Wednesday, March 27, 2013

U-turn considered on European PAP animal feed ban

27 Mar 2013 News



U-turn considered on European PAP animal feed ban



Nutritionlegislation Nutrition food safety Feed safety consumer issues Processed animal protein Australia China Europe Thailand US



370



The European Union is considering lifting a ban on processed animal proteins (PAPs) to ease the cost of protein used to make animal feed.

 

The change would come at a time of heightened consumer concern about food safety in Europe following the horsemeat scandal, Reuters reports. Stricter safety rules on PAPs, that include intestine, bones, blood and feather, would be imposed when the ban was lifted to prevent, for example, the "cannibalism" of pig feed being given to pigs.



But the cost to industry of implementing the new rules as well as consumer wariness means it is not clear how much the protein would be used. "We are currently discussing with member states the potential re-authorisation of processed animal proteins in feed for poultry and pigs from 2014," said a spokesman for Tonio Borg, the EU's Health and Consumer Policy Commissioner.

 

The by-products from pig and poultry slaughter were banned in 2000 as a precaution after the BSE outbreak and the number of cases in the EU fell from 2,167 cases in 2001 to 45 cases in 2009 according to the World Health Organisation.



In Europe, PAPs can currently be used in pet food. As of June this year they will also be allowed in EU fish feed.The next planned step would be to allow them in poultry and pig feed. This would bring Europe back in line with many other countries, including the United States, China, Thailand, Australia where there were no major reported outbreaks of BSE.

 

Animal by-products are a good alternative and would reduce reliance on expensive imports, producers say.

 

"It is a very good source of protein in terms of nutritional composition and digestibility and thus feed efficiency," said Leo den Hartog, director of Research and Development and Quality Affairs at the Dutch animal nutrition company Nutreco.

 

Whether the feed sector will use PAPs once the ban is lifted will depend on price and availability and the extent of consumer concerns, an industry source who declined to be named said.



"All chicken protein currently produced is being used by pet food sector now. If the ban for compound feed is lifted, there will be even more demand and prices will go up. It will become too expensive," the source said.




by World Poultry 27 Mar 2013






 
 





Wednesday, March 20, 2013


VETS have discovered 57 tonnes of banned British mutton in the freezers of meat products firm Spanghero – and raised fears of a new BSE scare

 







Friday, March 8, 2013


Dogs may have been used to make Petfood and animal feed

 







Monday, August 8, 2011


Susceptibility of Domestic Cats to CWD Infection


Oral.29: Susceptibility of Domestic Cats to CWD Infection

 








Friday, April 20, 2012


Ultrastructural findings in pigs experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent









PORCINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY PSE









Tuesday, March 5, 2013


FSA notified of BSE control breaches again and again 5 March 2013


(see 2012 BSE breaches as well...tss)

 








Monday, February 18, 2013 EU


Reauthorisation of non-ruminant processed animal proteins for fish feed and welcomes the likely potential for more TSE prion disease











Friday, December 14, 2012



DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012




snip...


In the USA, under the Food and Drug Administration’s BSE Feed Regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) most material (exceptions include milk, tallow, and gelatin) from deer and elk is prohibited for use in feed for ruminant animals. With regards to feed for non-ruminant animals, under FDA law, CWD positive deer may not be used for any animal feed or feed ingredients. For elk and deer considered at high risk for CWD, the FDA recommends that these animals do not enter the animal feed system. However, this recommendation is guidance and not a requirement by law.


Animals considered at high risk for CWD include:


1) animals from areas declared to be endemic for CWD and/or to be CWD eradication zones and


2) deer and elk that at some time during the 60-month period prior to slaughter were in a captive herd that contained a CWD-positive animal.


Therefore, in the USA, materials from cervids other than CWD positive animals may be used in animal feed and feed ingredients for non-ruminants.


The amount of animal PAP that is of deer and/or elk origin imported from the USA to GB can not be determined, however, as it is not specified in TRACES. It may constitute a small percentage of the 8412 kilos of non-fish origin processed animal proteins that were imported from US into GB in 2011.


Overall, therefore, it is considered there is a __greater than negligible risk___ that (nonruminant) animal feed and pet food containing deer and/or elk protein is imported into GB.




There is uncertainty associated with this estimate given the lack of data on the amount of deer and/or elk protein possibly being imported in these products.


snip...




36% in 2007 (Almberg et al., 2011). In such areas, population declines of deer of up to 30 to 50% have been observed (Almberg et al., 2011). In areas of Colorado, the prevalence can be as high as 30% (EFSA, 2011).




The clinical signs of CWD in affected adults are weight loss and behavioural changes that can span weeks or months (Williams, 2005). In addition, signs might include excessive salivation, behavioural alterations including a fixed stare and changes in interaction with other animals in the herd, and an altered stance (Williams, 2005). These signs are indistinguishable from cervids experimentally infected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).




Given this, if CWD was to be introduced into countries with BSE such as GB, for example, infected deer populations would need to be tested to differentiate if they were infected with CWD or BSE to minimise the risk of BSE entering the human food-chain via affected venison.




snip...




The rate of transmission of CWD has been reported to be as high as 30% and can approach 100% among captive animals in endemic areas (Safar et al., 2008).




snip...




In summary, in endemic areas, there is a medium probability that the soil and surrounding environment is contaminated with CWD prions and in a bioavailable form. In rural areas where CWD has not been reported and deer are present, there is a greater than negligible risk the soil is contaminated with CWD prion.




snip...


In summary, given the volume of tourists, hunters and servicemen moving between GB and North America, the probability of at least one person travelling to/from a CWD affected area and, in doing so, contaminating their clothing, footwear and/or equipment prior to arriving in GB is greater than negligible. For deer hunters, specifically, the risk is likely to be greater given the increased contact with deer and their environment. However, there is significant uncertainty associated with these estimates.




snip...




Therefore, it is considered that farmed and park deer may have a higher probability of exposure to CWD transferred to the environment than wild deer given the restricted habitat range and higher frequency of contact with tourists and returning GB residents.




snip...








Friday, December 14, 2012


DEFRA U.K. What is the risk of Chronic Wasting Disease CWD being introduced into Great Britain? A Qualitative Risk Assessment October 2012






please note, I do not know how much of this 125 TONS of banned mad cow protein was part of the ;


e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;




bbbut, this was about 10 years post mad cow feed ban from 1997. 10 years later, and still feeding banned mad cow protein to cervids???


considering that .005 gram is lethal to several bovines, and we know that the oral consumption of CWD tainted products is very efficient mode of transmission of CWD.


Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL AL AND FL VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 125 TONS Products manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006


Date: August 6, 2006 at 6:16 pm PST


PRODUCT


a) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish, Recall # V-100-6;


b) Performance Sheep Pell W/Decox/A/N, medicated, net wt. 50 lbs, Recall # V-101-6;


c) Pro 40% Swine Conc Meal -- 50 lb, Recall # V-102-6;


d) CO-OP 32% Sinking Catfish Food Medicated, Recall # V-103-6;


e) "Big Jim's" BBB Deer Ration, Big Buck Blend, Recall # V-104-6;


f) CO-OP 40% Hog Supplement Medicated Pelleted, Tylosin 100 grams/ton, 50 lb. bag, Recall # V-105-6;


g) Pig Starter Pell II, 18% W/MCDX Medicated 282020, Carbadox -- 0.0055%, Recall # V-106-6;


h) CO-OP STARTER-GROWER CRUMBLES, Complete Feed for Chickens from Hatch to 20 Weeks, Medicated, Bacitracin Methylene Disalicylate, 25 and 50 Lbs, Recall # V-107-6;


i) CO-OP LAYING PELLETS, Complete Feed for Laying Chickens, Recall # 108-6;


j) CO-OP LAYING CRUMBLES, Recall # V-109-6;


k) CO-OP QUAIL FLIGHT CONDITIONER MEDICATED, net wt 50 Lbs, Recall # V-110-6;


l) CO-OP QUAIL STARTER MEDICATED, Net Wt. 50 Lbs, Recall # V-111-6;


m) CO-OP QUAIL GROWER MEDICATED, 50 Lbs, Recall # V-112-6


CODE


Product manufactured from 02/01/2005 until 06/06/2006


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Alabama Farmers Cooperative, Inc., Decatur, AL, by telephone, fax, email and visit on June 9, 2006. FDA initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Animal and fish feeds which were possibly contaminated with ruminant based protein not labeled as "Do not feed to ruminants".


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


125 tons


DISTRIBUTION


AL and FL


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR AUGUST 2, 2006


###










Subject: bovine blood meal was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal 1,366,128 lbs. WI, TX, NE, TN, CO, and MN FEBRUARY 7, 2007 PRODUCT


Bulk Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, distributed in totes and in 1-ton bags (for one customer only), Recall # V-012-2007


CODE


Blood meal distributed between 9/7/2006-2/3/2007.


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Darling National LLC, Omaha, NB, by telephone on January 12, 2007. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON


Some of the exempt bovine blood meal was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and the labeling did not bear the cautionary BSE statement that it should not be fed to ruminants.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


1,366,128 lbs.


DISTRIBUTION


WI, TX, NE, TN, CO, and MN


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR FEBRUARY 7, 2007


###










PRODUCT


O-NO-MORE (Formerly ORPHAN-NO-MORE) Calf Claimer Powder, packaged in 11-oz. bottles, For Animal Use Only. Recall # V-043-2007


CODE


A06


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Springer Magrath Co., Mc Cook, NE, by telephone on January 2, 2007, fax dated January 9, 2007, by letters on February 22, 2007, March 12, March 14 and March 21, 2007. Firm initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON


The finished product was manufactured with prohibited bovine blood meal and did not bear the cautionary BSE statement that the product should not be fed to ruminants.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


Approximately 13,255 bottles


DISTRIBUTION


Nationwide


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR JUNE 13, 2007 ###






2007


10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007


Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST


RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II


PRODUCT


Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007


CODE


Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.


Firm initiated recall is ongoing.


REASON


Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


42,090 lbs.


DISTRIBUTION


WI


___________________________________


PRODUCT


Custom dairy premix products:


MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007


CODE


The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.


RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER


Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.


REASON


Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.


VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE


9,997,976 lbs.


DISTRIBUTION


ID and NV


END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007






Saturday, August 4, 2012


Final Feed Investigation Summary - California BSE Case - July 2012






Saturday, August 4, 2012


Update from APHIS Regarding Release of the Final Report on the BSE Epidemiological Investigation








2012-2013






Wednesday, March 20, 2013


GAO-13-244, Mar 18, 2013 Dietary Supplements FDA May Have Opportunities to Expand Its Use of Reported Health Problems to Oversee Product


From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.


Sent: Tuesday, March 19, 2013 2:46 PM


To: gomezj@gao.gov


Cc: siggerudk@gao.gov ; youngc1@gao.gov ; oighotline@gao.gov






Wednesday, February 20, 2013


World Organization for Animal Health Recommends United States' BSE Risk Status Be Upgraded


Statement from Agriculture Secretary Tom Vilsack:






Thursday, February 14, 2013


The Many Faces of Mad Cow Disease Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE and TSE prion disease








Monday, March 25, 2013


Minnesota Firm Recalls Bone-In Ribeye That May Contain Specified Risk Materials Recall Release CLASS II RECALL FSIS-RC-024-2013








look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;


Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates




Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.


snip...


BSE bovine brain inoculum


100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg


Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)


Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)


RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)


PrPres biochemical detection


The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.


Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula


Published online January 27, 2005






Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route


Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany


Background: In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.


Aims: The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.


Methods: Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).


Results: In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.


Conclusions: Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian vCJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.


The work referenced was performed in partial fulfilment of the study “BSE in primates“ supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).






Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate.






It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradleys surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.






it is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradleyâs surprise at the results because all the dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.








Prion 7:2, 99–108; March/April 2013; © 2013 Landes Bioscience


mini-Rev iew Mini-REVIEW


A closer look at prion strains


Characterization and important implications


Laura Solforosi,†,* Michela Milani,† Nicasio Mancini, Massimo Clementi and Roberto Burioni


Laboratory of Microbiology and Virology; University Vita-Salute San Raffaele; Milan, Italy


†These authors contributed equally to this work.


Keywords: cellular prion protein (PrPC), scrapie prion protein (PrPSc), transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), prion strains, strain mutation, variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease, sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease


Abbreviations: PrPC, cellular prion protein; PrPSc, scrapie prion protein; TSEs, transmissible spongiform encephalopathies; TME, transmissible mink encephalopathy; CJD, Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease; sCJD, sporadic CJD; vCJD, variant CJD; FFI, fatal familial insomnia; BSE, bovine spongiform encephalopathy; CWD, chronic wasting disease; PK, proteinase K; SAF, scrapie-associated fibrils; CNS, central nervous system; WB, western blot; PE, phosphatidylethanolamine; sPMCA, serial protein misfolding cyclic amplification; CPA, cell panel assay


Prions are infectious proteins that are responsible for transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) and consist primarily of scrapie prion protein (PrPSc), a pathogenic isoform of the host-encoded cellular prion protein (PrPC). The absence of nucleic acids as essential components of the infectious prions is the most striking feature associated to these diseases. Additionally, different prion strains have been isolated from animal diseases despite the lack of DNA or RNA molecules. Mounting evidence suggests that prion-strain-specific features segregate with different PrPSc conformational and aggregation states.


Strains are of practical relevance in prion diseases as they can drastically differ in many aspects, such as incubation period, PrPSc biochemical profile (e.g., electrophoretic mobility and glycoform ratio) and distribution of brain lesions. Importantly, such different features are maintained after inoculation of a prion strain into genetically identical hosts and are relatively stable across serial passages.


This review focuses on the characterization of prion strains and on the wide range of important implications that the study of prion strains involves.


Introduction


Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) or prion diseases, such as Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) in human, bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in cattle, chronic wasting disease (CWD) in cervids and scrapie in sheep, are a group of fatal neurodegenerative disorders. The major neuropathological hallmarks of TSEs are extensive spongiosis, neuronal cell loss in the central nervous system, gliosis,1 and deposition of amyloid plaques.2


*Correspondence to: Laura Solforosi; Email: solforosi.laura@hsr.it Submitted: 08/13/12; Revised: 12/20/12; Accepted: 01/03/13 http://dx.doi.org/10.4161/pri.23490




Prions are infectious proteins that are responsible for transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs) and consist primarily of scrapie prion protein (PrPSc), a pathogenic isoform of the host-encoded cellular prion protein (PrPC). The absence of nucleic acids as essential components of the infectious prions is the most striking feature associated to these diseases. Additionally, different prion strains have been isolated from animal diseases despite the lack of DNA or RNA molecules. Mounting evidence suggests that prion-strain-specific features segregate with different PrPSc conformational and aggregation states.




Strains are of practical relevance in prion diseases as they can drastically differ in many aspects, such as incubation period, PrPSc biochemical profile (e.g., electrophoretic mobility and glycoform ratio) and distribution of brain lesions. Importantly, such different features are maintained after inoculation of a prion strain into genetically identical hosts and are relatively stable across serial passages.




This review focuses on the characterization of prion strains and on the wide range of important implications that the study of prion strains involves. ...




snip...




This classification arises from the hypothesis that if the polymorphism 129 can modulate the phenotype of the familial prion diseases (fCJD and FFI, as explained earlier in this review), then probably it can modulate also that of sporadic prion diseases, justifying their heterogeneity. According to this hypothesis, the cases affected by sCJD were divided into six groups according to the genotype of the polymorphism in position 129 and the type of PrPSc. Then, the phenotypes of every group were analyzed to evaluate the homogeneity within every group. The results have permitted a molecular sub-classification of the sCJD.90,91 However, this classification seems not to be sufficient to explain the complexity of the sporadic form of CJD. In fact, in some molecular subtypes, additional variants have been reported, such as MM or VV patients with amyloid plaques, which are absent in the majority of patients with these genotypes.44 Moreover, among patients belonging to the same subgroup, important phenotypic differences can be found, such as, for instance, the extent of neuronal loss or PrPSc deposition differences.92




Even at the biochemical level the complexity is higher: indeed, aside from the migratory differences of the PrPSc of types 1 and 2, there are other properties that could be important during the propagation of the strain, like the presence of other fragments derived from differential cleavage at the C- and N-terminus of the protein, which probably coincide with the presence of other forms of PrPSc with different resistance to PK digestion.44 All these molecular classifications are based upon the principle that in all CNS districts the type of PrPSc is the same, but there are pieces of evidence pointing to the fact that different types of PrPSc can be found in different brain areas.64,93 The first evidence of the presence of more than one form of PrPSc in the brain of a sCJD patient was reported by Puoti in 1999.94 These different types of PrPSc can be found to coexist in the same brain region or they can infect distinct districts. Such co-infection influences the vacuolization and the amyloid aggregates formation.95 Even the ratio between the different glycoforms is determined in a regionspecific manner according to the type of PrPSc (1 or 2) and the genotype of codon 129.




The high degree of phenotypic heterogeneity characterizing sCJD90 can lead to the conclusion that transmission studies will probably identify a broad panel of different prions with a great divergence between strains. However, quite surprisingly, many of the recent studies focusing on the characterization of sCJD subtypes have shown that there is a strong tendency to converge to a limited number of strains. This aspect can find an explanation considering the selection conditions, already described in this review, mediated by the environment in which the prion replicates and by the differences in the amino acid sequence of the PrPC. In particular, studies with bank voles96 and mice97 lead to results that support the idea that there are two principal strains responsible of the sCJD, M1 and V2, and two potential strains, M2 and V1, which need further studies to be confirmed.




Different is the case of vCJD. vCJD has been observed in 12 different countries, but in every registered case the same clinical and pathological characteristics have been found.39 In particular, the PrPSc responsible of the vCJD shows a peculiar WB profile, with the unglycosylated form of the protease-resistant PrPSc of 19 kDa (type 2) and a higher representation of the diglycosilated PrPSc (PrPSc 2B) compared with sCJD.39 Nevertheless, using specific antibodies against type 1 PrPSc, a small amount of PrPSc type 1 with a high percentage of diglycosilated form can be detected in association with PrPSc 2B.98 The 2B type is a useful marker for identifying the replication of BSE prions also in other species, including non-human primates.99 In addition, unlike sporadic and genetic CJD, in vCJD the same biological marker (2B type) has been found in all the analyzed brain areas.100 This strong biochemical and pathological homogeneity is in agreement with the hypothesis of the existence of a unique strain. However, unexpectedly, typization experiments of the strains in different transgenic models have given divergent results. In one of these studies, in a context of homotropic transmission, transgenic mice expressing high levels of human PrPC-M129 were inoculated with vCJD isolates coming from France and from the UK.101 All of the French isolates propagated as vCJD, with abundant amyloid plaques and presence of PrPSc 2B.102 Instead, the isolates from the UK led to the propagation of either vCJD or sCJD.103 In particular, the incubation time was shorter and the lesion profile was different compared with the one obtained with the propagation of the classical vCJD strain. Moreover, early replication of the typical agent of the vCJD in lymphoid tissues was detected, indicating that both strains were present in the inoculum.




This new strain with phenotypical features that were similar to sCJD was found to be of type 1 and the transmission in transgenic mice expressing the bovine PrPC failed, unlike the vCJD classical strain (Type 2B).26 The idea that the infection of vCJD contains a minor component of sCJD prions is supported by many pieces of evidence such as the presence of this prion strain at the first passage or the persistence of both types of PrPSc through serial passages in mice.98 In conclusion, although vCJD is one of the most standardized phenotypes among the prion human diseases characterized by a typical form of PrPSc, the transmission studies of vCJD have shown the great potential of divergence of prions, contrary to the results obtained from the studies of sCJD. This data challenge our ability to recognize the pathologies that can derive from the divergence of the BSE strains when they infect humans, both at the pathological and at the biochemical level.




Conclusion




The discovery of prions has led to new interpretations of the pathogenetic mechanism of protein misfolding diseases. Indeed, the common thought was that a protein misfolding disease could only be caused by a mutation in the primary sequence of an endogenous protein, but the discovery of prions changed this view. In fact, it was demonstrated that a seed of misfolded protein can arise from an exogenous infectious protein, which is able to act as a template or as a catalyst for the formation of new aberrant protein.5,6 Importantly, new evidence shows how processes similar to those described for prions could be implicated in the propagation of misfolded proteins of other neurodegenerative pathologies like Alzheimer disease, Parkinson disease, Huntington disease and amyotrophic lateral sclerosis.104,105




Certainly, one of the most puzzling aspects in the prion field is the existence of different strains of an infectious protein. Nevertheless, such diversity can be accommodated within the protein-only hypothesis, as several robust pieces of experimental evidence indicate that strain-specificity is encoded at the level of the different conformations that the pathogenic protein can adopt. The identification of factors and mechanisms influencing the generation of new prion strains or the selection, from a conformationally heterogeneous PrPSc population, of the most suitable prion conformation in a specific environment, represents an important milestone toward the understanding of the mechanisms of prion strain diversity, which can have fundamental clinical and therapeutic implications. Although considerable advances have been made in the understanding of the phenomenon of prion strains, many pieces of information are still missing, foremost among them the definitive evidence for the structural nature of the differences between prion strains.














Thursday, February 21, 2013


National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center Cases Examined January 16, 2013






16 YEAR OLD SPORADIC FFI ?




Monday, January 14, 2013


Gambetti et al USA Prion Unit change another highly suspect USA mad cow victim to another fake name i.e. sporadic FFI at age 16 CJD Foundation goes along with this BSe








Monday, December 31, 2012


Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease and Human TSE Prion Disease in Washington State, 2006–2011-2012








Tuesday, December 25, 2012


CREUTZFELDT JAKOB TSE PRION DISEASE HUMANS END OF YEAR REVIEW DECEMBER 25, 2012








Tuesday, June 26, 2012


Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Human TSE report update North America, Canada, Mexico, and USDA PRION UNIT as of May 18, 2012


type determination pending Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (tdpCJD), is on the rise in Canada and the USA








Wednesday, June 13, 2012


MEXICO IS UNDER or MIS DIAGNOSING CREUTZFELDT JAKOB DISEASE AND OTHER PRION DISEASE SOME WITH POSSIBLE nvCJD








*** The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans and animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of prion diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about the epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating this latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and Nor98.




VARIABLY PROTEASE-SENSITVE PRIONOPATHY IS TRANSMISSIBLE ...price of prion poker goes up again $


OR-10: Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy is transmissible in bank voles


Romolo Nonno,1 Michele Di Bari,1 Laura Pirisinu,1 Claudia D’Agostino,1 Stefano Marcon,1 Geraldina Riccardi,1 Gabriele Vaccari,1 Piero Parchi,2 Wenquan Zou,3 Pierluigi Gambetti,3 Umberto Agrimi1 1Istituto Superiore di Sanità; Rome, Italy; 2Dipartimento di Scienze Neurologiche, Università di Bologna; Bologna, Italy; 3Case Western Reserve University; Cleveland, OH USA


Background. Variably protease-sensitive prionopathy (VPSPr) is a recently described “sporadic”neurodegenerative disease involving prion protein aggregation, which has clinical similarities with non-Alzheimer dementias, such as fronto-temporal dementia. Currently, 30 cases of VPSPr have been reported in Europe and USA, of which 19 cases were homozygous for valine at codon 129 of the prion protein (VV), 8 were MV and 3 were MM. A distinctive feature of VPSPr is the electrophoretic pattern of PrPSc after digestion with proteinase K (PK). After PK-treatment, PrP from VPSPr forms a ladder-like electrophoretic pattern similar to that described in GSS cases. The clinical and pathological features of VPSPr raised the question of the correct classification of VPSPr among prion diseases or other forms of neurodegenerative disorders. Here we report preliminary data on the transmissibility and pathological features of VPSPr cases in bank voles.


Materials and Methods. Seven VPSPr cases were inoculated in two genetic lines of bank voles, carrying either methionine or isoleucine at codon 109 of the prion protein (named BvM109 and BvI109, respectively). Among the VPSPr cases selected, 2 were VV at PrP codon 129, 3 were MV and 2 were MM. Clinical diagnosis in voles was confirmed by brain pathological assessment and western blot for PK-resistant PrPSc (PrPres) with mAbs SAF32, SAF84, 12B2 and 9A2.


Results. To date, 2 VPSPr cases (1 MV and 1 MM) gave positive transmission in BvM109. Overall, 3 voles were positive with survival time between 290 and 588 d post inoculation (d.p.i.). All positive voles accumulated PrPres in the form of the typical PrP27–30, which was indistinguishable to that previously observed in BvM109 inoculated with sCJDMM1 cases.


In BvI109, 3 VPSPr cases (2 VV and 1 MM) showed positive transmission until now. Overall, 5 voles were positive with survival time between 281 and 596 d.p.i.. In contrast to what observed in BvM109, all BvI109 showed a GSS-like PrPSc electrophoretic pattern, characterized by low molecular weight PrPres. These PrPres fragments were positive with mAb 9A2 and 12B2, while being negative with SAF32 and SAF84, suggesting that they are cleaved at both the C-terminus and the N-terminus. Second passages are in progress from these first successful transmissions.


Conclusions. Preliminary results from transmission studies in bank voles strongly support the notion that VPSPr is a transmissible prion disease. Interestingly, VPSPr undergoes divergent evolution in the two genetic lines of voles, with sCJD-like features in BvM109 and GSS-like properties in BvI109.


The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans and animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of prion diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about the epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating this latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and Nor98.








Wednesday, March 28, 2012


VARIABLY PROTEASE-SENSITVE PRIONOPATHY IS TRANSMISSIBLE, price of prion poker goes up again $






*** The discovery of previously unrecognized prion diseases in both humans and animals (i.e., Nor98 in small ruminants) demonstrates that the range of prion diseases might be wider than expected and raises crucial questions about the epidemiology and strain properties of these new forms. We are investigating this latter issue by molecular and biological comparison of VPSPr, GSS and Nor98.




*** atypical Nor-98 Scrapie has spread from coast to coast in the USA 2012


NIAA Annual Conference April 11-14, 2011


San Antonio, Texas








Tuesday, March 5, 2013


Use of Materials Derived From Cattle in Human Food and Cosmetics; Reopening of the Comment Period FDA-2004-N-0188-0051 (TSS SUBMISSION)


FDA believes current regulation protects the public from BSE but reopens comment period due to new studies











TSS

Wednesday, March 7, 2012

Case-control study of cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy born after July 31, 1996 (BARB cases) in Great Britain

Veterinary Record doi:10.1136/vr.100097


Papers



Case-control study of cases of bovine spongiform encephalopathy born after July 31, 1996 (BARB cases) in Great Britain



A. Ortiz-Pelaez, DVM MSc PhD MRCVS1, M. A. Stevenson, MVSc, MACVSc, PhD2, J. W. Wilesmith, BVSc, MRCVS3, J. B. M. Ryan, BEd MBiol4 and A. J. C. Cook, BVM&S, MSc, CertPM, DipECVPH, MRCVS5



+ Author Affiliations



Epidemiology Group. Centre for Epidemiology and Risk Analysis, Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency (AHVLA), New Haw, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK EpiCentre, Institute of Veterinary, Animal and Biomedical Sciences. College of Sciences, Massey University, Private Bag 11-222, Palmerston North, New Zealand Barton, 1 Woodham Road, Woking, Surrey, GU21 4DL, UK Barton, 1 Woodham Road, Woking, Surrey, GU21 4DL, UK Epidemiology Group. Centre for Epidemiology and Risk Analysis, Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency (AHVLA), New Haw, Addlestone, Surrey KT15 3NB, UK



E-mail for correspondence angel.ortizpelaez@ahvla.gsi.gov.uk



This paper reports the results of a case-control study of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) cases born in Great Britain after the statutory reinforcement of the ban (BARB) on the feeding of mammalian-derived meat and bone meal on 31 July 1996.

A total of 499 suspect clinical cases of BSE, born after 31 July 1996, and reported negative by July 31, 1996 and were compared with the set of 164 confirmed Great BARB cases in Great Britain detected by both passive and active surveillance. Animal-level risk factors (age and type of feed offered) and herd-level risk factors (herd size and type, number of prereinforced feed ban BSE cases born on the holding, the presence of other domestic species and waste management) were obtained for the analysis.

BARB cases were 2.56 times (95 per cent CI 1.29 to 5.07) more likely to be exposed to homemix or a combination of homemix and proprietary feeds were 0.59 times (95 per cent CI 0.50 to 0.69) as less likely to be exposed to the unit increases in the number of prereinforced feed ban BSE cases diagnosed on the natal holding. A supplementary spatial analysis of these cases revealed three areas of excess BARB density: Northwest and Southwest of Wales and Northeast of Scotland.

Footnotes



Provenance not commissioned; externally peer reviewed

Accepted November 9, 2011.

Published Online First 18 January 2012



http://veterinaryrecord.bmj.com/content/early/2012/02/01/vr.100097.abstract







Prev Vet Med. 2012 Feb 29. [Epub ahead of print]

The epidemiology of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the Republic of Ireland before and after the reinforced feed ban.

Ryan E, McGrath G, Sheridan H, More SJ, Aznar I.

Source

Central Veterinary Research Laboratory, Department of Agriculture Laboratories, Backweston, Celbridge, Co. Kildare, Ireland.

Abstract

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a prion disease spread by the inclusion in cattle feed of meat and bone meal made from cattle infected with the BSE agent. In the Republic of Ireland, a reinforced feed ban on mammalian meat and bone meal (MMBM) was introduced on 17th October 1996 to stop further infection of cattle. Between then and July 2010, 44 cases of BSE from 40 herds have been born, termed "born after the reinforced ban" or "BARB" cases. The objectives of this project were: (a) to describe the epidemiology of these BARB cases, (b) to determine area-level risk factors for BSE herds and how they related to the stage of the BSE epidemic, and (c) to evaluate whether the spatial pattern of BSE cases was non-random and had changed over time. The BSE epidemic was divided into three phases: cases born prior to 1991, born 1991-October 1996 and BARB cases. To determine the area level risk factors for BSE herds, a case-control study was conducted for each phase of the epidemic. We selected four control herds for each herd with one or more BSE cases. A grid of hexagons of 10km diameter was created covering the territory of the Republic of Ireland and BSE herds and control herds were assigned to a hexagon. The numbers of cattle herds, dairy herds, piggeries and poultry holdings within the hexagons containing these case and control herds were enumerated. To evaluate the spatial pattern of BSE cases, standardised mortality ratios were calculated for each hexagon, and Oden's Ipop was used to investigate clustering. The descriptive analysis showed "feeding of concentrates" as the only common factor to all BARB cases for which information existed. The case-control study identified being a dairy herd as a risk factor during the pre-1991 phase of the BSE epidemic. Dairy herd type, a large proportion of local herds which were dairy and large numbers of piggeries and poultry holdings locally were also risk factors during the 1991-1996 phase. For the post-October 1996 phase (BARBs), dairy herd type and large numbers of other herds locally were risk factors. The spatial pattern of BSE cases changed over the three phases of the epidemic and was non-random, with evidence of clustering. The evidence supports the hypothesis that BARB cases do not arise spontaneously but rather are caused by the same food-borne infectious route as other BSE cases.

Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.



http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167587712000633





>>> The evidence supports the hypothesis that BARB cases do not arise spontaneously but rather are caused by the same food-borne infectious route as other BSE cases.





Wednesday, March 7, 2012

The epidemiology of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the Republic of Ireland before and after the reinforced feed ban


http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2012/03/epidemiology-of-bovine-spongiform.html








Subject: fifth BARB cases has been found in Northern Ireland -- 12 March 2003

Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2003 20:16:29 –0600

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de

######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########

12 March 2003 - A fifth BARB cases has been found in Northern Ireland. The cow was born in November 1997.

There have been a number of BSE cases in cattle born after the feed ban of July 1988 (BABs). These cases only count for around 25 percent of all BSE cases but are forming an increasing proportion of suspect cases being reported as the epidemic dies out. The first case of BSE in an animal born after the July 1988 Feed Ban was confirmed in March 1991, in an animal born in August 1988. In the following months a number of further BAB cases were confirmed. Detailed investigations were carried out to determine whether they were the result of food borne exposure or some other route of infection. These initial studies indicated that some feed manufactured before the ban had remained on farms and in the food chain and, despite the prohibition, was used after the ban was introduced. This using up of old, pre-ban feed is the most likely source of infection for a majority of cases in cattle born shortly after the feed ban.

In the tables below you will find details for cases in animals born after the enhanced feed ban of August 1996.

GB cases Date of birth Date BSE confirmed Method of detection Published details relevant to the case

1 25/08/1996 27/06/2000 Passive Surveillance Final report 2 20/05/1997 14/06/2001 Passive Surveillance News release 3 04/12/1996 11/07/2001 Passive Surveillance News release 4 18/01/1997 24/08/2001 Passive Surveillance Official Announcement[pdf file] 5 25/04/1997 28/08/2001 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Official Announcement[pdf file] 6 07/09/1996 06/12/2001 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Official Announcement[pdf file] 7 04/01/1997 17/01/2002 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file] 8 12/02/1997 22/01/2002 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file] 9 27/07/1997 06/02/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 10 30/07/1997 06/02/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 11 06/03/1997 26/02/2002 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file] 12A 29/09/1996 13/03/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 13 27/04/1997 27/03/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 14B 16/02/1998 27/02/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 15 27/08/1996 13/05/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 16 18/09/1996 13/05/2002 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file] 17 29/11/1997 13/05/2002 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file] 18C 28/06/1997 06/06/2002 Active Surveillance - Fallen Stock Survey Announcement[pdf file] 19 20/07/1998 08/08/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 20 04/03/1998 22/08/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 21 21/07/1998 03/09/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 22 22/08/1996 16/10/2002 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file] 23 08/11/1996 17/10/2002 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file] 24 21/02/1997 29/10/2002 Active Surveillance - Fallen Stock Survey Announcement[pdf file] 25 17/09/1997 30/10/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 26 04/10/1996 21/11/2002 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file] 27 14/02/1997 27/11/2002 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file] 28 12/02/1997 29/11/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 29 13/02/1997 17/12/2002 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file] 30 06/11/1998 09/01/2003 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file] 31 30/04/1997 04/02/2003 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 32 20/03/1997 19/02/2003 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file] 33 30/07/1997 19/02/2003 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file] 34 05/09/1997 03/03/2003 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file] 35 12/03/1999 04/03/2003 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file]



Notes: A case, confirmed on 12th December 2001, was previously listed in the above table as born on 16 August 1996. Further investigation has discovered that the animal was in fact born in 1994 and its details have therefore been removed.

A This animal originated in Eire and was imported into the UK at 20 months of age in 1998.

B The animal was initially recorded as born in 1995 and confirmed as having disease on 27/02/02. However, further investigation, completed on 10/04/02, has now revealed the true date of birth (February 1998).

C Due to a recording error this animal was originally described as having been taken in the Casualty Survey.

NI Cases Date of Birth Date BSE confirmed Method of detection

1 10/09/1996 08/02/2001 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey 2 01/06/1997 13/12/2001 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey 3 25/05/1999 01/02/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey 4 28/09/1997 30/08/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey 5 20/11/1997 05/03/2003 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey

[Incidence] [Reasons] [Prevention] Incidence



Investigations were continued as BAB cases were found to occur in animals born in 1989 and subsequent years. Due to the long mean incubation period of the disease (around five years) such animals did not appear in significant numbers until 1993 and later. These cases indicated that there might have been some leakage of the feed ban.

By Autumn 1994, it was apparent that the decline in the epidemic, which had begun in the spring of 1993, was occurring more slowly in those parts of the country in which the proportion of pigs and poultry relative to cattle was the greatest. Pig and poultry feed could, at that time, legitimately contain ruminant meat and bone meal (MBM) and in such areas there was a higher possibility of cross contamination of ruminant feed with MBM either in the feed mill, during transport or on farm. Also, in August 1994, samples of cattle feed taken on a farm were shown to contain ruminant MBM, demonstrating that such cross-contamination could occur in practice.

[top of page] [Incidence] [Reasons] [Prevention] Reasons for BAB cases

A case control study in 1994 looked in detail at possible causes of BSE in BAB animals. This study found no statistical significance of horizontal or vertical transmission of BSE in BAB cases and concluded that a food borne source of infection was the most likely explanation.

In order for BSE infectivity to be found in MBM, it is necessary for some tissue carrying BSE infectivity to enter the rendering chain. This would suggest some degree of failing in the Specified Bovine Material (SBM) then called Specified Bovine Offals (SBO) controls. The most likely source of this problem came from the practice of splitting skulls. Until 15 August 1995, when the practice was banned, skulls could be split to remove the brain, allowing the remaining bone to be sent for rendering to meat and bone meal. Observation showed that brain material sometimes remained in the skull, providing a significant route by which infectivity could enter MBM. Research showed that as little as 1g of unprocessed brain from a clinically affected cow would cause infection and eventually disease when fed to calves.

Other SBM may not have been adequately separated from non-SBM material either, providing another potential route of infection.

Cross-contamination of feed production in the mill could then lead to the infected MBM entering cattle rations.

Alternatively, a farmer might, accidentally or deliberately, feed cattle with pig or poultry rations, which could legitimately contain MBM.

It is significant that research has since shown that some of the rendering systems in use until December 1994 had virtually no effect on any BSE infectivity present.



[top of page] [Incidence] [Reasons] [Prevention] Prevention of cross-contamination



The controls on the handling of SBMs were strengthened in August 1995, particularly to further protect animal health. They required that the whole skull (with the exception of the tongue) must be disposed of as an SBM and required rendering plants to use dedicated lines for the processing of SBM tissues.

In April 1996 the use of mammalian MBM was banned in all feed for farmed animals. This was not as a result of fears that non-ruminant species may catch BSE by oral exposure, but rather to remove any possible risk of cross-contamination of cattle rations in feed mills, during transport or on farms with MBM intended for other species. From August 1996 it became an offence (save in very tightly defined and controlled circumstances) to hold mammalian MBM on farms or in feed mills and premises where livestock feed is used, produced, prepared or stored.

A test has now been developed to look for evidence of mammalian protein in feed, but because of the complex nature of compound feed, and consequent risks of cross-reactions, further improvements will be essential. Up to 24,000 samples a year can now be tested.

http://www.defra.gov.uk/



TSS



########### http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############



-------- Original Message --------

Subject: BSE has been diagnosed in a cow born in April 2000

Date: Sun, 08 Aug 2004 20:28:58 –0500

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

© Defra 2004 A BSE case born in April 2000 BSE has been diagnosed in a Limousin Cross cow, born on 01 April 2000, forty-four months after 1 August 1996, when extra control measures on animal feed containing mammalian meat and bone meal (MMBM) were considered to have been fully implemented. The animal was taken under passive surveillance as a clinical suspect. Its farm of origin was in Derbyshire, where it remained until it was slaughtered as a BSE suspect on 25 June 2004. Disease was officially confirmed on 04 August 2004. This is the most recently born case of BSE confirmed in the UK. It was always expected that a small number of cases would be born after the feed ban, and the appearance of these cases is in no way unexpected.

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/animal-health/010400.pdf




© Defra 2003 Page 1 of 3 BSE Cases Born on or After 1 August 1996:

Q & A Q. What is significant about the date 1 August 1996?

A. Since BSE was first recognised, controls on animal feed have been central to the UK s eradication policy. It is believed that most infected cattle were primarily exposed to the BSE agent through feed containing meat and bone meal (MBM) produced by the rendering of ruminant material. Since 1988, extensive regulatory controls have been introduced by the Government and the EU to keep potentially infectious material out of ruminant feed, with the aim of removing exposure to BSE. In 1996, controls were extended to prevent the feeding of mammalian MBM to all farmed livestock, in order to avoid any possibility of cross-contamination with feed for pigs and poultry. Since 1 August 1996 it has been an offence to possess mammalian MBM on premises where livestock feed is used, produced, prepared or stored. Q. What are the possible causes of BSE cases in cattle born after 1 August 1996? A. Scientific advice suggests that the following routes of transmission might be theoretically possible: (a) some animals might have been exposed to BSE through feed carried over from before 1 August 1996 (either accidentally or deliberately); or (b) some animals might have been exposed to BSE through maternal transmission; or (c) there may be routes of transmission which have not yet been identified. Possibilities include environmental contamination, contamination of imported feed ingredients and the use of tallow-based calf milk replacer; and/or (d) the disease may occur spontaneously in a small number of cases. © Defra 2003 Page 2 of 3 Q. What are the implications if further post-August 1996 cases continue to appear? A. The latest opinion of the EU Scientific Steering Committee, adopted on 10-11 April 2003, effectively removed its previous threshold for concern of 55 of these cases during a 12 month period. This figure was derived some time ago and assumes that 10% of such cases would be due to maternal transmission. The SSC concluded that: These model-based estimates have been overtaken by two sources of subsequent intelligence , i.e. the results of the Community-wide active surveillance programme and the fact that the majority of BARB cases are unlikely to have been caused by maternal transmission. There is likely to be a small increase in case numbers as animals born in 1996 and 1997 reach the peak-risk age for clinical BSE and animals from the 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 cohorts may be expected to contribute more cases. Q. What are the human health implications of these cases? A. There are no public health implications arising from these cases. Even if the animals involved had not been suffering from BSE, because they have all been over thirty months old they would have been excluded from human or animal consumption. Any surviving offspring born after August 1996 are traced and excluded from human consumption too. Q. What if the over thirty months rule is scrapped? A. All over thirty month cattle would need to be tested for BSE before they could enter the food chain. Any cows that tested positive for BSE would be destroyed. The BSE test was rigorously checked before it came into use. No incorrect results were found. More than 20 million cattle have now been tested throughout the European Union. In the UK, more than 600,000 cattle have been tested. Q. Has the Department investigated the cause of individual post-August 1996 animals? A. All such cases are the subject of detailed veterinary enquiries. Although it is very difficult to show how individual animals contracted BSE, veterinary advisers see no indication that maternal transmission could explain the majority of these cases either the dams are still alive and healthy, or they were slaughtered without exhibiting signs of BSE long after the birth of the affected progeny. Similarly, whilst exposure from an environmental source cannot be eliminated, it would appear unlikely based on the results of enquiries into the cause of individual cases and in the absence of other BSE cases on a number of the affected farms. The evidence thus seems to point to a feed-borne source as the most likely explanation for the BARB cases. © Defra 2003 Page 3 of 3 Q. So, are there major problems with the UK feed ban? A. Domestic feed controls are enforced by a major sampling programme under which around 16-18,000 samples are taken each year from different premises. The results of the sampling programme indicate a high level of compliance with the feed ban. In 2003, EU scientists have also indicated that there are so far no reasons to assume widespread and systematic inappropriate implementation of the current feed ban of 1996 . Q. What else is the Government doing to follow up these cases? A. Epidemiological investigations will continue in all cases and a specific study is being planned to investigate the possible reasons for the occurrence of these cases. In addition, the cohorts of the affected animals (animals born 12 months before and after the index case and which may have been exposed to the same source of infection) are identified. When these animals are slaughtered, brain samples are taken to see if they have also been affected. These cohort animals are also excluded from human consumption but they are not slaughtered immediately. Monitoring their progress allows them to develop signs of disease, and ensure that important epidemiological evidence is not destroyed. Q. What tests are used to diagnose BSE cases? Descriptions of the tests used to diagnose BSE are available on the DEFRA website under Science/Research into BSE/Diagnosis of BSE. Q. Does the appearance of post-August 1996 cases mean that the epidemic is not declining as predicted? A. No. The overall BSE epidemic in Great Britain continues to decline by around 40 per cent a year. In 1992, approximately 37,000 clinical cases were detected. Last year there were just over 1,000. Q. Have other EU member states experienced BSE cases in young animals (i.e. born since 1 August 1996)? A. Yes. Most EU member states have recorded cases born after this date. The highest numbers have been recorded in France, Germany, Portugal and Spain. It should be noted, however, that these countries have carried out more active surveillance than the UK over time, because they are required to test all cattle over 30 months old which are sold for human consumption. At present, the UK tests only cattle aged more than 42 months and born after August 1996, plus a sample of 10,000 older cattle slaughtered under our Over 30 Months Scheme. In addition, a fully effective feed ban in the EU was not put in place until January 2001. Details on the numbers of cases and their dates of birth are available on the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) website and on individual countries websites accessed via the OIE website.


http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/animal-health/barbq%2Ba.pdf






TSS



==================================



3. TSEs in Cattle

We predict a continued decline in cases of BSE in the EU and estimate fewer than 75 cases in UK by the end of 2007 (compared to 114 in 2006). The majority of cases are still being detected in cattle born before the 1996 feed ban. The Older Cattle Disposal Scheme closes at the end of 2008 and we are working with industry to maximise the uptake. The prevalence in successive BARB birth cohorts is extremely low and appears to be decreasing. However, as the pre-1996 cattle population declines, BARBs will form an increasing percentage of the total number of cases.

The overall prevalence of atypical BSE appears low. Two cases of atypical BSE have been detected in UK to date in older cattle. Oral challenge studies are being planned in Europe and Japan which will provide further information on the pathogenesis. While the aetiology of atypical BSE remains unknown the long term consequences for the maintenance of key BSE controls remains uncertain.

snip...full text 10 pages ;



http://www.seac.gov.uk/papers/99-5.pdf





==================================



ITEM 6 – BARB CASE CLUSTERS

> > 39. Professor John Wilesmith (Defra) updated the committee on the

> > BSE cases born after the 1996 reinforced mammalian meat and

> > bone meal ban in the UK (BARB cases). Around 116 BARB cases

> > had been identified in Great Britain up to 22 November 2005,

> > mostly through active surveillance. BARB cases had decreased in

> > successive birth cohorts, from 44 in the 1996/1997 cohort to none

> > to date in the 2000/2001 cohort. However, 3 BARB cases had

> > been identified in the 2001/2002 cohort. Backcalculation of the

> > prevalence of BARB cases indicated a drop from 130 infected

> > animals per million (95% confidence interval 90-190) in the

> > 1996/1997 cohort to 30 infected animals per million (95%

> > confidence interval 10-60) in the 1999/2000 cohort. A shift in the

> > geographical distribution of BSE cases, from the concentration of

> > pre-1996 BSE cases in Eastern England to a more uniform

> > 14

> > © SEAC 2005

> > distribution of BARB cases, had occurred. However, it appeared

> > that certain post-1996 cohorts had a higher exposure to BSE in

> > certain areas for limited periods. Several clusters of BARB cases

> > within herds had been identified (5 pairs, 2 triplets and 1

> > quadruplet).

> > 40. A triplet of BARB cases in South West Wales had been

> > investigated in detail. The triplet comprised 2 cases born in

> > September and October 2001 and a third in May 2002. The

> > animals born in 2001 were reared outdoors from the spring of 2002

> > but the animal born in 2002 had been reared indoors. Further

> > investigation of feeding practices revealed that a new feed bin for

> > the adult dairy herd had been installed in September 1998. In July

> > 2002 the feed bin was emptied, but not cleaned, and relocated. All

> > 3 BARB cases received feed from the relocated bin. This finding

> > suggested the hypothesis that the feed bin installed in September

> > 1998 was filled initially with contaminated feed, that remnants of

> > this feed fell to the bottom of the bin during its relocation, and thus

> > young animals in the 2001/2002 birth cohort were exposed to

> > feedstuffs produced in 1998. No adult cattle had been infected

> > because of the reduced susceptibility to BSE with increasing age.

> > 41. Further investigation of multiple case herds had found no

> > association of BARB clusters with the closure of feed mills.

> > 42. Professor Wilesmith concluded that there is evidence of a decline

> > in risk of infection for successive birth cohorts of cattle. The BARB

> > epidemic is unlikely to be sustained by animals born after 31 July

> > 2000. Feed bins could represent a continued source of occasional

> > infection and advice to farmers is being formulated to reduce this

> > risk. There is no evidence for an indigenous source of infection for

> > the BARB cases.

> > 43. Members considered it encouraging that no other factor, apart from

> > feed contamination, had been identified as a possible cause of

> > BARB cases to date. Members commented that this study

> > suggests that only a small amount of contaminated feed may be

> > required for infection and that BSE infectivity can survive in the

> > environment for several years. Professor Wilesmith agreed and

> > noted that infection caused by small doses of infectious material

> > was consistent with other studies, and it would appear there is little

> > dilution of infectivity, if present, in the rendering system.

> > Additionally it appeared that the infectious agent had survived for 4

> > years in the feed bin.

> > 44. The Chair thanked Professor Wilesmith for his presentation.

> > > > snip...

> > > > http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/final90.pdf

> > > TSS


> > #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html > ####################



Wednesday, March 7, 2012




ANOTHER COW NOT TESTED FOR BSE AKA MAD COW LIKELY TO HAVE BEEN EATEN UK 2012


http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/03/another-cow-not-tested-for-bse-aka-mad.html





Thursday, March 01, 2012




Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease Fact sheet N°180 Revised February 2012 W.H.O.


http://vcjd.blogspot.com/2012/03/variant-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-fact.html





Saturday, March 03, 2012



The contribution of different prion protein types and host polymorphisms to clinicopathological variations in Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease




Mark W. Head*, James W. Ironside Article first published online: 28 FEB 2012


http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/03/contribution-of-different-prion-protein.html





Thursday, February 16, 2012




Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE




31 USA SENATORS ASK PRESIDENT OBAMA TO HELP SPREAD MAD COW DISEASE 2012


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-bse-31.html





Thursday, February 23, 2012




EIGHT FORMER SECRETARIES OF AGRICULTURE SPEAKING AT USDA'S 2012 AGRICULTURE OUTLOOK FORUM INDUCTED INTO USA MAD COW HALL OF SHAME


http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/02/eight-former-secretaries-of-agriculture.html





Sunday, February 5, 2012 February 2012




Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/february-2012-update-on-feed.html






10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007

Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST

RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html

NEW URL

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm






Thursday, March 19, 2009


MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html







Tuesday, March 2, 2010



Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-proteins-prohibited-in-ruminant.html





Monday, March 1, 2010



ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010



http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html







TSS

The epidemiology of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the Republic of Ireland before and after the reinforced feed ban

Prev Vet Med. 2012 Feb 29. [Epub ahead of print]




The epidemiology of bovine spongiform encephalopathy in the Republic of Ireland before and after the reinforced feed ban.


Ryan E, McGrath G, Sheridan H, More SJ, Aznar I.

Source

Central Veterinary Research Laboratory, Department of Agriculture Laboratories, Backweston, Celbridge, Co. Kildare, Ireland.

Abstract

Bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) is a prion disease spread by the inclusion in cattle feed of meat and bone meal made from cattle infected with the BSE agent. In the Republic of Ireland, a reinforced feed ban on mammalian meat and bone meal (MMBM) was introduced on 17th October 1996 to stop further infection of cattle. Between then and July 2010, 44 cases of BSE from 40 herds have been born, termed "born after the reinforced ban" or "BARB" cases. The objectives of this project were: (a) to describe the epidemiology of these BARB cases, (b) to determine area-level risk factors for BSE herds and how they related to the stage of the BSE epidemic, and (c) to evaluate whether the spatial pattern of BSE cases was non-random and had changed over time. The BSE epidemic was divided into three phases: cases born prior to 1991, born 1991-October 1996 and BARB cases. To determine the area level risk factors for BSE herds, a case-control study was conducted for each phase of the epidemic. We selected four control herds for each herd with one or more BSE cases. A grid of hexagons of 10km diameter was created covering the territory of the Republic of Ireland and BSE herds and control herds were assigned to a hexagon. The numbers of cattle herds, dairy herds, piggeries and poultry holdings within the hexagons containing these case and control herds were enumerated. To evaluate the spatial pattern of BSE cases, standardised mortality ratios were calculated for each hexagon, and Oden's Ipop was used to investigate clustering. The descriptive analysis showed "feeding of concentrates" as the only common factor to all BARB cases for which information existed. The case-control study identified being a dairy herd as a risk factor during the pre-1991 phase of the BSE epidemic. Dairy herd type, a large proportion of local herds which were dairy and large numbers of piggeries and poultry holdings locally were also risk factors during the 1991-1996 phase. For the post-October 1996 phase (BARBs), dairy herd type and large numbers of other herds locally were risk factors. The spatial pattern of BSE cases changed over the three phases of the epidemic and was non-random, with evidence of clustering. The evidence supports the hypothesis that BARB cases do not arise spontaneously but rather are caused by the same food-borne infectious route as other BSE cases.

Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.


http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167587712000633






>>> The evidence supports the hypothesis that BARB cases do not arise spontaneously but rather are caused by the same food-borne infectious route as other BSE cases.




Subject: fifth BARB cases has been found in Northern Ireland -- 12 March 2003

Date: Thu, 13 Mar 2003 20:16:29 –0600

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

Reply-To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy

To: BSE-L@uni-karlsruhe.de


######## Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #########


12 March 2003 - A fifth BARB cases has been found in Northern Ireland.
The cow was born in November 1997.



There have been a number of BSE cases in cattle born after the feed ban
of July 1988 (BABs). These cases only count for around 25 percent of all
BSE cases but are forming an increasing proportion of suspect cases
being reported as the epidemic dies out. The first case of BSE in an
animal born after the July 1988 Feed Ban was confirmed in March 1991, in
an animal born in August 1988. In the following months a number of
further BAB cases were confirmed. Detailed investigations were carried
out to determine whether they were the result of food borne exposure or
some other route of infection. These initial studies indicated that some
feed manufactured before the ban had remained on farms and in the food
chain and, despite the prohibition, was used after the ban was
introduced. This using up of old, pre-ban feed is the most likely source
of infection for a majority of cases in cattle born shortly after the
feed ban.



In the tables below you will find details for cases in animals born
after the enhanced feed ban of August 1996.



GB cases Date of birth Date BSE confirmed Method of detection Published
details relevant to the case



1 25/08/1996 27/06/2000 Passive Surveillance Final report
2 20/05/1997 14/06/2001 Passive Surveillance News release
3 04/12/1996 11/07/2001 Passive Surveillance News release
4 18/01/1997 24/08/2001 Passive Surveillance Official Announcement[pdf file]
5 25/04/1997 28/08/2001 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Official
Announcement[pdf file]
6 07/09/1996 06/12/2001 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Official
Announcement[pdf file]
7 04/01/1997 17/01/2002 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file]
8 12/02/1997 22/01/2002 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file]
9 27/07/1997 06/02/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
Announcement[pdf file]
10 30/07/1997 06/02/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
Announcement[pdf file]
11 06/03/1997 26/02/2002 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file]
12A 29/09/1996 13/03/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
Announcement[pdf file]
13 27/04/1997 27/03/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
Announcement[pdf file]
14B 16/02/1998 27/02/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
Announcement[pdf file]
15 27/08/1996 13/05/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
Announcement[pdf file]
16 18/09/1996 13/05/2002 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file]
17 29/11/1997 13/05/2002 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file]
18C 28/06/1997 06/06/2002 Active Surveillance - Fallen Stock Survey
Announcement[pdf file]
19 20/07/1998 08/08/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
Announcement[pdf file]
20 04/03/1998
22/08/2002
Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file]
21 21/07/1998 03/09/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
Announcement[pdf file]
22 22/08/1996 16/10/2002 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file]
23 08/11/1996 17/10/2002 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file]
24 21/02/1997 29/10/2002 Active Surveillance - Fallen Stock Survey
Announcement[pdf file]
25 17/09/1997 30/10/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
Announcement[pdf file]
26 04/10/1996 21/11/2002 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file]
27 14/02/1997 27/11/2002 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file]
28 12/02/1997 29/11/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
Announcement[pdf file]
29 13/02/1997 17/12/2002 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file]
30 06/11/1998 09/01/2003 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file]
31
30/04/1997
04/02/2003
Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey Announcement[pdf file]
32 20/03/1997 19/02/2003 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
Announcement[pdf file]
33 30/07/1997 19/02/2003 Active Surveillance - OTMS Announcement[pdf file]
34 05/09/1997 03/03/2003 Passive Surveillance Announcement[pdf file]
35 12/03/1999 04/03/2003 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
Announcement[pdf file]




Notes:


A case, confirmed on 12th December 2001, was previously listed in the
above table as born on 16 August 1996. Further investigation has
discovered that the animal was in fact born in 1994 and its details have
therefore been removed.



A This animal originated in Eire and was imported into the UK at 20
months of age in 1998.



B The animal was initially recorded as born in 1995 and confirmed as
having disease on 27/02/02. However, further investigation, completed on
10/04/02, has now revealed the true date of birth (February 1998).



C Due to a recording error this animal was originally described as
having been taken in the Casualty Survey.



NI Cases Date of Birth Date BSE confirmed Method of detection



1 10/09/1996 08/02/2001 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
2 01/06/1997 13/12/2001 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
3 25/05/1999 01/02/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
4 28/09/1997 30/08/2002 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey
5 20/11/1997 05/03/2003 Active Surveillance - Casualty Survey


[Incidence] [Reasons] [Prevention]
Incidence




Investigations were continued as BAB cases were found to occur in
animals born in 1989 and subsequent years. Due to the long mean
incubation period of the disease (around five years) such animals did
not appear in significant numbers until 1993 and later. These cases
indicated that there might have been some leakage of the feed ban.



By Autumn 1994, it was apparent that the decline in the epidemic, which
had begun in the spring of 1993, was occurring more slowly in those
parts of the country in which the proportion of pigs and poultry
relative to cattle was the greatest. Pig and poultry feed could, at that
time, legitimately contain ruminant meat and bone meal (MBM) and in such
areas there was a higher possibility of cross contamination of ruminant
feed with MBM either in the feed mill, during transport or on farm.
Also, in August 1994, samples of cattle feed taken on a farm were shown
to contain ruminant MBM, demonstrating that such cross-contamination
could occur in practice.



[top of page] [Incidence] [Reasons] [Prevention]
Reasons for BAB cases



A case control study in 1994 looked in detail at possible causes of BSE
in BAB animals. This study found no statistical significance of
horizontal or vertical transmission of BSE in BAB cases and concluded
that a food borne source of infection was the most likely explanation.



In order for BSE infectivity to be found in MBM, it is necessary for
some tissue carrying BSE infectivity to enter the rendering chain. This
would suggest some degree of failing in the Specified Bovine Material
(SBM) then called Specified Bovine Offals (SBO) controls. The most
likely source of this problem came from the practice of splitting
skulls. Until 15 August 1995, when the practice was banned, skulls could
be split to remove the brain, allowing the remaining bone to be sent for
rendering to meat and bone meal. Observation showed that brain material
sometimes remained in the skull, providing a significant route by which
infectivity could enter MBM. Research showed that as little as 1g of
unprocessed brain from a clinically affected cow would cause infection
and eventually disease when fed to calves.



Other SBM may not have been adequately separated from non-SBM material
either, providing another potential route of infection.


Cross-contamination of feed production in the mill could then lead to
the infected MBM entering cattle rations.



Alternatively, a farmer might, accidentally or deliberately, feed cattle
with pig or poultry rations, which could legitimately contain MBM.



It is significant that research has since shown that some of the
rendering systems in use until December 1994 had virtually no effect on
any BSE infectivity present.



[top of page] [Incidence] [Reasons] [Prevention]
Prevention of cross-contamination




The controls on the handling of SBMs were strengthened in August 1995,
particularly to further protect animal health. They required that the
whole skull (with the exception of the tongue) must be disposed of as an
SBM and required rendering plants to use dedicated lines for the
processing of SBM tissues.



In April 1996 the use of mammalian MBM was banned in all feed for farmed
animals. This was not as a result of fears that non-ruminant species may
catch BSE by oral exposure, but rather to remove any possible risk of
cross-contamination of cattle rations in feed mills, during transport or
on farms with MBM intended for other species. From August 1996 it became
an offence (save in very tightly defined and controlled circumstances)
to hold mammalian MBM on farms or in feed mills and premises where
livestock feed is used, produced, prepared or stored.



A test has now been developed to look for evidence of mammalian protein
in feed, but because of the complex nature of compound feed, and
consequent risks of cross-reactions, further improvements will be
essential. Up to 24,000 samples a year can now be tested.



http://www.defra.gov.uk/





TSS




########### http://mailhost.rz.uni-karlsruhe.de/warc/bse-l.html ############






-------- Original Message --------

Subject: BSE has been diagnosed in a cow born in April 2000

Date: Sun, 08 Aug 2004 20:28:58 –0500

From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."

To: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy



© Defra 2004

A BSE case born in April 2000

BSE has been diagnosed in a Limousin Cross cow, born on 01 April 2000, forty-four months after 1 August 1996, when extra control measures on animal feed containing mammalian meat and bone meal (MMBM) were considered to have been fully implemented. The animal was taken under passive surveillance as a clinical suspect. Its farm of origin was in Derbyshire, where it remained until it was slaughtered as a BSE suspect on 25 June 2004. Disease was officially confirmed on 04 August 2004.

This is the most recently born case of BSE confirmed in the UK. It was always expected that a small number of cases would be born after the feed ban, and the appearance of these cases is in no way unexpected.

http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/animal-health/010400.pdf



© Defra 2003 Page 1 of 3

BSE Cases Born on or After 1 August 1996: Q & A

Q. What is significant about the date 1 August 1996?

A. Since BSE was first recognised, controls on animal feed have been central to the UK s eradication policy. It is believed that most infected cattle were primarily exposed to the BSE agent through feed containing meat and bone meal (MBM) produced by the rendering of ruminant material. Since 1988, extensive regulatory controls have been introduced by the Government and the EU to keep potentially infectious material out of ruminant feed, with the aim of removing exposure to BSE. In 1996, controls were extended to prevent the feeding of mammalian MBM to all farmed livestock, in order to avoid any possibility of cross-contamination with feed for pigs and poultry. Since 1 August 1996 it has been an offence to possess mammalian MBM on premises where livestock feed is used, produced, prepared or stored.

Q. What are the possible causes of BSE cases in cattle born after 1 August 1996? A. Scientific advice suggests that the following routes of transmission might be theoretically possible:

(a) some animals might have been exposed to BSE through feed carried over from before 1 August 1996 (either accidentally or deliberately); or

(b) some animals might have been exposed to BSE through maternal transmission; or

(c) there may be routes of transmission which have not yet been identified. Possibilities include environmental contamination, contamination of imported feed ingredients and the use of tallow-based calf milk replacer; and/or

(d) the disease may occur spontaneously in a small number of cases.

© Defra 2003 Page 2 of 3

Q. What are the implications if further post-August 1996 cases continue to appear?

A. The latest opinion of the EU Scientific Steering Committee, adopted on 10-11 April 2003, effectively removed its previous threshold for concern of 55 of these cases during a 12 month period. This figure was derived some time ago and assumes that 10% of such cases would be due to maternal transmission. The SSC concluded that: These model-based estimates have been overtaken by two sources of subsequent intelligence , i.e. the results of the Community-wide active surveillance programme and the fact that the majority of BARB cases are unlikely to have been caused by maternal transmission. There is likely to be a small increase in case numbers as animals born in 1996 and 1997 reach the peak-risk age for clinical BSE and animals from the 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 cohorts may be expected to contribute more cases.

Q. What are the human health implications of these cases?

A. There are no public health implications arising from these cases. Even if the animals involved had not been suffering from BSE, because they have all been over thirty months old they would have been excluded from human or animal consumption. Any surviving offspring born after August 1996 are traced and excluded from human consumption too.

Q. What if the over thirty months rule is scrapped?

A. All over thirty month cattle would need to be tested for BSE before they could enter the food chain. Any cows that tested positive for BSE would be destroyed.

The BSE test was rigorously checked before it came into use. No incorrect results were found. More than 20 million cattle have now been tested throughout the European Union. In the UK, more than 600,000 cattle have been tested.

Q. Has the Department investigated the cause of individual post-August 1996 animals?

A. All such cases are the subject of detailed veterinary enquiries. Although it is very difficult to show how individual animals contracted BSE, veterinary advisers see no indication that maternal transmission could explain the majority of these cases either the dams are still alive and healthy, or they were slaughtered without exhibiting signs of BSE long after the birth of the affected progeny. Similarly, whilst exposure from an environmental source cannot be eliminated, it would appear unlikely based on the results of enquiries into the cause of individual cases and in the absence of other BSE cases on a number of the affected farms. The evidence thus seems to point to a feed-borne source as the most likely explanation for the BARB cases.

© Defra 2003 Page 3 of 3

Q. So, are there major problems with the UK feed ban?

A. Domestic feed controls are enforced by a major sampling programme under which around 16-18,000 samples are taken each year from different premises. The results of the sampling programme indicate a high level of compliance with the feed ban. In 2003, EU scientists have also indicated that there are so far no reasons to assume widespread and systematic inappropriate implementation of the current feed ban of 1996 .

Q. What else is the Government doing to follow up these cases?

A. Epidemiological investigations will continue in all cases and a specific study is being planned to investigate the possible reasons for the occurrence of these cases. In addition, the cohorts of the affected animals (animals born 12 months before and after the index case and which may have been exposed to the same source of infection) are identified. When these animals are slaughtered, brain samples are taken to see if they have also been affected. These cohort animals are also excluded from human consumption but they are not slaughtered immediately. Monitoring their progress allows them to develop signs of disease, and ensure that important epidemiological evidence is not destroyed.

Q. What tests are used to diagnose BSE cases?

Descriptions of the tests used to diagnose BSE are available on the DEFRA website under Science/Research into BSE/Diagnosis of BSE.

Q. Does the appearance of post-August 1996 cases mean that the epidemic is not declining as predicted?

A. No. The overall BSE epidemic in Great Britain continues to decline by around 40 per cent a year. In 1992, approximately 37,000 clinical cases were detected. Last year there were just over 1,000.

Q. Have other EU member states experienced BSE cases in young animals (i.e. born since 1 August 1996)?

A. Yes. Most EU member states have recorded cases born after this date. The highest numbers have been recorded in France, Germany, Portugal and Spain. It should be noted, however, that these countries have carried out more active surveillance than the UK over time, because they are required to test all cattle over 30 months old which are sold for human consumption. At present, the UK tests only cattle aged more than 42 months and born after August 1996, plus a sample of 10,000 older cattle slaughtered under our Over 30 Months Scheme. In addition, a fully effective feed ban in the EU was not put in place until January 2001. Details on the numbers of cases and their dates of birth are available on the Office International des Epizooties (OIE) website and on individual countries websites accessed via the OIE website.



http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/animal-health/barbq%2Ba.pdf





TSS





==================================




3. TSEs in Cattle


We predict a continued decline in cases of BSE in the EU and estimate fewer
than 75 cases in UK by the end of 2007 (compared to 114 in 2006). The
majority of cases are still being detected in cattle born before the 1996
feed ban. The Older Cattle Disposal Scheme closes at the end of 2008 and we
are working with industry to maximise the uptake. The prevalence in
successive BARB birth cohorts is extremely low and appears to be decreasing.
However, as the pre-1996 cattle population declines, BARBs will form an
increasing percentage of the total number of cases.


The overall prevalence of atypical BSE appears low. Two cases of atypical
BSE have been detected in UK to date in older cattle. Oral challenge studies
are being planned in Europe and Japan which will provide further information
on the pathogenesis. While the aetiology of atypical BSE remains unknown the
long term consequences for the maintenance of key BSE controls remains
uncertain.


snip...full text 10 pages ;


http://www.seac.gov.uk/papers/99-5.pdf





==================================






ITEM 6 – BARB CASE CLUSTERS

> > 39. Professor John Wilesmith (Defra) updated the committee on the

> > BSE cases born after the 1996 reinforced mammalian meat and

> > bone meal ban in the UK (BARB cases). Around 116 BARB cases

> > had been identified in Great Britain up to 22 November 2005,

> > mostly through active surveillance. BARB cases had decreased in

> > successive birth cohorts, from 44 in the 1996/1997 cohort to none

> > to date in the 2000/2001 cohort. However, 3 BARB cases had

> > been identified in the 2001/2002 cohort. Backcalculation of the

> > prevalence of BARB cases indicated a drop from 130 infected

> > animals per million (95% confidence interval 90-190) in the

> > 1996/1997 cohort to 30 infected animals per million (95%

> > confidence interval 10-60) in the 1999/2000 cohort. A shift in the

> > geographical distribution of BSE cases, from the concentration of

> > pre-1996 BSE cases in Eastern England to a more uniform

> > 14

> > © SEAC 2005

> > distribution of BARB cases, had occurred. However, it appeared

> > that certain post-1996 cohorts had a higher exposure to BSE in

> > certain areas for limited periods. Several clusters of BARB cases

> > within herds had been identified (5 pairs, 2 triplets and 1

> > quadruplet).

> > 40. A triplet of BARB cases in South West Wales had been

> > investigated in detail. The triplet comprised 2 cases born in

> > September and October 2001 and a third in May 2002. The

> > animals born in 2001 were reared outdoors from the spring of 2002

> > but the animal born in 2002 had been reared indoors. Further

> > investigation of feeding practices revealed that a new feed bin for

> > the adult dairy herd had been installed in September 1998. In July

> > 2002 the feed bin was emptied, but not cleaned, and relocated. All

> > 3 BARB cases received feed from the relocated bin. This finding

> > suggested the hypothesis that the feed bin installed in September

> > 1998 was filled initially with contaminated feed, that remnants of

> > this feed fell to the bottom of the bin during its relocation, and thus

> > young animals in the 2001/2002 birth cohort were exposed to

> > feedstuffs produced in 1998. No adult cattle had been infected

> > because of the reduced susceptibility to BSE with increasing age.

> > 41. Further investigation of multiple case herds had found no

> > association of BARB clusters with the closure of feed mills.

> > 42. Professor Wilesmith concluded that there is evidence of a decline

> > in risk of infection for successive birth cohorts of cattle. The BARB

> > epidemic is unlikely to be sustained by animals born after 31 July

> > 2000. Feed bins could represent a continued source of occasional

> > infection and advice to farmers is being formulated to reduce this

> > risk. There is no evidence for an indigenous source of infection for

> > the BARB cases.

> > 43. Members considered it encouraging that no other factor, apart from

> > feed contamination, had been identified as a possible cause of

> > BARB cases to date. Members commented that this study

> > suggests that only a small amount of contaminated feed may be

> > required for infection and that BSE infectivity can survive in the

> > environment for several years. Professor Wilesmith agreed and

> > noted that infection caused by small doses of infectious material

> > was consistent with other studies, and it would appear there is little

> > dilution of infectivity, if present, in the rendering system.

> > Additionally it appeared that the infectious agent had survived for 4

> > years in the feed bin.

> > 44. The Chair thanked Professor Wilesmith for his presentation.

> > > > snip...

> > > > http://www.seac.gov.uk/minutes/final90.pdf

> > > TSS


> > #################### https://lists.aegee.org/bse-l.html > ####################



Wednesday, March 7, 2012



ANOTHER COW NOT TESTED FOR BSE AKA MAD COW LIKELY TO HAVE BEEN EATEN UK 2012


http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2012/03/another-cow-not-tested-for-bse-aka-mad.html





Thursday, March 01, 2012


Variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease Fact sheet N°180 Revised February 2012 W.H.O.


http://vcjd.blogspot.com/2012/03/variant-creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-fact.html





Saturday, March 03, 2012


The contribution of different prion protein types and host polymorphisms to clinicopathological variations in Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease



Mark W. Head*, James W. Ironside Article first published online: 28 FEB 2012


http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2012/03/contribution-of-different-prion-protein.html





Thursday, February 16, 2012



Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy BSE



31 USA SENATORS ASK PRESIDENT OBAMA TO HELP SPREAD MAD COW DISEASE 2012


http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/bovine-spongiform-encephalopathy-bse-31.html




Thursday, February 23, 2012



EIGHT FORMER SECRETARIES OF AGRICULTURE SPEAKING AT USDA'S 2012 AGRICULTURE OUTLOOK FORUM INDUCTED INTO USA MAD COW HALL OF SHAME




http://madcowusda.blogspot.com/2012/02/eight-former-secretaries-of-agriculture.html






Sunday, February 5, 2012 February 2012




Update on Feed Enforcement Activities to Limit the Spread of BSE




http://transmissiblespongiformencephalopathy.blogspot.com/2012/02/february-2012-update-on-feed.html








10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. BLOOD LACED MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007




Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST




RECALLS AND FIELD CORRECTIONS: VETERINARY MEDICINES -- CLASS II




___________________________________




PRODUCT




Bulk cattle feed made with recalled Darling's 85% Blood Meal, Flash Dried, Recall # V-024-2007

CODE

Cattle feed delivered between 01/12/2007 and 01/26/2007

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Pfeiffer, Arno, Inc, Greenbush, WI. by conversation on February 5, 2007.

Firm initiated recall is ongoing.

REASON

Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross- contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

42,090 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

WI

___________________________________

PRODUCT

Custom dairy premix products: MNM ALL PURPOSE Pellet, HILLSIDE/CDL Prot- Buffer Meal, LEE, M.-CLOSE UP PX Pellet, HIGH DESERT/ GHC LACT Meal, TATARKA, M CUST PROT Meal, SUNRIDGE/CDL PROTEIN Blend, LOURENZO, K PVM DAIRY Meal, DOUBLE B DAIRY/GHC LAC Mineral, WEST PIONT/GHC CLOSEUP Mineral, WEST POINT/GHC LACT Meal, JENKS, J/COMPASS PROTEIN Meal, COPPINI - 8# SPECIAL DAIRY Mix, GULICK, L-LACT Meal (Bulk), TRIPLE J - PROTEIN/LACTATION, ROCK CREEK/GHC MILK Mineral, BETTENCOURT/GHC S.SIDE MK-MN, BETTENCOURT #1/GHC MILK MINR, V&C DAIRY/GHC LACT Meal, VEENSTRA, F/GHC LACT Meal, SMUTNY, A- BYPASS ML W/SMARTA, Recall # V-025-2007

CODE

The firm does not utilize a code - only shipping documentation with commodity and weights identified.

RECALLING FIRM/MANUFACTURER

Rangen, Inc, Buhl, ID, by letters on February 13 and 14, 2007. Firm initiated recall is complete.

REASON

Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.

VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE

9,997,976 lbs.

DISTRIBUTION

ID and NV

END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007

http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html



NEW URL

http://www.fda.gov/Safety/Recalls/EnforcementReports/2007/ucm120446.htm








Thursday, March 19, 2009

MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA WITH ONGOING 12 YEARS OF DENIAL

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html






Tuesday, March 2, 2010

Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed/Adulterated/Misbranded Rangen Inc 2/11/10 USA

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-proteins-prohibited-in-ruminant.html





Monday, March 1, 2010

ANIMAL PROTEIN I.E. MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE A REVIEW 2010

http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/03/animal-protien-ie-mad-cow-feed-in.html





TSS