
In the light of the evolving BSE epidemic, the zoonotic potential of BSE and consumer concerns, the authorities were therefore forced to take drastic measures and exclude all animal proteins from all feed for farmed animals, with a few exceptions as outlined above.
By 2010, the BSE epidemic appears to be phasing out. In 2001, 2,167 BSE positive cases were detected within the framework of the EU surveillance activities. By 2008, this number had fallen to 125, 17 times less. Also the number of BSE cases detected per 10,000 animals tested had fallen dramatically: 2.55 BSE cases per 10,000 in 2001 against 0.12 BSE cases per 10,000 in 2008, a 21-fold reduction (Ref. 10). This also implies that the probability has diminished significantly that infected cattle erroneously enter the feed production chain.
Emerging Disease Considerations
Atypical BSE and other TSEs
For almost the entire two decades that BSE had been known in the world it was thought that there was only one ?train?that infected cattle and caused disease in other species such as humans (Refs. 17, 18).
In 2004, cases of a bovine prion disease molecularly different than those already documented as classical BSE were described by scientists in both Italy (Ref. 18) and France (Ref. 19). In both countries the cattle were over 8 years of age. The Italian cases (11 and 15 years of age) named bovine amyloidotic spongiform encephalopathy (BASE) were characterized by an unglycosylated protein band with a lower molecular mass (thus named L cases) and the predominance of the monoglycosylated band. In addition, immunohistochemical detection of PrPres in these cases found greater deposits in the cerebral cortex and thalamus versus the brain stem, as is characteristic of classical BSE. The French cases found a higher molecular mass associated with the unglycosylated protein band and were called H cases. The different ?trains?are now called atypical BSE.
Atypical BSE is a study in progress with more unknowns than knowns. One of the most important of the unknowns is the significance of atypical BSE in regard to human and animal health.
Since these two publications, additional cases of atypical BSE have been found in other countries. H cases have been detected in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. L cases have been diagnosed in Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and Poland.
It has now been shown that both the L and H types of atypical BSE are experimentally transmissible via the intracerebral route. Homogenates from L cases have been transmitted to wild-type mice, bovinized, ovinized and humanized transgenic mice, Cynomolgus monkeys and cattle (Refs. 20, 21, and 22).
H cases have been transmitted to bovinized transgenic (Tgbov) and ovinized transgenic mice (Ref. 23) and cattle (personal communication March 2009).
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Early studies provide some evidence that L type (or BASE) BSE may be more virulent for primates including humans (Refs. 21, 24, and 25).
Studies on the oral route are underway. These would provide data to evaluate the potential for natural transmission of the disease.
Atypical BSE may arise spontaneously in a small proportion of cattle. The existence of sporadic CJD in humans has led to postulation that disease could arise spontaneously in any animal, but this theory like others has not been proved.
In the US one of the H-type BSE case was found to be associated with the novel mutation E211K within the prion protein gene (Prnp) suggesting that this strain may have a genetic origin (Ref. 26).
As per the SEAC: „here are too few data to enable an assessment of the natural transmissibility of L- and H-type BSE between cattle, or to sheep or goats. The present feed control measures which prevent feeding of mammalian meat and bone meal to ruminants would limit the spread of these forms of BSE to cattle, sheep and goats should they be transmissible to these species by the oral route.?
Atypical Scrapie
In 1998, scientists in Norway discovered a previously uncharacterized strain of scrapie that is now called Nor 98 or atypical scrapie (Ref. 27). Certain epidemiological evidence indicates that atypical scrapie may be a sporadic disease (Ref. 28), however additional research is underway to examine the likelihood of natural transmission and the extent of tissue distribution.
As with atypical BSE, there are few data on the potential for natural transmission of the disease to sheep and other species. The disease has been transmitted to sheep however the route was intracerebral (Ref. 29). Studies investigating the possibility of oral transmission are underway.
There is some evidence from transmission studies utilizing porcinized transgenic mice that pigs may be susceptible to atypical scrapie and BSE in sheep (Ref. 30). These studies do not involve the natural host or route of transmission so caution may be taken in drawing conclusions.
Potential for TSEs in Other Species
Studies conducted at the National Institutes of Health Rocky Mountain Laboratory caution against assuming that animals which do not become clinically ill are not infected. There is experimental evidence to indicate that certain species may become carriers (i.e., become infected, shed agent but do not progress to clinical disease) (Ref 31, Ref 32, Ref 33). Specifically, mice inoculated with 263K hamster scrapie demonstrated a phase of inactive persistence. That is, after exposure the mice had a prolonged period (approximately one year), where there was no evidence of infectivity or PrPsc. This was followed by a period of an increasing infectivity and agent adaptation. Many of the mice continued to be devoid of detectable PrPsc.
It is important to determine if this persistence and adaptation could occur naturally as it may have significance in feeding programs which continually expose species other than ruminants
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to TSE infectivity. The results of Race and colleagues, warns that an inactive persistent phase might not produce detectable PrPsc, yet tissues may harbor infectivity (Ref 32).
Very recent research provides illustrations of the accumulation of infectivity in tongue and nasal mucosa from terminally diseased field cases and experimentally challenged cases of BSE even when no abnormal PrP was detectable (Ref 34). This same phenomena has also been reported for peripheral tissues collected from sheep with atypical scrapie. (Ref 35).
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Key issues to deal with before the feed ban for non-ruminants can be relaxed
In our opinion, several key requirements need to be met before the feed ban for non-ruminants can be relaxed:
The feed industry needs to ensure the following:
Ruminant materials remain excluded completely from the entire feed chain. This requires a complete and reliable traceability system for both ruminant and non-ruminant materials.
Intra-species feeding is prevented entirely. This requires that pig and poultry by-products are prevented from mutual cross-contamination by dedicated separate logistical pathways from slaughterhouses through rendering and feed production processes.
No animal proteins are included in ruminant feed. This requires that the ingredients for and the production of ruminant feed is completely separate from the ingredients for and the production of non-ruminant feed.
Scientific knowledge required:
Diagnostic tools must be developed with the capacity to verify compliance with any revised feed ban. These tools must be able to differentiate between PAPs from different animal species, and – in case it is decided to implement a tolerance level for contamination of feed – they must be able to determine if the level of contamination exceeds the defined tolerance levels.
More research is needed to support the assumption that non-ruminant proteins cannot induce TSE-like diseases in ruminants, even if these diseases circulated among different non-ruminant species beforehand.
The authorities need to ensure the following:
Competent authorities have the means and capacity to monitor the feed industry closely and assess their capacity to comply with the remaining feed ban regulations BEFORE any changes are allowed to proceed.
Legislation is in place to hold the industry liable in case of breaches of the remaining feed ban.
Appropriate diagnostic tools are registered and validated to verify compliance with the feed regulations.
In the view of TAFS, taking into consideration all of the scientific and epidemiological knowns and unknowns, the fact that the requirements as listed above are currently not met and acknowledging the potential for fraudulent behavior, a relaxation of the feed ban at the present time would not eliminate all risks. We feel strongly that maintenance of the ban is the only means to drive the level of risk toward zero.
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see full text and references here ;
http://www.tafsforum.org/position_papers/TAFS_POSITION_PAPER_ON_RELAXATION_OF_FEED_BAN_2010.pdf
PLEASE NOTE ***
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME.
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The rancher was a ''dead stock'' feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle...
http://web.archive.org/web/20030516051623/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
Atypical BSE in Cattle
BSE has been linked to the human disease variant Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (vCJD). The known exposure pathways for humans contracting vCJD are through the consumption of beef and beef products contaminated by the BSE agent and through blood transfusions. However, recent scientific evidence suggests that the BSE agent may play a role in the development of other forms of human prion diseases as well. These studies suggest that classical type of BSE may cause type 2 sporadic CJD and that H-type atypical BSE is connected with a familial form of CJD.
To date the OIE/WAHO assumes that the human and animal health standards set out in the BSE chapter for classical BSE (C-Type) applies to all forms of BSE which include the H-type and L-type atypical forms. This assumption is scientifically not completely justified and accumulating evidence suggests that this may in fact not be the case. Molecular characterization and the spatial distribution pattern of histopathologic lesions and immunohistochemistry (IHC) signals are used to identify and characterize atypical BSE. Both the L-type and H-type atypical cases display significant differences in the conformation and spatial accumulation of the disease associated prion protein (PrPSc) in brains of afflicted cattle. Transmission studies in bovine transgenic and wild type mouse models support that the atypical BSE types might be unique strains because they have different incubation times and lesion profiles when compared to C-type BSE. When L-type BSE was inoculated into ovine transgenic mice and Syrian hamster the resulting molecular fingerprint had changed, either in the first or a subsequent passage, from L-type into C-type BSE. In addition, non-human primates are specifically susceptible for atypical BSE as demonstrated by an approximately 50% shortened incubation time for L-type BSE as compared to C-type. Considering the current scientific information available, it cannot be assumed that these different BSE types pose the same human health risks as C-type BSE or that these risks are mitigated by the same protective measures.
snip...see full text ;
http://www.prionetcanada.ca/detail.aspx?menu=5&dt=293380&app=93&cat1=387&tp=20&lk=no&cat2
14th ICID International Scientific Exchange Brochure -
Final Abstract Number: ISE.114
Session: International Scientific Exchange
Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America
update October 2009
T. Singeltary
Bacliff, TX, USA
Background:
An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and fed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.
Methods:
12 years independent research of available data
Results:
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.
Conclusion:
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries. I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.
page 114 ;
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/14th_ICID_ISE_Abstracts.pdf
*** BANNED MAD COW FEED IN THE USA IN COMMERCE TONS AND TONS
THIS is just ONE month report, of TWO recalls of prohibited banned MBM, which is illegal, mixed with 85% blood meal, which is still legal, but yet we know the TSE/BSE agent will transmit blood. we have this l-BSE in North America that is much more virulent and there is much concern with blood issue and l-BSE as there is with nvCJD in humans. some are even starting to be concerned with sporadic CJD and blood, and there are studies showing transmission there as well. ... this is one month recall page, where 10 MILLION POUNDS OF BANNED MAD COW FEED WENT OUT INTO COMMERCE, TO BE FED OUT. very little of the product that reaches commerce is ever returned via recall, very, very little. this was 2007, TEN YEARS AFTER THE AUGUST 4, 1997, PARTIAL AND VOLUNTARY MAD COW FEED BAN IN THE USA, that was nothing but ink on paper. i have listed the tonnage of mad cow feed that was in ALABAMA in one of the links too, this is where the infamous g-h-BSEalabama case was, a genetic relation matching the new sporadic CJD in the USA. seems this saga just keeps getting better and better.......$$$
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
CODE
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
42,090 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
WI
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
CODE
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9,997,976 lbs.
DISTRIBUTION
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm
Saturday, August 14, 2010
BSE Case Associated with Prion Protein Gene Mutation (g-h-BSEalabama) and VPSPr PRIONPATHY
*** (see mad cow feed in COMMERCE IN ALABAMA...TSS)
BANNED MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE IN ALABAMA
Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST PRODUCT
a) EVSRC Custom dairy feed, Recall # V-130-6;
b) Performance Chick Starter, Recall # V-131-6;
c) Performance Quail Grower, Recall # V-132-6;
d) Performance Pheasant Finisher, Recall # V-133-6.
CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Donaldson & Hasenbein/dba J&R Feed Service, Inc., Cullman, AL, by telephone on June 23, 2006 and by letter dated July 19, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Dairy and poultry feeds were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 477.72 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL
______________________________
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00968.html
PRODUCT Bulk custom dairy pre-mixes,
Recall # V-120-6 CODE None RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Ware Milling Inc., Houston, MS, by telephone on June 23, 2006. Firm initiated recall is complete. REASON Possible contamination of dairy animal feeds with ruminant derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 350 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and MS
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) Tucker Milling, LLC Tm 32% Sinking Fish Grower, #2680-Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-121-6;
b) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder Pellet, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-122-6;
c) Tucker Milling, LLC #31232 Game Bird Grower, 50 lb. bags, Recall # V-123-6;
d) Tucker Milling, LLC 31227-Crumble, Game Bird Starter, BMD Medicated, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-124-6;
e) Tucker Milling, LLC #31120, Game Bird Breeder, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-125-6;
f) Tucker Milling, LLC #30230, 30 % Turkey Starter, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-126-6;
g) Tucker Milling, LLC #30116, TM Broiler Finisher, 50 lb bags, Recall # V-127-6
CODE All products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/20/2006 RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Recalling Firm: Tucker Milling LLC, Guntersville, AL, by telephone and visit on June 20, 2006, and by letter on June 23, 2006. Manufacturer: H. J. Baker and Brothers Inc., Stamford, CT. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON Poultry and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein were not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 7,541-50 lb bags
DISTRIBUTION AL, GA, MS, and TN
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 9, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ENFORCE/2006/ENF00964.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST PRODUCT
a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;
b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;
c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;
d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;
e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;
f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;
g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;
h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;
i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;
j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;
k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;
l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;
m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6 CODE
Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.
REASON Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 tons
DISTRIBUTION AL and FL
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00963.html
MAD COW FEED RECALL USA EQUALS 10,878.06 TONS NATIONWIDE Sun Jul 16, 2006 09:22 71.248.128.67
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINE -- CLASS II
______________________________
PRODUCT
a) PRO-LAK, bulk weight, Protein Concentrate for Lactating Dairy Animals, Recall # V-079-6;
b) ProAmino II, FOR PREFRESH AND LACTATING COWS, net weight 50lb (22.6 kg), Recall # V-080-6;
c) PRO-PAK, MARINE & ANIMAL PROTEIN CONCENTRATE FOR USE IN ANIMAL FEED, Recall # V-081-6;
d) Feather Meal, Recall # V-082-6 CODE
a) Bulk
b) None
c) Bulk
d) Bulk
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER H. J. Baker & Bro., Inc., Albertville, AL, by telephone on June 15, 2006 and by press release on June 16, 2006. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
REASON
Possible contamination of animal feeds with ruminent derived meat and bone meal.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 10,878.06 tons
DISTRIBUTION Nationwide
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR July 12, 2006
###
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2006/ENF00960.html
please see full text ;
http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/bse-case-associated-with-prion-protein.html
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-proteins-prohibited-in-ruminant.html
Monday, March 1, 2010
ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Feed Safety and BSE/Ruminant Feed Ban Support Project (U18)
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/09/feed-safety-and-bseruminant-feed-ban.html
Friday, October 8, 2010
Scientific reasons for a feed ban of meat-and-bone meal, applicable to all farmed animals including cattle, pigs, poultry, farmed fish and pet food
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/10/scientific-reasons-for-feed-ban-of-meat.html
P.9.21
Molecular characterization of BSE in Canada
Jianmin Yang1, Sandor Dudas2, Catherine Graham2, Markus Czub3, Tim McAllister1, Stefanie Czub1 1Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada Research Centre, Canada; 2National and OIE BSE Reference Laboratory, Canada; 3University of Calgary, Canada
Background: Three BSE types (classical and two atypical) have been identified on the basis of molecular characteristics of the misfolded protein associated with the disease. To date, each of these three types have been detected in Canadian cattle.
Objectives: This study was conducted to further characterize the 16 Canadian BSE cases based on the biochemical properties of there associated PrPres. Methods: Immuno-reactivity, molecular weight, glycoform profiles and relative proteinase K sensitivity of the PrPres from each of the 16 confirmed Canadian BSE cases was determined using modified Western blot analysis.
Results: Fourteen of the 16 Canadian BSE cases were C type, 1 was H type and 1 was L type. The Canadian H and L-type BSE cases exhibited size shifts and changes in glycosylation similar to other atypical BSE cases. PK digestion under mild and stringent conditions revealed a reduced protease resistance of the atypical cases compared to the C-type cases. N terminal- specific antibodies bound to PrPres from H type but not from C or L type. The C-terminal-specific antibodies resulted in a shift in the glycoform profile and detected a fourth band in the Canadian H-type BSE.
Discussion: The C, L and H type BSE cases in Canada exhibit molecular characteristics similar to those described for classical and atypical BSE cases from Europe and Japan. This supports the theory that the importation of BSE contaminated feedstuff is the source of C-type BSE in Canada.
*** It also suggests a similar cause or source for atypical BSE in these countries.
http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf
O.4.3
Spread of BSE prions in cynomolgus monkeys (Macaca fascicularis) after oral transmission
Edgar Holznagel1, Walter Schulz-Schaeffer2, Barbara Yutzy1, Gerhard Hunsmann3, Johannes Loewer1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Federal Institute for Sera and Vaccines, Germany; 2Department of Neuropathology, Georg-August University, Göttingen, Germany, 3Department of Virology and Immunology, German Primate Centre, Göttingen, Germany
Background: BSE-infected cynomolgus monkeys represent a relevant animal model to study the pathogenesis of variant Creutzfeldt-Jacob disease (vCJD).
Objectives: To study the spread of BSE prions during the asymptomatic phase of infection in a simian animal model.
Methods: Orally BSE-dosed macaques (n=10) were sacrificed at defined time points during the incubation period and 7 orally BSE-dosed macaques were sacrificed after the onset of clinical signs. Neuronal and non-neuronal tissues were tested for the presence of proteinase-K-resistant prion protein (PrPres) by western immunoblot and by paraffin-embedded tissue (PET) blot technique.
Results: In clinically diseased macaques (5 years p.i. + 6 mo.), PrPres deposits were widely spread in neuronal tissues (including the peripheral sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system) and in lymphoid tissues including tonsils. In asymptomatic disease carriers, PrPres deposits could be detected in intestinal lymph nodes as early as 1 year p.i., but CNS tissues were negative until 3 – 4 years p.i. Lumbal/sacral segments of the spinal cord and medulla oblongata were PrPres positive as early as 4.1 years p.i., whereas sympathetic trunk and all thoracic/cervical segments of the spinal cord were still negative for PrPres. However, tonsil samples were negative in all asymptomatic cases.
Discussion: There is evidence for an early spread of BSE to the CNS via autonomic fibres of the splanchnic and vagus nerves indicating that trans-synaptical spread may be a time-limiting factor for neuroinvasion. Tonsils were predominantly negative during the main part of the incubation period indicating that epidemiological vCJD screening results based on the detection of PrPres in tonsil biopsies may mostly tend to underestimate the prevalence of vCJD among humans.
P.4.23
Transmission of atypical BSE in humanized mouse models
Liuting Qing1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5, Qingzhong Kong1 1Case Western Reserve University, USA; 2Instituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University (Previously at USDA National Animal Disease Center), USA
Background: Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Atypical BSE cases have been discovered in three continents since 2004; they include the L-type (also named BASE), the H-type, and the first reported case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PRNP (termed BSE-M). The public health risks posed by atypical BSE were largely undefined.
Objectives: To investigate these atypical BSE types in terms of their transmissibility and phenotypes in humanized mice. Methods: Transgenic mice expressing human PrP were inoculated with several classical (C-type) and atypical (L-, H-, or Mtype) BSE isolates, and the transmission rate, incubation time, characteristics and distribution of PrPSc, symptoms, and histopathology were or will be examined and compared.
Results: Sixty percent of BASE-inoculated humanized mice became infected with minimal spongiosis and an average incubation time of 20-22 months, whereas only one of the C-type BSE-inoculated mice developed prion disease after more than 2 years. Protease-resistant PrPSc in BASE-infected humanized Tg mouse brains was biochemically different from bovine BASE or sCJD. PrPSc was also detected in the spleen of 22% of BASE-infected humanized mice, but not in those infected with sCJD. Secondary transmission of BASE in the humanized mice led to a small reduction in incubation time. The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible with distinct phenotypes in the humanized mice, but no BSE-M transmission has been observed so far.
Discussion: Our results demonstrate that BASE is more virulent than classical BSE, has a lymphotropic phenotype, and displays a modest transmission barrier in our humanized mice.
BSE-H is also transmissible in our humanized Tg mice.
The possibility of more than two atypical BSE strains will be discussed.
Supported by NINDS NS052319, NIA AG14359, and NIH AI 77774.
http://www.prion2009.com/sites/default/files/Prion2009_Book_of_Abstracts.pdf
P03.137
Transmission of BSE to Cynomolgus Macaque, a Non-human Primate; Development of Clinical Symptoms and Tissue Distribution of PrPSC
Yamakawa, Y1; Ono, F2; Tase, N3; Terao, K3; Tannno, J3; Wada, N4; Tobiume, M5; Sato, Y5; Okemoto-Nakamura, Y1; Hagiwara, K1; Sata, T5 1National Institure of Infectious diseases, Cell biology and Biochemistry, Japan; 2Corporation for Production and Research Laboratory Primates., Japan; 3National Institure of Biomedical Innovation, Tsukuba Primate Reserch Center, Japan; 4Yamauchi Univ., Veterinary Medicine, Japan; 5National Institure of Infectious diseases, Pathology, Japan
Two of three cynomolgus monkeys developed abnormal neuronal behavioral signs at 30-(#7) and 28-(#10) months after intracerebral inoculation of 200ul of 10% brain homogenates of BSE affected cattle (BSE/JP6). Around 30 months post inoculation (mpi), they developed sporadic anorexia and hyperekplexia with squeal against environmental stimulations such as light and sound. Tremor, myoclonic jerk and paralysis became conspicuous during 32 to 33-mpi, and symptoms become worsened according to the disease progression. Finally, one monkey (#7) fell into total paralysis at 36-mpi. This monkey was sacrificed at 10 days after intensive veterinary care including infusion and per oral supply of liquid food. The other monkey (#10) had to grasp the cage bars to keep an upright posture caused by the sever ataxia. This monkey was sacrificed at 35-mpi. EEG of both monkeys showed diffuse slowing. PSD characteristic for sporadic CJD was not observed in both monkeys. The result of forearm movement test showed the hypofunction that was observed at onset of clinical symptoms. Their cognitive function determined by finger maze test was maintained at the early stage of sideration. However, it was rapidly impaired followed by the disease progression. Their autopsied tissues were immunochemically investigated for the tissue distribution of PrPSc. Severe spongiform change in the brain together with heavy accumulation of PrPSc having the type 2B/4 glycoform profile confirmed successful transmission of BSE to Cynomolgus macaques. Granular and linear deposition of PrPSC was detected by IHC in the CNS of both monkeys. At cerebral cortex, PrPSC was prominently accumulated in the large plaques. Sparse accumulation of PrPSc was detected in several peripheral nerves of #7 but not in #10 monkey, upon the WB analysis. Neither #7 nor #10 monkey accumulated detectable amounts of PrPSc in their lymphatic organs such as tonsil, spleen, adrenal grands and thymus although PrPSc was barely detected in the submandibular lymph node of #7 monkey. Such confined tissue distribution of PrPSc after intracerebral infection with BSE agent is not compatible to that reported on the Cynomolgus macaques infected with BSE by oral or intra-venous (intra-peritoneal) routs, in which PrPSc was accumulated at not only CNS but also widely distributed lymphatic tissues.
P04.27
Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route
Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany
Background: In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.
Aims: The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.
Methods: Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).
Results: In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.
Conclusions: Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian vCJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.
The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study “BSE in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).
http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2007/abstract_book.pdf
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate.
http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf
WE know now, and we knew decades ago, that 5.5 grams of suspect feed in TEXAS was enough to kill 100 cows.
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.
snip...
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa
It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://web.archive.org/web/20040523230128/www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf
it is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradleyâs surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://web.archive.org/web/20030526212610/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf
Date: June 21, 2007 at 2:49 pm PST
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf
Audit Report Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program  Phase II and Food Safety and Inspection Service
Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III
Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006
Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything they did before 2005 suspect," Brown said.
http://www.upi.com/ConsumerHealthDaily/view.php?StoryID=20060315-055557-1284r
THIS is what happens when industry runs government policy ;
STRICTLY PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL 25, AUGUST 1995
snip...
To minimise the risk of farmers' claims for compensation from feed compounders.
To minimise the potential damage to compound feed markets through adverse publicity.
To maximise freedom of action for feed compounders, notably by maintaining the availability of meat and bone meal as a raw material in animal feeds, and ensuring time is available to make any changes which may be required.
snip...
THE FUTURE
4..........
MAFF remains under pressure in Brussels and is not skilled at handling potentially explosive issues.
5. Tests _may_ show that ruminant feeds have been sold which contain illegal traces of ruminant protein. More likely, a few positive test results will turn up but proof that a particular feed mill knowingly supplied it to a particular farm will be difficult if not impossible.
6. The threat remains real and it will be some years before feed compounders are free of it. The longer we can avoid any direct linkage between feed milling _practices_ and actual BSE cases, the more likely it is that serious damage can be avoided. ...
SEE full text ;
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20090114060225/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1995/08/24002001.pdf
Sunday, October 31, 2010
Scientific Opinion on the results of the EU survey for Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) in cervids EFSA Panel on Biological Hazards (BIOHAZ) (October) 2010
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2010/10/scientific-opinion-on-results-of-eu.html
Friday, October 15, 2010
BSE infectivity in the absence of detectable PrPSc accumulation in the tongue and nasal mucosa of terminally diseased cattle
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/10/bse-infectivity-in-absence-of.html
Thursday, October 07, 2010
Experimental Transmission of H-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy to Bovinized Transgenic Mice
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/10/experimental-transmission-of-h-type.html
Tuesday, November 02, 2010
BSE - ATYPICAL LESION DISTRIBUTION (RBSE 92-21367) statutory (obex only) diagnostic criteria CVL 1992
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/11/bse-atypical-lesion-distribution-rbse.html
Wednesday, July 28, 2010
Atypical prion proteins and IBNC in cattle DEFRA project code SE1796 FOIA Final report
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/07/atypical-prion-proteins-and-ibnc-in.html
IBNC
"All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated prion protein."
Saturday, February 28, 2009
NEW RESULTS ON IDIOPATHIC BRAINSTEM NEURONAL CHROMATOLYSIS "All of the 15 cattle tested showed that the brains had abnormally accumulated PrP" 2009
SEAC 102/2
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/new-results-on-idiopathic-brainstem.html
Monday, August 9, 2010
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined (July 31, 2010)
(please watch and listen to the video and the scientist speaking about atypical BSE and sporadic CJD and listen to Professor Aguzzi)
SEE where sporadic cjd in the USA went from 59 cases in 1997, to 216 cases in 2009. a steady increase since 1997. ...TSS
National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined (July 31, 2010)
Year Total Referrals2 Prion Disease Sporadic Familial Iatrogenic vCJD
1997 114 68 59 9 0 0
to
2009 425 259 216 43 0 0
http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf
see full text ;
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/08/national-prion-disease-pathology.html
Wednesday, August 18, 2010
Incidence of CJD Deaths Reported by CJD-SS in Canada as of July 31, 2010
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/08/incidence-of-cjd-deaths-reported-by-cjd.html
REPORT OF THE WORKING PARTY ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY 1989
snip...
4.2.9 ...Also, if it resulted from a localised chance transmission of the scrapie strain from sheep to cattle giving rise to a mutant, a different pattern of disease would have been expected: its range would have increased with time. Thus the evidence from Britain is against the disease being due to a new strain of the agent, but we note that in the United States from 1984 to 1988 outbreaks of scrapie in sheep flocks are reported to have Increased markedly, now being nearly 3 times as high as during any previous period (18).
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102132706/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ib/ibd1/tab02.pdf
http://collections.europarchive.org/tna/20080102193106/http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m12/tab12.pdf
Monday, December 1, 2008
When Atypical Scrapie cross species barriers
Authors
Andreoletti O., Herva M. H., Cassard H., Espinosa J. C., Lacroux C., Simon S., Padilla D., Benestad S. L., Lantier F., Schelcher F., Grassi J., Torres, J. M., UMR INRA ENVT 1225, Ecole Nationale Veterinaire de Toulouse.France; ICISA-INlA, Madrid, Spain; CEA, IBiTec-5, DSV, CEA/Saclay, Gif sur Yvette cedex, France; National Veterinary Institute, Postboks 750 Sentrum, 0106 Oslo, Norway, INRA IASP, Centre INRA de Tours, 3738O Nouzilly, France.
Content
Atypical scrapie is a TSE occurring in small ruminants and harbouring peculiar clinical, epidemiological and biochemical properties. Currently this form of disease is identified in a large number of countries. In this study we report the transmission of an atypical scrapie isolate through different species barriers as modeled by transgenic mice (Tg) expressing different species PRP sequence.
The donor isolate was collected in 1995 in a French commercial sheep flock. inoculation into AHQ/AHQ sheep induced a disease which had all neuro-pathological and biochemical characteristics of atypical scrapie. Transmitted into Transgenic mice expressing either ovine or PrPc, the isolate retained all the described characteristics of atypical scrapie.
Surprisingly the TSE agent characteristics were dramatically different v/hen passaged into Tg bovine mice. The recovered TSE agent had biological and biochemical characteristics similar to those of atypical BSE L in the same mouse model. Moreover, whereas no other TSE agent than BSE were shown to transmit into Tg porcine mice, atypical scrapie was able to develop into this model, albeit with low attack rate on first passage.
Furthermore, after adaptation in the porcine mouse model this prion showed similar biological and biochemical characteristics than BSE adapted to this porcine mouse model. Altogether these data indicate.
(i) the unsuspected potential abilities of atypical scrapie to cross species barriers
(ii) the possible capacity of this agent to acquire new characteristics when crossing species barrier
These findings raise some interrogation on the concept of TSE strain and on the origin of the diversity of the TSE agents and could have consequences on field TSE control measures.
http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2008/abstract-book-prion2008.pdf
P03.141
Aspects of the Cerebellar Neuropathology in Nor98
Gavier-Widén, D1; Benestad, SL2; Ottander, L1; Westergren, E1 1National Veterinary Insitute, Sweden; 2National Veterinary Institute,
Norway Nor98 is a prion disease of old sheep and goats. This atypical form of scrapie was first described in Norway in 1998. Several features of Nor98 were shown to be different from classical scrapie including the distribution of disease associated prion protein (PrPd) accumulation in the brain. The cerebellum is generally the most affected brain area in Nor98. The study here presented aimed at adding information on the neuropathology in the cerebellum of Nor98 naturally affected sheep of various genotypes in Sweden and Norway. A panel of histochemical and immunohistochemical (IHC) stainings such as IHC for PrPd, synaptophysin, glial fibrillary acidic protein, amyloid, and cell markers for phagocytic cells were conducted. The type of histological lesions and tissue reactions were evaluated. The types of PrPd deposition were characterized. The cerebellar cortex was regularly affected, even though there was a variation in the severity of the lesions from case to case. Neuropil vacuolation was more marked in the molecular layer, but affected also the granular cell layer. There was a loss of granule cells. Punctate deposition of PrPd was characteristic. It was morphologically and in distribution identical with that of synaptophysin, suggesting that PrPd accumulates in the synaptic structures. PrPd was also observed in the granule cell layer and in the white matter. The pathology features of Nor98 in the cerebellum of the affected sheep showed similarities with those of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
***The pathology features of Nor98 in the cerebellum of the affected sheep showed similarities with those of sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in humans.
http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf
PR-26
NOR98 SHOWS MOLECULAR FEATURES REMINISCENT OF GSS
R. Nonno1, E. Esposito1, G. Vaccari1, E. Bandino2, M. Conte1, B. Chiappini1, S. Marcon1, M. Di Bari1, S.L. Benestad3, U. Agrimi1 1 Istituto Superiore di Sanità, Department of Food Safety and Veterinary Public Health, Rome, Italy (romolo.nonno@iss.it); 2 Istituto Zooprofilattico della Sardegna, Sassari, Italy; 3 National Veterinary Institute, Department of Pathology, Oslo, Norway
Molecular variants of PrPSc are being increasingly investigated in sheep scrapie and are generally referred to as "atypical" scrapie, as opposed to "classical scrapie". Among the atypical group, Nor98 seems to be the best identified. We studied the molecular properties of Italian and Norwegian Nor98 samples by WB analysis of brain homogenates, either untreated, digested with different concentrations of proteinase K, or subjected to enzymatic deglycosylation. The identity of PrP fragments was inferred by means of antibodies spanning the full PrP sequence. We found that undigested brain homogenates contain a Nor98-specific PrP fragment migrating at 11 kDa (PrP11), truncated at both the C-terminus and the N-terminus, and not N-glycosylated. After mild PK digestion, Nor98 displayed full-length PrP (FL-PrP) and N-glycosylated C-terminal fragments (CTF), along with increased levels of PrP11. Proteinase K digestion curves (0,006-6,4 mg/ml) showed that FL-PrP and CTF are mainly digested above 0,01 mg/ml, while PrP11 is not entirely digested even at the highest concentrations, similarly to PrP27-30 associated with classical scrapie. Above 0,2 mg/ml PK, most Nor98 samples showed only PrP11 and a fragment of 17 kDa with the same properties of PrP11, that was tentatively identified as a dimer of PrP11. Detergent solubility studies showed that PrP11 is insoluble in 2% sodium laurylsorcosine and is mainly produced from detergentsoluble, full-length PrPSc. Furthermore, among Italian scrapie isolates, we found that a sample with molecular and pathological properties consistent with Nor98 showed plaque-like deposits of PrPSc in the thalamus when the brain was analysed by PrPSc immunohistochemistry. Taken together, our results show that the distinctive pathological feature of Nor98 is a PrP fragment spanning amino acids ~ 90-155. This fragment is produced by successive N-terminal and C-terminal cleavages from a full-length and largely detergent-soluble PrPSc, is produced in vivo and is extremely resistant to PK digestion.
*** Intriguingly, these conclusions suggest that some pathological features of Nor98 are reminiscent of Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker disease.
119
http://www.neuroprion.com/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2006/abstract_book.pdf
A newly identified type of scrapie agent can naturally infect sheep with resistant PrP genotypes
Annick Le Dur*,?, Vincent Béringue*,?, Olivier Andréoletti?, Fabienne Reine*, Thanh Lan Laï*, Thierry Baron§, Bjørn Bratberg¶, Jean-Luc Vilotte?, Pierre Sarradin**, Sylvie L. Benestad¶, and Hubert Laude*,?? +Author Affiliations
*Virologie Immunologie Moléculaires and ?Génétique Biochimique et Cytogénétique, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 78350 Jouy-en-Josas, France; ?Unité Mixte de Recherche, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique-Ecole Nationale Vétérinaire de Toulouse, Interactions Hôte Agent Pathogène, 31066 Toulouse, France; §Agence Française de Sécurité Sanitaire des Aliments, Unité Agents Transmissibles Non Conventionnels, 69364 Lyon, France; **Pathologie Infectieuse et Immunologie, Institut National de la Recherche Agronomique, 37380 Nouzilly, France; and ¶Department of Pathology, National Veterinary Institute, 0033 Oslo, Norway
***Edited by Stanley B. Prusiner, University of California, San Francisco, CA (received for review March 21, 2005)
Abstract Scrapie in small ruminants belongs to transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), or prion diseases, a family of fatal neurodegenerative disorders that affect humans and animals and can transmit within and between species by ingestion or inoculation. Conversion of the host-encoded prion protein (PrP), normal cellular PrP (PrPc), into a misfolded form, abnormal PrP (PrPSc), plays a key role in TSE transmission and pathogenesis. The intensified surveillance of scrapie in the European Union, together with the improvement of PrPSc detection techniques, has led to the discovery of a growing number of so-called atypical scrapie cases. These include clinical Nor98 cases first identified in Norwegian sheep on the basis of unusual pathological and PrPSc molecular features and "cases" that produced discordant responses in the rapid tests currently applied to the large-scale random screening of slaughtered or fallen animals. Worryingly, a substantial proportion of such cases involved sheep with PrP genotypes known until now to confer natural resistance to conventional scrapie. Here we report that both Nor98 and discordant cases, including three sheep homozygous for the resistant PrPARR allele (A136R154R171), efficiently transmitted the disease to transgenic mice expressing ovine PrP, and that they shared unique biological and biochemical features upon propagation in mice. *** These observations support the view that a truly infectious TSE agent, unrecognized until recently, infects sheep and goat flocks and may have important implications in terms of scrapie control and public health.
http://www.pnas.org/content/102/44/16031.abstract
EU COMMENTS AND POSITIONS
On the proposed changes to OIE Manual of Diagnostic Tests and Vaccines for Terrestrial Animals
20
CHAPTER 2.4.6: BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
General comments
The changes proposed are generally welcomed by the EU. However, some specific comments detailed below should be taken into account for the final revised version to be adopted in the next General Session.
Specific comments
LINE 13: The words "and possibly spontaneous" should be added as follows: "... suggesting that earlier, undetected indigenous and possibly spontaneous cases may have occurred."
LINE 31: The EU would argue for the re-instatement of the deleted phrase [before, or without, the recognition] since fallen stock in particular could be showing some clinical signs which went unrecognised. As written, it applies more to the active screening of the healthy slaughter population.
Line 228: Replace: "All currently recognized forms of BSE (C, H and L-Type) are detectable by these methods." with: "Classical BSE is recognized by all these methods, while a complete evaluation of the approved BSE rapid tests on atypical forms (C, H and L-Type) was never carried out".
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/docs/l410677%20EU%20positions%20OIE%2078GS%20Terrestrial%20Manual_annex.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/docs/0510_general_session/Annex%20XXXV_scrapie%20EU%20position.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/docs/0510_general_session/Annex%20XXVIII_BSE%20EU%20position.pdf
http://ec.europa.eu/food/international/organisations/EU_comments_position_papers_en.htm
SCRAPIE
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_chapitre_1.14.9.htm
Monday, November 30, 2009
USDA AND OIE COLLABORATE TO EXCLUDE ATYPICAL SCRAPIE NOR-98 ANIMAL HEALTH CODE
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/11/usda-and-oie-collaborate-to-exclude.html
Sunday, March 28, 2010
Nor-98 atypical Scrapie, atypical BSE, spontaneous TSE, trade policy, sound science ?
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/03/nor-98-atypical-scrapie-atypical-bse.html
THE O.I.E. and it's junk science continues to emerge, and spread, and put the cart before the horse so to speak about atypical Scrapie with it's may and may not be risk factors, because all science to date shows that in fact the Nor-98 is a risk factor to not only animal health, but human health as well. SINCE when did the 'may not' and 'may' become sound science ?
"may not be contagious and may, in fact, be a spontaneous degenerative condition of older sheep’ (22)."
The OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code (the Code) does not cover atypical scrapie/Nor 98 because, it states, the condition ‘… is clinically, pathologically, biochemically and epidemiologically unrelated to ‘classical’ scrapie, may not be contagious and may, in fact, be a spontaneous degenerative condition of older sheep’ (22).
22. World Organisation for Animal Health (OIE) (2009). – Terrestrial Animal Health Code. www.oie.int/eng/normes/mcode/en_chapitre_1.14.9.htm.
Last year, after examining member country submissions and investigating rigorous scientific research, the OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health) decided that atypical scrapie/Nor 98 should not be listed in its Terrestrial Animal Health Code. The Code sets out trade recommendations or restrictions for listed diseases or conditions, and the OIE determined there was no need for such recommendations around atypical scrapie/Nor 98.
http://www.biosecurity.govt.nz/files/pests/atypical-scrapie/atypical-scrapie-faq-oct09.pdf
Friday, May 7, 2010
Identification of atypical scrapie in Canadian sheep Brief Research Reports
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/05/brief-research-reports-identification.html
Friday, August 27, 2010
NEW ATYPICAL NOR-98 SCRAPIE CASE DETECTED IDAHO NOW 5 CASES DOCUMENTED 2010
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/08/new-atypical-nor-98-scrapie-case.html
Greetings,
(Figure 6) including five goat cases in FY 2008 that originated from the same herd in Michigan.
This is highly unusual for goats, and I strenuously urge that there should be an independent investigation into finding the common denominator for these 5 goats in the same herd in Michigan with Scrapie. ...
Kind Regards, Terry
Thursday, January 07, 2010
Scrapie and Nor-98 Scrapie November 2009 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2010 and FISCAL YEAR 2008
http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2010/01/scrapie-and-nor-98-scrapie-november.html
Monday, December 14, 2009
Similarities between Forms of Sheep Scrapie and Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Are Encoded by Distinct Prion Types
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2009/12/similarities-between-forms-of-sheep.html
TRANSMISSION OF SCRAPIE AND ATYPICAL SCRAPIE TO HUMANS, why not ?
Sunday, April 18, 2010
SCRAPIE AND ATYPICAL SCRAPIE TRANSMISSION STUDIES A REVIEW 2010
http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/2010/04/scrapie-and-atypical-scrapie.html
SEE FULL TEXT ;
Sunday, October 3, 2010
Scrapie, Nor-98 atypical Scrapie, and BSE in sheep and goats North America, who's looking ?
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2010/10/scrapie-nor-98-atypical-scrapie-and-bse.html
Monday, December 21, 2009
Distinct Molecular Signature of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Prion in Pigs
http://madporcinedisease.blogspot.com/2009/12/distinct-molecular-signature-of-bovine.html
Thursday, October 15, 2009
The presence of neurological signs in pigs inoculated with BSE without detectable PrPd raises the possibility that the BSE agent may produce a prion disease in pigs that remains undetected by the current postmortem tests.
Transmissibility studies of vacuolar changes in the rostral colliculus of pigs
http://madporcinedisease.blogspot.com/2009/10/transmissibility-studies-of-vacuolar.html
Saturday, December 01, 2007
Phenotypic Similarity of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy in Cattle and L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Mouse Model Volume 13, Number 12–December 2007 Research
http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/2007/12/phenotypic-similarity-of-transmissible.html
Wednesday, September 08, 2010
CWD PRION CONGRESS SEPTEMBER 8-11 2010
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2010/09/cwd-prion-2010.html
Thursday, August 12, 2010
Seven main threats for the future linked to prions
http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/2010/08/seven-main-threats-for-future-linked-to.html
http://prionpathy.blogspot.com/
WHAT ABOUT NORTH AMERICA ATYPICAL TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY, AND FRIENDLY FIRE, i.e. PASS IF FORWARD MODE OF TSE THERE FROM VIA BLOOD PRODUCTS AND OR TISSUE TRANSPLANT ;
PRODUCT
1) Plasma Frozen within 24 hours (FP24). Recall # B-2448-10;
2) Red Blood Cells. Recall # B-2449-10;
3) Cryoprecipitated AHF. Recall # B-2450-10;
4) Plasma. Recall # B-2451-10
CODE
1) Units: W038509802210, W038509800965;
2) Units: W038509802210, W038509800965, W038508801111, W038508330725;
3) Unit: W03850830725;
4) Units: W038509801111, W038508330725
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Walter L. Shepeard Community Blood Center, Inc., Augusta, GA, by fax on July 9 and 21, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9 units
DISTRIBUTION
Korea, SC, GA
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Recovered Plasma. Recall # B-2306-10
CODE
Unit: W137508110097
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Lane Memorial Blood Bank, Eugene, OR, by fax on June 10, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood product, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), was distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
1 unit
DISTRIBUTION
KY
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Red Blood Cells (Apheresis) Leukocytes Reduced. Recall # B-2348-10
CODE
Units: W041609075327D (part a and b), 3922801 (part a and b)
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Blood Systems Inc/dba United Blood Services, Meridian, MS, by telephone and fax on May 26, 2010 and May 28, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
4 units
DISTRIBUTION
MS
___________________________________
PRODUCT
1) Recovered Plasma. Recall # B-2363-10;
2) Cryoprecipitated AHF, Pooled. Recall # B-2364-10;
3) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced. Recall # B-2365-10
CODE
1) and 3) Units: 2613522, 2578779;
2) Unit: 2578779
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by fax and e-mail on May 5, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
5 units
DISTRIBUTION
TX
___________________________________
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR OCTOBER 6, 2010
#
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/ucm228605.htm
Friday, September 24, 2010
USA Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for vCJD, were distributed SEPTEMBER 2010
http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2010/09/usa-blood-products-collected-from-donor.html
Enforcement Report for October 20, 2010
October 20, 2010
PRODUCT
1) Cryoprecipitated AHF. Recall # B-2523-10;
2) Plasma. Recall # B-2524-10;
3) Red Blood Cells. Recall # B-2525-10;
4) Fresh Frozen Plasma. Recall # B-2526-10
CODE
1) Unit: W038508310277;
2) Units: 3127765, W038508310277, 3129157, 4121927;
3) Units: W038508310277, 3129157, 3127765, 4025397, 4121927, 4018030;
4) Units: 4025397, 4018030
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Walter L. Shepeard Community Blood Center, Inc., Augusta, GA, by facsimile on July 22, 2010 and July 28, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
13 units
DISTRIBUTION
GA, MD, SC, Austria, Israel, South Korea, Switzerland
___________________________________
PRODUCT
1) Fresh Frozen Plasma. Recall # B-2531-10;
2) Recovered Plasma. Recall # B-2532-10;
3) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced. Recall # B-2533-10
CODE
1) Unit: W115910041730;
2) Units: W115910080008, W115910081199;
3) Units: W115910080008, W115910041730, W115910081199
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Central California Blood Center, Fresno, CA, by e-mail on July 19, 2010 and July 23, 2010 and by facsimile on July 23, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
6 units
DISTRIBUTION
Austria, CA
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR OCTOBER 20, 2010
#
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/ucm230357.htm
Enforcement Report for October 13, 2010
October 13, 2010
PRODUCT
1) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced. Recall # B-2275-10;
2) Recovered Plasma. Recall # B-2276-10;
3) Cryoprecipitated AHF, Pooled. Recall # B-2277-10
CODE
1), 2) and 3) Unit: 6400811
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
South Texas Blood & Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by fax on April 7, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
3 units
DISTRIBUTION
FL, TX
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Fresh Frozen Plasma. Recall # B-2283-10
CODE
Units: W001606004574; W001606003405
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Department of the Air Force 88th Medical Group SGQC WPAFB, Wright Patterson, AFB, OH, by letter dated April 17, 2008. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood products, collected from a donor who may have warranted deferral for residency in an area at risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, were distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
2 units
DISTRIBUTION
NJ
___________________________________
PRODUCT
1) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced. Recall # B-2322-10
2) Fresh Frozen Plasma. Recall # B-2323-10
CODE
1) and 2) Unit: W280310400336
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Upstate New York Transplant Services, Inc., Buffalo, NY, by telephone and fax on June 21, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
2 units
DISTRIBUTION
NY
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Red Blood Cells. Recall # B-2324-10
CODE
Unit: W121610120511
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
The Blood Connection, Inc., Piedmont, SC, by fax and computerized notification system on June 17, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood product, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), was distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
1 unit
DISTRIBUTION
NY
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Recovered Plasma. Recall # B-2325-10
CODE
Unit: W121610120511
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
The Blood Connection, Inc., Piedmont, SC, by fax and computerized notification system on June 17, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood product, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), was distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
1 unit
DISTRIBUTION
Switzerland
___________________________________
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/ucm229271.htm
USA Blood products, collected from a donor who was at risk for vCJD, were distributed END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR OCTOBER 6, 2010
PRODUCT
1) Plasma Frozen within 24 hours (FP24). Recall # B-2448-10;
2) Red Blood Cells. Recall # B-2449-10;
3) Cryoprecipitated AHF. Recall # B-2450-10;
4) Plasma. Recall # B-2451-10
CODE
1) Units: W038509802210, W038509800965;
2) Units: W038509802210, W038509800965, W038508801111, W038508330725;
3) Unit: W03850830725;
4) Units: W038509801111, W038508330725
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Walter L. Shepeard Community Blood Center, Inc., Augusta, GA, by fax on July 9 and 21, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
9 units
DISTRIBUTION
Korea, SC, GA
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Recovered Plasma. Recall # B-2306-10
CODE
Unit: W137508110097
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Lane Memorial Blood Bank, Eugene, OR, by fax on June 10, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood product, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), was distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
1 unit
DISTRIBUTION
KY
___________________________________
PRODUCT
Red Blood Cells (Apheresis) Leukocytes Reduced. Recall # B-2348-10
CODE
Units: W041609075327D (part a and b), 3922801 (part a and b)
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
Blood Systems Inc/dba United Blood Services, Meridian, MS, by telephone and fax on May 26, 2010 and May 28, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
4 units
DISTRIBUTION
MS
___________________________________
PRODUCT
1) Recovered Plasma. Recall # B-2363-10;
2) Cryoprecipitated AHF, Pooled. Recall # B-2364-10;
3) Red Blood Cells Leukocytes Reduced. Recall # B-2365-10
CODE
1) and 3) Units: 2613522, 2578779;
2) Unit: 2578779
RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER
South Texas Blood and Tissue Center, San Antonio, TX, by fax and e-mail on May 5, 2010. Firm initiated recall is complete.
REASON
Blood products, collected from a donor considered to be at increased risk for variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCJD), were distributed.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
5 units
DISTRIBUTION
TX
___________________________________
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR OCTOBER 6, 2010
#
http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/ucm228605.htm
Tuesday, September 28, 2010
Variant CJD: where has it gone, or has it?
Pract Neurol 2010; 10: 250-251
http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2010/09/variant-cjd-where-has-it-gone-or-has-it.html
Monday, October 18, 2010
TSEAC Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee Draft Agenda and Meeting Materials, Posted: 10/18/2010
http://tseac.blogspot.com/2010/10/tseac-transmissible-spongiform.html
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies Advisory Committee; Notice of Meeting October 28 and 29, 2010 (COMMENT SUBMISSION)
http://tseac.blogspot.com/2010/09/transmissible-spongiform_14.html
Wednesday, September 08, 2010
Emerging Infectious Diseases: CJD, BSE, SCRAPIE, CWD, PRION, TSE Evaluation to Implementation for Transfusion and Transplantation September 2010
http://vcjdtransfusion.blogspot.com/2010/09/emerging-infectious-diseases-cjd-bse.html
layperson
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
flounder9@verizon.net
Saturday, November 6, 2010
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