Veterinary Record doi:10.1136/vr.100097
Case-control study of cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy born after July 31, 1996 (BARB cases) in Great Britain
A. Ortiz-Pelaez, DVM MSc PhD MRCVS1, M. A. Stevenson, MVSc, MACVSc, PhD2, J. W. Wilesmith, BVSc, MRCVS3, J. B. M. Ryan, BEd MBiol4 and A. J. C. Cook, BVM&S, MSc, CertPM, DipECVPH, MRCVS5
+ Author Affiliations
Epidemiology Group. Centre for Epidemiology and Risk Analysis, Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency (AHVLA), New Haw, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK EpiCentre, Institute of Veterinary, Animal and Biomedical Sciences. College of Sciences, Massey University, Private Bag 11-222, Palmerston North, New Zealand Barton, 1 Woodham Road, Woking, Surrey, GU21 4DL, UK Barton, 1 Woodham Road, Woking, Surrey, GU21 4DL, UK Epidemiology Group. Centre for Epidemiology and Risk Analysis, Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency (AHVLA), New Haw, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK
E-mail for correspondence firstname.lastname@example.org
This paper reports the results of a case-control study of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) cases born in Great Britain after the statutory reinforcement of the ban (BARB) on the feeding of mammalian-derived meat and bone meal on 31 July 1996.
A total of 499 suspect clinical cases of BSE, born after 31 July 1996, and reported negative by July 31, 1996 and were compared with the set of 164 confirmed Great BARB cases in Great Britain detected by both passive and active surveillance. Animal-level risk factors (age and type of feed offered) and herd-level risk factors (herd size and type, number of prereinforced feed ban BSE cases born on the holding, the presence of other domestic species and waste management) were obtained for the analysis.
BARB cases were 2.56 times (95 per cent CI 1.29 to 5.07) more likely to be exposed to homemix or a combination of homemix and proprietary feeds were 0.59 times (95 per cent CI 0.50 to 0.69) as less likely to be exposed to the unit increases in the number of prereinforced feed ban BSE cases diagnosed on the natal holding. A supplementary spatial analysis of these cases revealed three areas of excess BARB density: Northwest and Southwest of Wales and Northeast of Scotland.
Provenance not commissioned; externally peer reviewed
Accepted November 9, 2011.
Published Online First 18 January 2012
Prev Vet Med. 2012 Feb 29. [Epub ahead of print]
The epidemiology of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the Republic of Ireland before and after the reinforced feed ban.
Ryan E, McGrath G, Sheridan H, More SJ, Aznar I.
Central Veterinary Research Laboratory, Department of Agriculture Laboratories, Backweston, Celbridge, Co. Kildare, Ireland.
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a prion disease spread by the inclusion in cattle feed of meat and bone meal made from cattle infected with the BSE agent. In the Republic of Ireland, a reinforced feed ban on mammalian meat and bone meal (MMBM) was introduced on 17th October 1996 to stop further infection of cattle. Between then and July 2010, 44 cases of BSE from 40 herds have been born, termed "born after the reinforced ban" or "BARB" cases. The objectives of this project were: (a) to describe the epidemiology of these BARB cases, (b) to determine area-level risk factors for BSE herds and how they related to the stage of the BSE epidemic, and (c) to evaluate whether the spatial pattern of BSE cases was non-random and had changed over time. The BSE epidemic was divided into three phases: cases born prior to 1991, born 1991-October 1996 and BARB cases. To determine the area level risk factors for BSE herds, a case-control study was conducted for each phase of the epidemic. We selected four control herds for each herd with one or more BSE cases. A grid of hexagons of 10km diameter was created covering the territory of the Republic of Ireland and BSE herds and control herds were assigned to a hexagon. The numbers of cattle herds, dairy herds, piggeries and poultry holdings within the hexagons containing these case and control herds were enumerated. To evaluate the spatial pattern of BSE cases, standardised mortality ratios were calculated for each hexagon, and Oden's Ipop was used to investigate clustering. The descriptive analysis showed "feeding of concentrates" as the only common factor to all BARB cases for which information existed. The case-control study identified being a dairy herd as a risk factor during the pre-1991 phase of the BSE epidemic. Dairy herd type, a large proportion of local herds which were dairy and large numbers of piggeries and poultry holdings locally were also risk factors during the 1991-1996 phase. For the post-October 1996 phase (BARBs), dairy herd type and large numbers of other herds locally were risk factors. The spatial pattern of BSE cases changed over the three phases of the epidemic and was non-random, with evidence of clustering. The evidence supports the hypothesis that BARB cases do not arise spontaneously but rather are caused by the same food-borne infectious route as other BSE cases.
Copyright Â© 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
>>> The evidence supports the hypothesis that BARB cases do not arise spontaneously but rather are caused by the same food-borne infectious route as other BSE cases.
Wednesday, March 7, 2012
The epidemiology of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the Republic of Ireland before and after the reinforced feed ban
Subject: fifth BARB cases has been found in Northern Ireland -- 12 March 2003
Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2003 20:16:29 –0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########
12 March 2003 - A fifth BARB cases has been found in Northern Ireland. The cow was born in November 1997.
There have been a number of BSE cases in cattle born after the feed ban of July 1988 (BABs). These cases only count for around 25 percent of all BSE cases but are forming an increasing proportion of suspect cases being reported as the epidemic dies out. The first case of BSE in an animal born after the July 1988 Feed Ban was confirmed in March 1991, in an animal born in August 1988. In the following months a number of further BAB cases were confirmed. Detailed investigations were carried out to determine whether they were the result of food borne exposure or some other route of infection. These initial studies indicated that some feed manufactured before the ban had remained on farms and in the food chain and, despite the prohibition, was used after the ban was introduced. This using up of old, pre-ban feed is the most likely source of infection for a majority of cases in cattle born shortly after the feed ban.
In the tables below you will find details for cases in animals born after the enhanced feed ban of August 1996.
GB cases Date of birth Date BSE confirmed Method of detection Published details relevant to the case
1 25/08/1996 27/06/2000 Passive Surveillance Final report 2 20/05/1997 14/06/2001 Passive Surveillance News release 3 04/12/1996 11/07/2001 Passive Surveillance News release 4 18/01/1997 24/08/2001 Passive Surveillance Official Announcement[pdf file] 5 25/04/1997 28/08/2001 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Official Announcement[pdf file] 6 07/09/1996 06/12/2001 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Official Announcement[pdf file] 7 04/01/1997 17/01/2002 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file] 8 12/02/1997 22/01/2002 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file] 9 27/07/1997 06/02/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 10 30/07/1997 06/02/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 11 06/03/1997 26/02/2002 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file] 12A 29/09/1996 13/03/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 13 27/04/1997 27/03/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 14B 16/02/1998 27/02/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 15 27/08/1996 13/05/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 16 18/09/1996 13/05/2002 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file] 17 29/11/1997 13/05/2002 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file] 18C 28/06/1997 06/06/2002 Active Surveillance - Fallen Stock Survey Announcement[pdf file] 19 20/07/1998 08/08/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 20 04/03/1998 22/08/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 21 21/07/1998 03/09/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 22 22/08/1996 16/10/2002 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file] 23 08/11/1996 17/10/2002 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file] 24 21/02/1997 29/10/2002 Active Surveillance - Fallen Stock Survey Announcement[pdf file] 25 17/09/1997 30/10/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 26 04/10/1996 21/11/2002 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file] 27 14/02/1997 27/11/2002 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file] 28 12/02/1997 29/11/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 29 13/02/1997 17/12/2002 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file] 30 06/11/1998 09/01/2003 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file] 31 30/04/1997 04/02/2003 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 32 20/03/1997 19/02/2003 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 33 30/07/1997 19/02/2003 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file] 34 05/09/1997 03/03/2003 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file] 35 12/03/1999 04/03/2003 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file]
Notes: A case, confirmed on 12th December 2001, was previously listed in the above table as born on 16 August 1996. Further investigation has discovered that the animal was in fact born in 1994 and its details have therefore been removed.
A This animal originated in Eire and was imported into the UK at 20 months of age in 1998.
B The animal was initially recorded as born in 1995 and confirmed as having disease on 27/02/02. However, further investigation, completed on 10/04/02, has now revealed the true date of birth (February 1998).
C Due to a recording error this animal was originally described as having been taken in the Casualty Survey.
NI Cases Date of Birth Date BSE confirmed Method of detection
1 10/09/1996 08/02/2001 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey 2 01/06/1997 13/12/2001 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey 3 25/05/1999 01/02/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey 4 28/09/1997 30/08/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey 5 20/11/1997 05/03/2003 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
[Incidence] [Reasons] [Prevention] Incidence
Investigations were continued as BAB cases were found to occur in animals born in 1989 and subsequent years. Due to the long mean incubation period of the disease (around five years) such animals did not appear in significant numbers until 1993 and later. These cases indicated that there might have been some leakage of the feed ban.
By Autumn 1994, it was apparent that the decline in the epidemic, which had begun in the spring of 1993, was occurring more slowly in those parts of the country in which the proportion of pigs and poultry relative to cattle was the greatest. Pig and poultry feed could, at that time, legitimately contain ruminant meat and bone meal (MBM) and in such areas there was a higher possibility of cross contamination of ruminant feed with MBM either in the feed mill, during transport or on farm. Also, in August 1994, samples of cattle feed taken on a farm were shown to contain ruminant MBM, demonstrating that such cross-contamination could occur in practice.
[top of page] [Incidence] [Reasons] [Prevention] Reasons for BAB cases
A case control study in 1994 looked in detail at possible causes of BSE in BAB animals. This study found no statistical significance of horizontal or vertical transmission of BSE in BAB cases and concluded that a food borne source of infection was the most likely explanation.
In order for BSE infectivity to be found in MBM, it is necessary for some tissue carrying BSE infectivity to enter the rendering chain. This would suggest some degree of failing in the Specified Bovine Material (SBM) then called Specified Bovine Offals (SBO) controls. The most likely source of this problem came from the practice of splitting skulls. Until 15 August 1995, when the practice was banned, skulls could be split to remove the brain, allowing the remaining bone to be sent for rendering to meat and bone meal. Observation showed that brain material sometimes remained in the skull, providing a significant route by which infectivity could enter MBM. Research showed that as little as 1g of unprocessed brain from a clinically affected cow would cause infection and eventually disease when fed to calves.
Other SBM may not have been adequately separated from non-SBM material either, providing another potential route of infection.
Cross-contamination of feed production in the mill could then lead to the infected MBM entering cattle rations.
Alternatively, a farmer might, accidentally or deliberately, feed cattle with pig or poultry rations, which could legitimately contain MBM.
It is significant that research has since shown that some of the rendering systems in use until December 1994 had virtually no effect on any BSE infectivity present.
[top of page] [Incidence] [Reasons] [Prevention] Prevention of cross-contamination
The controls on the handling of SBMs were strengthened in August 1995, particularly to further protect animal health. They required that the whole skull (with the exception of the tongue) must be disposed of as an SBM and required rendering plants to use dedicated lines for the processing of SBM tissues.
In April 1996 the use of mammalian MBM was banned in all feed for farmed animals. This was not as a result of fears that non-ruminant species may catch BSE by oral exposure, but rather to remove any possible risk of cross-contamination of cattle rations in feed mills, during transport or on farms with MBM intended for other species. From August 1996 it became an offence (save in very tightly defined and controlled circumstances) to hold mammalian MBM on farms or in feed mills and premises where livestock feed is used, produced, prepared or stored.
A test has now been developed to look for evidence of mammalian protein in feed, but because of the complex nature of compound feed, and consequent risks of cross-reactions, further improvements will be essential. Up to 24,000 samples a year can now be tested.
########### http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: BSE has been diagnosed in a cow born in April 2000
Date: Sun, 08 Aug 2004 20:28:58 –0500
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy
Â© Defra 2004 A BSE case born in April 2000 BSE has been diagnosed in a Limousin Cross cow, born on 01 April 2000, forty-four months after 1 August 1996, when extra control measures on animal feed containing mammalian meat and bone meal (MMBM) were considered to have been fully implemented. The animal was taken under passive surveillance as a clinical suspect. Its farm of origin was in Derbyshire, where it remained until it was slaughtered as a BSE suspect on 25 June 2004. Disease was officially confirmed on 04 August 2004. This is the most recently born case of BSE confirmed in the UK. It was always expected that a small number of cases would be born after the feed ban, and the appearance of these cases is in no way unexpected.
Â© Defra 2003 Page 1 of 3 BSE Cases Born on or After 1 August 1996:
Q & A Q. What is significant about the date 1 August 1996?
A. Since BSE was first recognised, controls on animal feed have been central to the UK s eradication policy. It is believed that most infected cattle were primarily exposed to the BSE agent through feed containing meat and bone meal (MBM) produced by the rendering of ruminant material. Since 1988, extensive regulatory controls have been introduced by the Government and the EU to keep potentially infectious material out of ruminant feed, with the aim of removing exposure to BSE. In 1996, controls were extended to prevent the feeding of mammalian MBM to all farmed livestock, in order to avoid any possibility of cross-contamination with feed for pigs and poultry. Since 1 August 1996 it has been an offence to possess mammalian MBM on premises where livestock feed is used, produced, prepared or stored. Q. What are the possible causes of BSE cases in cattle born after 1 August 1996? A. Scientific advice suggests that the following routes of transmission might be theoretically possible: (a) some animals might have been exposed to BSE through feed carried over from before 1 August 1996 (either accidentally or deliberately); or (b) some animals might have been exposed to BSE through maternal transmission; or (c) there may be routes of transmission which have not yet been identified. Possibilities include environmental contamination, contamination of imported feed ingredients and the use of tallow-based calf milk replacer; and/or (d) the disease may occur spontaneously in a small number of cases. Â© Defra 2003 Page 2 of 3 Q. What are the implications if further post-August 1996 cases continue to appear? A. The latest opinion of the EU Scientific Steering Committee, adopted on 10-11 April 2003, effectively removed its previous threshold for concern of 55 of these cases during a 12 month period. This figure was derived some time ago and assumes that 10% of such cases would be due to maternal transmission. The SSC concluded that: These model-based estimates have been overtaken by two sources of subsequent intelligence , i.e. the results of the Community-wide active surveillance programme and the fact that the majority of BARB cases are unlikely to have been caused by maternal transmission. There is likely to be a small increase in case numbers as animals born in 1996 and 1997 reach the peak-risk age for clinical BSE and animals from the 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 cohorts may be expected to contribute more cases. Q. What are the human health implications of these cases? A. There are no public health implications arising from these cases. Even if the animals involved had not been suffering from BSE, because they have all been over thirty months old they would have been excluded from human or animal consumption. Any surviving offspring born after August 1996 are traced and excluded from human consumption too. Q. What if the over thirty months rule is scrapped? A. All over thirty month cattle would need to be tested for BSE before they could enter the food chain. Any cows that tested positive for BSE would be destroyed. The BSE test was rigorously checked before it came into use. No incorrect results were found. More than 20 million cattle have now been tested throughout the European Union. In the UK, more than 600,000 cattle have been tested. Q. Has the Department investigated the cause of individual post-August 1996 animals? A. All such cases are the subject of detailed veterinary enquiries. Although it is very difficult to show how individual animals contracted BSE, veterinary advisers see no indication that maternal transmission could explain the majority of these cases either the dams are still alive and healthy, or they were slaughtered without exhibiting signs of BSE long after the birth of the affected progeny. Similarly, whilst exposure from an environmental source cannot be eliminated, it would appear unlikely based on the results of enquiries into the cause of individual cases and in the absence of other BSE cases on a number of the affected farms. The evidence thus seems to point to a feed-borne source as the most likely explanation for the BARB cases. Â© Defra 2003 Page 3 of 3 Q. So, are there major problems with the UK feed ban? A. Domestic feed controls are enforced by a major sampling programme under which around 16-18,000 samples are taken each year from different premises. The results of the sampling programme indicate a high level of compliance with the feed ban. In 2003, EU scientists have also indicated that there are so far no reasons to assume widespread and systematic inappropriate implementation of the current feed ban of 1996 . Q. What else is the Government doing to follow up these cases? A. Epidemiological investigations will continue in all cases and a specific study is being planned to investigate the possible reasons for the occurrence of these cases. In addition, the cohorts of the affected animals (animals born 12 months before and after the index case and which may have been exposed to the same source of infection) are identified. When these animals are slaughtered, brain samples are taken to see if they have also been affected. These cohort animals are also excluded from human consumption but they are not slaughtered immediately. Monitoring their progress allows them to develop signs of disease, and ensure that important epidemiological evidence is not destroyed. Q. What tests are used to diagnose BSE cases? Descriptions of the tests used to diagnose BSE are available on the DEFRA website under Science/Research into BSE/Diagnosis of BSE. Q. Does the appearance of post-August 1996 cases mean that the epidemic is not declining as predicted? A. No. The overall BSE epidemic in Great Britain continues to decline by around 40 per cent a year. In 1992, approximately 37,000 clinical cases were detected. Last year there were just over 1,000. Q. Have other EU member states experienced BSE cases in young animals (i.e. born since 1 August 1996)? A. Yes. Most EU member states have recorded cases born after this date. The highest numbers have been recorded in France, Germany, Portugal and Spain. It should be noted, however, that these countries have carried out more active surveillance than the UK over time, because they are required to test all cattle over 30 months old which are sold for human consumption. At present, the UK tests only cattle aged more than 42 months and born after August 1996, plus a sample of 10,000 older cattle slaughtered under our Over 30 Months Scheme. In addition, a fully effective feed ban in the EU was not put in place until January 2001. Details on the numbers of cases and their dates of birth are available on the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) website and on individual countries websites accessed via the OIE website.
3. TSEs in Cattle
We predict a continued decline in cases of BSE in the EU and estimate fewer than 75 cases in UK by the end of 2007 (compared to 114 in 2006). The majority of cases are still being detected in cattle born before the 1996 feed ban. The Older Cattle Disposal Scheme closes at the end of 2008 and we are working with industry to maximise the uptake. The prevalence in successive BARB birth cohorts is extremely low and appears to be decreasing. However, as the pre-1996 cattle population declines, BARBs will form an increasing percentage of the total number of cases.
The overall prevalence of atypical BSE appears low. Two cases of atypical BSE have been detected in UK to date in older cattle. Oral challenge studies are being planned in Europe and Japan which will provide further information on the pathogenesis. While the aetiology of atypical BSE remains unknown the long term consequences for the maintenance of key BSE controls remains uncertain.
snip...full text 10 pages ;
ITEM 6 – BARB CASE CLUSTERS
> > 39. Professor John Wilesmith (Defra) updated the committee on the
> > BSE cases born after the 1996 reinforced mammalian meat and
> > bone meal ban in the UK (BARB cases). Around 116 BARB cases
> > had been identified in Great Britain up to 22 November 2005,
> > mostly through active surveillance. BARB cases had decreased in
> > successive birth cohorts, from 44 in the 1996/1997 cohort to none
> > to date in the 2000/2001 cohort. However, 3 BARB cases had
> > been identified in the 2001/2002 cohort. Backcalculation of the
> > prevalence of BARB cases indicated a drop from 130 infected
> > animals per million (95% confidence interval 90-190) in the
> > 1996/1997 cohort to 30 infected animals per million (95%
> > confidence interval 10-60) in the 1999/2000 cohort. A shift in the
> > geographical distribution of BSE cases, from the concentration of
> > pre-1996 BSE cases in Eastern England to a more uniform
> > 14
> > © SEAC 2005
> > distribution of BARB cases, had occurred. However, it appeared
> > that certain post-1996 cohorts had a higher exposure to BSE in
> > certain areas for limited periods. Several clusters of BARB cases
> > within herds had been identified (5 pairs, 2 triplets and 1
> > quadruplet).
> > 40. A triplet of BARB cases in South West Wales had been
> > investigated in detail. The triplet comprised 2 cases born in
> > September and October 2001 and a third in May 2002. The
> > animals born in 2001 were reared outdoors from the spring of 2002
> > but the animal born in 2002 had been reared indoors. Further
> > investigation of feeding practices revealed that a new feed bin for
> > the adult dairy herd had been installed in September 1998. In July
> > 2002 the feed bin was emptied, but not cleaned, and relocated. All
> > 3 BARB cases received feed from the relocated bin. This finding
> > suggested the hypothesis that the feed bin installed in September
> > 1998 was filled initially with contaminated feed, that remnants of
> > this feed fell to the bottom of the bin during its relocation, and thus
> > young animals in the 2001/2002 birth cohort were exposed to
> > feedstuffs produced in 1998. No adult cattle had been infected
> > because of the reduced susceptibility to BSE with increasing age.
> > 41. Further investigation of multiple case herds had found no
> > association of BARB clusters with the closure of feed mills.
> > 42. Professor Wilesmith concluded that there is evidence of a decline
> > in risk of infection for successive birth cohorts of cattle. The BARB
> > epidemic is unlikely to be sustained by animals born after 31 July
> > 2000. Feed bins could represent a continued source of occasional
> > infection and advice to farmers is being formulated to reduce this
> > risk. There is no evidence for an indigenous source of infection for
> > the BARB cases.
> > 43. Members considered it encouraging that no other factor, apart from
> > feed contamination, had been identified as a possible cause of
> > BARB cases to date. Members commented that this study
> > suggests that only a small amount of contaminated feed may be
> > required for infection and that BSE infectivity can survive in the
> > environment for several years. Professor Wilesmith agreed and
> > noted that infection caused by small doses of infectious material
> > was consistent with other studies, and it would appear there is little
> > dilution of infectivity, if present, in the rendering system.
> > Additionally it appeared that the infectious agent had survived for 4
> > years in the feed bin.
> > 44. The Chair thanked Professor Wilesmith for his presentation.
> > > > snip...
> > > > http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/final90.pdf
> > > TSS
> > #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html > ####################
Wednesday, March 7, 2012
ANOTHER COW NOT TESTED FOR BSE AKA MAD COW LIKELY TO HAVE BEEN EATEN UK 2012
Thursday, March 01, 2012
Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease Fact sheet N°180 Revised February 2012 W.H.O.
Saturday, March 03, 2012
The contribution of different prion protein types and host polymorphisms to clinicopathological variations in Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease
Mark W. Head*, James W. Ironside Article first published online: 28 FEB 2012
Thursday, February 16, 2012
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE
31 USA SENATORS ASK PRESIDENT OBAMA TO HELP SPREAD MAD COW DISEASE 2012
Thursday, February 23, 2012
EIGHT FORMER SECRETARIES OF AGRICULTURE SPEAKING AT USDA'S 2012 AGRICULTURE OUTLOOK FORUM INDUCTED INTO USA MAD COW HALL OF SHAME
Sunday, February 5, 2012 February 2012
Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II
Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007
Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007
Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.
Firm initiated recall is ongoing.
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007
The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.
Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE
ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
Thursday, March 19, 2009
MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL
Tuesday, March 2, 2010
Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA
Monday, March 1, 2010
ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010