November 25, 2008
November 2008 Update On Feed Enforcement Activities To Limit The Spread Of BSE
To help prevent the establishment and amplification of Bovine Spongiform Encephalophathy (BSE) through feed in the United States, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) implemented a final rule that prohibits the use of most mammalian protein in feeds for ruminant animals. This rule, Title 21 Part 589.2000 of the Code of Federal Regulations, here called the Ruminant Feed Ban, became effective on August 4, 1997.
The following is an update on FDA enforcement activities regarding the ruminant feed ban. FDA's Center for Veterinary Medicine (CVM) has assembled data from the inspections that have been conducted AND whose final inspection report has been recorded in the FDA's inspection database as of November 15, 2008. As of November 15, 2008, FDA had received over 66,000 inspection reports. The majority of these inspections (approximately 71%) were conducted by State feed control officials, with the remainder conducted by FDA officials.
Inspections conducted by FDA or State investigators are classified to reflect the compliance status at the time of the inspection based upon the objectionable conditions documented. These inspection conclusions are reported as Official Action Indicated (OAI), Voluntary Action Indicated (VAI), or No Action Indicated (NAI).
An OAI inspection classification occurs when significant objectionable conditions or practices were found and regulatory sanctions are warranted in order to address the establishment's lack of compliance with the regulation. An example of an OAI inspection classification would be findings of manufacturing procedures insufficient to ensure that ruminant feed is not contaminated with prohibited material. Inspections classified with OAI violations will be promptly re-inspected following the regulatory sanctions to determine whether adequate corrective actions have been implemented.
A VAI inspection classification occurs when objectionable conditions or practices were found that do not meet the threshold of regulatory significance, but do warrant advisory actions to inform the establishment of findings that should be voluntarily corrected. Inspections classified with VAI violations are more technical violations of the Ruminant Feed Ban. These include provisions such as minor recordkeeping lapses and conditions involving non-ruminant feeds.
An NAI inspection classification occurs when no objectionable conditions or practices were found during the inspection or the significance of the documented objectionable conditions found does not justify further actions.
The results to date are reported here both by “segment of industry” and “in total”. NOTE – A single firm can operate as more than one firm type. As a result, the categories of the different industry segments are not mutually exclusive.
RENDERERS
These firms are the first to handle and process (i.e., render) animal proteins and to send these processed materials to feed mills and/or protein blenders for use as a feed ingredient.
Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 267
Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 155 (58% of those active firms inspected)
Of the 155 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:
0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI
3 firms (2.0%) were classified as VAI
LICENSED FEED MILLS
FDA licenses these feed mills to produce medicated feed products. The license is required to manufacture and distribute feed using certain potent drug products, usually those requiring some pre-slaughter withdrawal time. This licensing has nothing to do with handling prohibited materials under the feed ban regulation. A medicated feed license from FDA is not required to handle materials prohibited under the Ruminant Feed Ban.
Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 1.075
Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 494 (46% of those active firms inspected)
Of the 494 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:
0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI
4 firms (0.8 %) were classified as VAI
FEED MILLS NOT LICENSED BY FDA
These feed mills are not licensed by the FDA to produce medicated feeds.
Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 5,290
Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 2,685 (51% of those active firms inspected)
Of the 2,685 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:
0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI
29 firms (1.1%) were classified as VAI
PROTEIN BLENDERS
These firms blend rendered animal protein for the purpose of producing quality feed ingredients that will be used by feed mills.
Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 387
Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 196 (51% of those active firms inspected)
Of the 196 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:
0 firms (0%) was classified as OAI
0 firms (0%) were classified as VAI
RENDERERS, FEED MILLS, AND PROTEIN BLENDERS MANUFACTURING WITH PROHIBITED MATERIAL
This category includes only those firms that actually use prohibited material to manufacture, process, or blend animal feed or feed ingredients.
Total number of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 6,712
Number of active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders processing with prohibited materials – 506 (7.5%)
Of the 506 active renderers, feed mills, and protein blenders processing with prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:
0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI
11 firms (2.2%) were classified as VAI
OTHER FIRMS INSPECTED
Examples of such firms include ruminant feeders, on-farm mixers, pet food manufacturers, animal feed salvagers, distributors, retailers, and animal feed transporters.
Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 21,865
Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 7,295 (33% of those active firms inspected)
Of the 7,295 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:
0 firm (0%) were classified as OAI
113 firms (1.5%) were classified as VAI
TOTAL FIRMS
Note that a single firm can be reported under more than one firm category; therefore, the summation of the individual OAI/VAI firm categories will be more than the actual total number of OAI/VAI firms, as presented below.
Number of active firms whose initial inspection has been reported to FDA – 24,065
Number of active firms handling materials prohibited from use in ruminant feed – 7,876 (33% of those active firms inspected)
Of the 7,876 active firms handling prohibited materials, their most recent inspection revealed that:
0 firms (0%) were classified as OAI
121 firms (1.5%) were classified as VAI
http://www.fda.gov/cvm/CVM_Updates/BseInspNov08.htm
unacceptable! in 2008, almost 2009, this many firms still in violation of mad cow feed ban rules. the infamous august 4, 1997 partial and voluntary mad cow feed ban was nothing more than ink on paper. ...TSS
Plasma & Serum Proteins Receive Continued FDA Approval
4/25/2008 APC, Inc. is pleased to advise our customers and industry partners that as anticipated, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) will continue to allow the use of bovine blood, plasma and serum proteins in ruminant feeds.
In April 2008 FDA announced the publication of its Final Rule for 21 CFR Part 589.2001 - Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed. FDA specifically stated in their opinion that, "FDA is not prohibiting the use of blood and blood products in animal feed because we believe such a prohibition would do very little to reduce the risk of BSE transmission."
Known as a leader in developing nutritional products for the swine industry, where 95% of pig starter diets in the United States contain functional proteins, APC has more recently developed their line of colostrum replacers, supplements, feed additives and milk replacer ingredients for calves. Products include plasma, serum and immunoglobulin concentrate based Acquire®, Lifeline®, Gammulin® and Nutrapro® used to optimize the health and performance of calves.
To view the full report for Final Rule 21 CFR Part 589.2001 visit:
http://www.fda.gov/OHRMS/DOCKETS/98fr/FDA-2002-N-0031-nfr.pdf
To view the complete Feed Rule 21 CFR Part 589 visit:
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfcfr/CFRSearch.cfm?CFRPart=589&showFR=1
Friday, November 21, 2008 Plasma & Serum Proteins Receive Continued FDA Approval
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/11/plasma-serum-proteins-receive-continued.html
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/
TRANSFUSION MEDICINE
Prion diseases are efficiently transmitted by blood transfusion in sheep
Fiona Houston1, Sandra McCutcheon1, Wilfred Goldmann2, Angela Chong2, James Foster2, Silvia Sisó3, Lorenzo González3, Martin Jeffrey3, and Nora Hunter2 1 Neuropathogenesis Division, Roslin Institute, Compton, United Kingdom; 2 Neuropathogenesis Division, Roslin Institute, University of Edinburgh, Edinburgh, United Kingdom; and 3 Lasswade Laboratory, Veterinary Laboratories Agency, Penicuik, United Kingdom
The emergence of variant Creutzfeld-Jakob disease, following on from the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) epidemic, led to concerns about the potential risk of iatrogenic transmission of disease by blood transfusion and the introduction of costly control measures to protect blood supplies. We previously reported preliminary data demonstrating the transmission of BSE and natural scrapie by blood transfusion in sheep. The final results of this experiment, reported here, give unexpectedly high transmission rates by transfusion of 36% for BSE and 43% for scrapie. A proportion of BSE-infected tranfusion recipients (3 of 8) survived for up to 7 years without showing clinical signs of disease. The majority of transmissions resulted from blood collected from donors at more than 50% of the estimated incubation period. The high transmission rates and relatively short and consistent incubation periods in clinically positive recipients suggest that infectivity titers in blood were substantial and/or that blood transfusion is an efficient method of transmission. This experiment has established the value of using sheep as a model for studying transmission of variant Creutzfeld-Jakob disease by blood products in humans.
http://bloodjournal.hematologylibrary.org/cgi/content/abstract/112/12/4739?ct
PLEASE BE ADVISED, also, such 'significant objectionable conditions or practices' such as this, allow millions and millions of pounds of banned ruminant feed into commerce, such as the one in 2007. I suppose this is why they DO NOT release such data anymore i.e. in tonnage or pounds, much too embarrassing considering .005 grams is lethal for a cow. ...TSS
In 2007, in one weekly enforcement report, the fda recalled 10,000,000+ pounds of BANNED MAD COW FEED, 'in commerce', and i can tell you that most of it was fed out ;
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST
REASON
Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI
REASON
Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
snip... see listings and references of enormous amounts of banned mad cow protein 'in commerce' in 2006 and 2005 ;
see full text ;
Friday, April 25, 2008
Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed [Docket No. 2002N-0273] (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/04/substances-prohibited-from-use-in.html
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS
http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html
0C3.01
Transmission of atypical BSE to Microcebus murinus, a non-human primate: Development of clinical symptoms and tissue distribution of PrPres
Background: Atypical BSE cases have been observed in Europe, Japan and North America. They differ in their PrPres profiles from those found in classical BSE. These atypical cases fall into 2 types, depending on the molecular mass of the unglycosylated PrPres band observed by Western blot: the L -type (lower molecular mass than the typical BSE cases) and H-type (higher molecular mass than the typical BSE cases).
Objectives and Methods: In order to see if the atypical BSE cases were transmissible to primates, either animals (were intracerebrally inoculated with 50 ul of a 10% brain homogenates of two atypical French BSE case, a H-type (2 males and 2 females) and a L-type (2 males and 2 females).
Results: Only one of the four lemurs challenged with H-type BSE died without clinical signs after 19 months post inoculation (mpi), whereas all the 4 animals inoculated with L -type BSE died at 19 mpi (2 males) and 22 mpi (2 females). Three months before their sacrifice, they developed blindness, tremor, abnormal posture, incoordinated movements, balance loss. Symptoms got worse according to the disease progression, until severe ataxia. The brain tissue were biochemically and immunocytochemically investigated for PrPres. For the H-type, spongiform changes without PrPres accumulation were observed in the brainstem. However Western blot analysis did not allow to detect PrPres into the brain. For the L-type, severe spongiosis was evidenced into the thalamus, the striatum, the mesencephalon, and the brainstem. whereas into the cortex the spongiosis was evidenced, but the Vacuolisation was weaker. Strong deposits of PrPres were detected by western blot, PET-blot and immunocytochemistry in the CNS: dense accumulation was observed into the thalamus, the striatum, and the hippocampus whereas in the cerebral cortex, PrPres was prominently accumulated in plaques. Western blot analysis also readily confirmed the presence of protease-resistant prion protein.
Conclusions: L-type infected lemurs showed survival times considerably shorter than for classical BSE strain, indicating that the disease is caused by a very virulent distinct prion strain in a model of non human primate.
http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2008/abstract-book-prion2008.pdf
P7.09
Biochemical screening for identification of atypical bse in belgium, 1999-present
Authors
Alexandre DobIy: Caroline Rodeghiero, Riet Geeroms; Stephanie Durand, Jessica De Sloovere, Emanuel Yanopdenbosch, Stefan Roels,
Content
Background: Recently atypical forms of BSE have been described. Western blot analyses showed that, in comparison to the classic BSE (C-type), they are demonstrable by a higher or lower molecular weight of the unglycosylated PrPres. They Viere thus named H-type and L-type BSE (L-type is also called BASE). In addition they show a lower proportion of diglycosylated PrPres than C-type. These emerging types represent different strains of BSE. They show unique incubation periods and histological lesions. Such types have been described on different continents. Indeed they might correspond to "sporadic" forms of BSE. In 2004 we already described one L-type in Belgium.
Objective: We retrospectively analysed the bovines at least 7-year-old in the Belgian archive of BSE diagnosed cattle in order to determine the prevalence of the two types of atypical BSE in Belgium.
Methods: We analysed homogenates from 39 bovines of 93 months old in median (min: 84, max: 181 months). The most recent one was diagnosed in 2006. We used Western blot with a panel of anti-PrP antibodies (Ab). They detect different regions of the PrP protein, from N-terminal to C-terminal: 12B2, 9A2, Sha31. SAFB4, 94B4. Their combination is aimed at an efficient typing diagnostic. We detected bound Ab with SuperSignal West Dura (Pierce) and analysed PrPres, signals with an image-analysis software (Quantity One, Bio-Rad).
Results: The results are still under analysis. We will detail the most crucial characteristics for typing PrPres. These include 1) the apparent molecular mass of the an-, mono- and diglycosylated bands, 2) the binding affinity to the five Ab (e.g.12B2 for H-type), 3) the presence of a fourth (unglycosylated) band and 4) the glycoprofile based on the relative proportions of the visible bands.
Discussion: The emergence of atypical types of BSE is partially due to a better knowledge of prion strains and more efficient diagnostic techniques. As the area in the brain where the PrPres is deposited can differ drastically between the types, it is essential to ascertain that the sampling techniques and analyses are adapted to these new types. As these new strains seem more virulent than classic types, they represent one of the next challenges in the field of prions.
http://www.neuroprion.org/resources/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2008/abstract-book-prion2008.pdf
Saturday, December 01, 2007 Phenotypic Similarity of Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy in Cattle and L-type Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy in a Mouse Model Volume 13, Number 12-December 2007 Research
snip...see full text ;
http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/2007/12/phenotypic-similarity-of-transmissible.html
A New Prionopathy OR more of the same old BSe and sporadic CJD
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html
Sunday, April 20, 2008 Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center April 3, 2008
Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.
see full text ;
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2008/04/progress-report-from-national-prion.html
ONE HUNDRED AND FIRST MEETING OF THE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Oct 23, 2008 at 9:00 AM
http://seac992007.blogspot.com/2008/10/one-hundred-and-first-meeting-of_23.html
http://flounder068.vox.com/library/post/one-hundred-and-first-meeting-of-the-spongiform-encephalopathy-advisory-committee.html
MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html
Please remember, the last two mad cows documented in the USA i.e. Alabama and Texas, both were of the 'atypical' BSE strain, and immediately after that, the USDA shut down the testing from 470,000 to 40,000 in the U.S. in 2007 out of about 35 million cattle slaughtered. also, science is showing that some of these atypical cases are more virulent to humans than the typical UK BSE strain ;
***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***
Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center
An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD
April 3, 2008
http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45
please see full text with additional comments and links @ ;
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/
In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.
In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=8125
To be published in the Proceedings of the Fourth International Scientific Congress in Fur Animal Production. Toronto, Canada, August 21-28, 1988
Evidence That Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy Results from Feeding Infected Cattle
R.F. Marsh* and G.R. Hartsough
•Department of Veterinary Science, University of Wisconsin-Madison, Madison, Wisconsin 53706; and ^Emba/Creat Lakes Ranch Service, Thiensville, Wisconsin 53092
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. Since previous incidences of TME were associated with common or shared feeding practices, we obtained a careful history of feed ingredients used over the past 12-18 months. The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/
BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/05/agriculture-secretary-ed-schafer.html
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/
CJD RISING USA
The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.
http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html
There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.
He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Sunday, November 30, 2008
November 2008 Update On Feed Enforcement Activities To Limit The Spread Of BSE
Labels:
atypical bse,
bse,
FDA,
MAD COW,
ruminant feed ban
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