Import Alert 71-02
(Note: This import alert represents the Agency's current guidance to FDA field personnel regarding the manufacturer(s) and/or products(s) at issue. It does not create or confer any rights for or on any person, and does not operate to bind FDA or the public).
Import Alert # 71-02
Published Date: 10/02/2009
Type: DWPE
Import Alert Name:
"Detention Without Physical Examination Of Animal Feeds And Feed Ingredients That May Contain Ingredients Of Animal Origin"
Reason for Alert:
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) regulates the importation of animals and animal-derived materials. More specifically, under 9 CFR 95.4, the USDA does not allow the importation of animal feeds or feed ingredients that contain or consist of processed animal protein (e.g. meat and bone meal) and other animal waste and by product materials that have been derived from animals that have been in specified BSE-affected and BSE-at-risk countries. The USDA may, however, allow for the importation of specific non-ruminant animal-derived products, provided the product is the subject of a valid USDA import permit (VS Form 16-6).
BSE is the bovine form of a group of uniformly fatal Neurological diseases known as TSEs (Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies). BSE appears to be spread in part through feeding of infected material to cattle. At this time, the causative agent is unknown and there is no test for the presence of the agent in animal derived products. There appears to be a link between the bovine TSE, BSE, and a human form of TSE known as vCJD (new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease).
In support of the USDA/APHIS import prohibitions, the FDA instituted Import Alert #99-25, "Detention Without Physical Examination of Animal Feed, Animal Feed Ingredients and Other Products For Animal Use Consisting or Containing Ingredients of Animal Origin and NOT the subject of a valid USDA permit."
To ensure compliance with Import Alert #99-25, the FDA has a sampling program to conduct random sampling and analysis of feed and feed ingredients for the presence of animal tissues offered for entry into the U.S. The firms listed in the Attachment of this Import Alert #71-02 have offered feed and/or feed ingredients into the U.S. that have been found to contain animal protein upon sampling and analysis.
Guidance: Districts may detain without physical examination products offered for import from those firms that are identified in the attachment to this alert. In order to fully evaluate whether such products contain ingredients of animal origin subject to detention under Import Alert #99-25 and, if so, whether this problem has been corrected, FDA recommends that firms provide the following information:
1. Evidence that the firm has determined that the products it is importing are no longer subject to detention under Import Alert 99-25, because it has taken appropriate steps to prevent the presence of animal material in feed and feed ingredients. This should be documented by:
a. Results of the firm's investigation(s) into the problem of animal protein contamination.
b. Documentation showing corrective action(s).
This should include at a minimum:
1) a description of the current processes being used to prevent contamination and
2) verification that the processes are adequate
c. Documentation, based on current feed microscopy analytical methodology, that a minimum of five (5) consecutive import entries have been released by FDA based on private laboratory analyses that show the shipments contain no material of animal origin. Requests to remove from the DWPE list multiple products from a manufacturer should include a minimum of twelve (12) import entries representative of products covered by detention without physical examination.
OR
2. Evidence that the product is the subject of a valid USDA import permit (VS Form 16-6).
All requests for removal from DWPE should be forwarded to(HFC-170)at the address below. Requests will be forwarded to CVM for evaluation.
Food And Drug Administration Division, Import Operations and Policy (HFC-170), Room 12-38 5600 Fishers Lane Rockville, MD 20857
For questions or issues concerning science, science policy, sample collection, analysis, preparation, or analytical methodology, contact the Division of Field Science at (301) 827-7605.
Product Description: Animal feeds and feed ingredients
Charge: "The article is subject to refusal of admission pursuant to Section 801(a)(1)in that it appears that such article has been manufactured, processed, or packed under insanitary conditions."
OASIS Charge Code: MFR INSAN
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
List of firms and their products subject to Detention without Physical Examination (DWPE) under this Import Alert (a.k.a. Red List)
(3004346002) Aliments Breton inc.Date Published : 09/16/2009 1312 St-georges Street , St.Bernard, CA-QC CA 70 M - - 03 Poultry Mixed Feed Ration Date Published: 09/16/2009
(3003626904) Cargill Animal NutritionDate Published : 09/16/2009 235 36th Street North , Lethbridge, Alberta CA 69 - - - -- Medicated Animal Feeds Date Published: 09/16/2009
Notes:Blood Material 70 - - - -- Animal Feed(Non-Medicated) Date Published: 09/16/2009
(3003447727) Cereales D. L. LteeDate Published : 09/16/2009 25 Dupont , Saint-Louis-De-Gonzague, QC CA 69 - - - -- Medicated Animal Feeds Date Published: 09/16/2009
70 - - - -- Animal Feed(Non-Medicated) Date Published: 09/16/2009
(1000344064) Dawn Foods ProductsDate Published : 09/16/2009 75 33rd Street East , Saskatoon, SK CA 69 - - - -- Medicated Animal Feeds Date Published: 09/16/2009
70 - - - -- Animal Feed(Non-Medicated) Date Published: 09/16/2009
(3004318728) Land O'Lakes FeedsDate Published : 09/16/2009 Rr# 2 , 90540 London Road , Wingham, CA-ON CA 69 - - - -- Medicated Animal Feeds Date Published: 09/16/2009
(3001400728) Landmark Feeds IncDate Published : 09/16/2009 1950 Brier Park Rd Nw , Medicine Hat, AB CA 70 M - - 01 Cattle Mixed Feed Ration Date Published: 09/16/2009
(3004283114) Louis Dreyfus Canada Ltd.Date Published : 09/16/2009 P.o. Box 689 , Brass Facility , Wilkie, Saskatchewan CA 69 - - - -- Medicated Animal Feeds Date Published: 09/16/2009
70 - - - -- Animal Feed(Non-Medicated) Date Published: 09/16/2009
(3003541855) MasterfeedsDate Published : 09/16/2009 111 Jamison Ave , Picture Butte, AB CA 69 - - - -- Medicated Animal Feeds Date Published: 09/16/2009
70 - - - -- Animal Feed(Non-Medicated) Date Published: 09/16/2009
(3003334575) Oleet ProcessingDate Published : 09/16/2009 Box 26011 , Regina, SK CA 69 - - - -- Medicated Animal Feeds Date Published: 09/16/2009
70 - - - -- Animal Feed(Non-Medicated) Date Published: 09/16/2009
(3000120903) Ritchie Smith Feeds IncDate Published : 09/16/2009 33777 Enterprise Avenue , Abbotsford, BC CA 69 - - - -- Medicated Animal Feeds Date Published: 09/16/2009
70 - - - -- Animal Feed(Non-Medicated) Date Published: 09/16/2009
(3003612587) Unifeed LimitedDate Published : 09/16/2009 46255 Chilliwack Central Road , Chilliwack, BC CA 69 - - - -- Medicated Animal Feeds Date Published: 09/16/2009
Notes:Muscle tissue 70 - - - -- Animal Feed(Non-Medicated) Date Published: 09/16/2009
Notes:Muscle tissue
(3003110241) Unifeed Limited dba Sure Crop FeedsDate Published : 09/16/2009 1150 Industrial Drive , Armstrong, BC CA 69 - - - -- Medicated Animal Feeds Date Published: 09/16/2009
70 - - - -- Animal Feed(Non-Medicated) Date Published: 09/16/2009
(3004306775) Unifeed Limited-LethbridgeDate Published : 09/16/2009 1810-39 Street North , Lethbridge, CA-AB CA 69 - - - -- Medicated Animal Feeds Date Published: 09/16/2009
Notes:Feather material; blood Material 70 - - - -- Animal Feed(Non-Medicated) Date Published: 09/16/2009
Notes:Feather material; blood Material
(3004316870) excel feeds incDate Published : 09/16/2009 3007 Turner Street , abbotsford, CA-BC CA 69 - - - -- Medicated Animal Feeds Date Published: 09/16/2009
70 - - - -- Animal Feed(Non-Medicated) Date Published: 09/16/2009
-
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cms_ia/importalert_216.html
PLEASE BE AWARE ;
The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.
http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf
Friday, September 4, 2009
FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html
Saturday, August 29, 2009
FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html
C O N F I R M E D
----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To:
Sent: Thursday, November 05, 2009 9:25 PM
Subject: [BSE-L] re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/re-foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html
Thursday, November 12, 2009
BSE FEED RECALL Misbranding of product by partial label removal to hide original source of materials 2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-feed-recall-misbranding-of-product.html
CVM Annual Report Fiscal Year 2008: October 1, 2007-September 30, 2008
PUTTING LIPSTICK ON A PIG AND TAKING HER TO A DANCE...TSS
BSE Feed Rule Enforcement: A Decade of Success OFF TO A FAST START
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/06/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html
Sunday, January 17, 2010
BSE USA feed inspection violations 01/01/2009 to 01/17/2010 FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/01/bse-usa-feed-inspection-violations.html
A band aid approach, to something that needs a tourniquet, like irradiation, and or ammonia, or whatever, same thing, your masking the problem, and in the end, will make it worse, the industry will become more complacent. see below, you can run just the numbers I picked up over the years. i'm talking 100s and 100s of tonnage of mad cow feed. I even remember the token purina mad cow feed mill in Gonzales Texas back in 2001. where the FDA spouted out that ;
''FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.''
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2001/new00752.html
you can take that with how ever many grains of salt you wish, but i read that as saying, it was only 5 1/2 grams, and the old cow ways 600 pounds, so know way that even if the feed was tainted, there was not enough to cause disease. the fda, usda et al, knew at that exact moment when they wrote that statement, they knew then that the 5 1/2 grams was enough to kill a small herd of cows. it was old science. but again, they chose to deceive. THIS WAS 2001, and it's now 2009, and they still are choosing to deceive, and the new administration appears willing to continue the USA mad cow charade. NOW, since the charade at the purina mill in 2001, i am going to list a few figures of suspect, banned mad cow feed that went out into commerce, even in 2008, 2007, 2006, back a few years, and you can compare, what enormous amounts of banned suspect mad cow feed and other products continue to go out. when you consider, and they knew all along, that .005 grams is lethal, my God, how much of this poison was consumed?
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI
REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
snip...SEE ALL THAT I FOUND HERE ;
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html
WE know now, and we knew decades ago, that 5.5 grams of suspect feed in TEXAS was enough to kill 100 cows.
P04.27
Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route
Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany
Background:
In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.
Aims:
The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.
Methods:
Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).
Results:
In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.
Conclusions:
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.
The work referenced was performed in partial fulfillment of the study "BSE in primates" supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).
http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.
snip...
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa
Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as low as 0.01g and 0.001g. .........
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/science-research/pathog.html#dose
It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the dose
levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf
2
6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley’s answer (that it would take less than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within the same species. This information did not become available until the "attack rate" experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the study and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the
dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf
Re: BSE .1 GRAM LETHAL NEW STUDY SAYS via W.H.O. Dr Maura Ricketts
[BBC radio 4 FARM news]
http://www.maddeer.org/audio/BBC4farmingtoday2_1_03.ram
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm
2) Infectious dose:
To cattle: 1 gram of infected brain material (by oral ingestion)
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/bio/bseesbe.shtml
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
CVM's OR Develops New PCR-Based Method for Testing Animal Feed
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/01/cvms-or-develops-new-pcr-based-method.html
NOW that we have established that this infamous part of the USA BSE MAD COW TRIPLE FIRE WALL was a farce, let's look further into the historical myth of no mad cows in the USA (well, they estimate at 1 in a million slip by into the food system), but i dispute that by many more. The BSE surveillance program was/is terribly flawed as well.
bottom line, and i say this with full confidence, with the present and past surveillance of BSE/TSE in the USA, and the continued feed violations, in the TONS, no one will ever know the true extent of any strain of mad cow disease in the USA. you don't have to just take my word on it, read the facts. blunder, after blunder, after blunder. they have all been posted here, i would be glad to go over any and or all of them one by one for any that doubts me. i can sum it all up real quick, Canada is looking to find, and the USA has never, EVER, done that. it's been just the opposite for the USA. don't believe me, or the facts, here is what Dr. Paul Brown of the cdc/nih et al ;
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
PAUL BROWN CDC ET AL COMMENT TO THE MEDIA ON THIS ISSUE ;
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/09/japans-new-leaders-seen-tougher-on-us.html
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/national-prion-disease-pathology.html
Statement on Texas cow with central nervous system symptoms
Main Category: Public Health Article
Date: 05 May 2004 - 0:00 PDT
snip...see full text ;
http://fdafailedus.blogspot.com/2010/01/establishing-fully-integrated-national.html
18.173 page 189
Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE
A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada
Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.
Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions.At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.
Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathogenesis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types. Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.
http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf
http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml
From: xxxx
To: Terry Singeltary
Sent: Saturday, December 05, 2009 9:09 AM
Subject: 14th ICID - abstract accepted for 'International Scientific Exchange'
Your preliminary abstract number: 670
Dear Mr. Singeltary,
On behalf of the Scientific Committee, I am pleased to inform you that your abstract
'Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009'
WAS accepted for inclusion in the INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE (ISE) section of the 14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases. Accordingly, your abstract will be included in the "Intl. Scientific Exchange abstract CD-rom" of the Congress which will be distributed to all participants.
Abstracts accepted for INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE are NOT PRESENTED in the oral OR poster sessions.
Your abstract below was accepted for: INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE
#0670: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009
Author: T. Singeltary; Bacliff, TX/US
Topic: Emerging Infectious Diseases Preferred type of presentation: International Scientific Exchange
This abstract has been ACCEPTED.
#0670: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009
Authors: T. Singeltary; Bacliff, TX/US
Title: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009
Body: Background
An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and feed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.
Methods
12 years independent research of available data
Results
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.
Conclusion
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries.
I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.
Keywords: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Prion
http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/
http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf
Monday, October 19, 2009
Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009
snip...
I ask Professor Kong ;
Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment
''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''
Professor Kong reply ;
.....snip
''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.
Thanks for your interest.''
Best regards,
Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
END...TSS
I look forward to further transmission studies, and a true ENHANCED BSE/atypical BSE surveillance program put forth testing all cattle for human and animal consumption for 5 years. a surveillance program that uses the most sensitive TSE testing, and has the personnel that knows how to use them, and can be trusted. I look forward to a stringent mad cow feed ban being put forth, and then strictly enforced. we need a forced, not voluntary feed ban, an enhanced feed ban at that, especially excluding blood. we need some sort of animal traceability. no more excuses about privacy. if somebody is putting out a product that is killing folks and or has the potential to kill you, then everybody needs to know who they are, and where that product came from. same with hospitals, i think medical incidents in all states should be recorded, and made public, when it comes to something like a potential accidental transmission exposure event. so if someone is out there looking at a place to go have surgery done, if you have several hospitals having these type 'accidental exposure events', than you can go some place else. it only makes sense. somewhere along the road, the consumer lost control, and just had to take whatever they were given, and then charged these astronomical prices. some where along the line the consumer just lost interest, especially on a long incubating disease such as mad cow disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. like i said before, there is much more to the mad cow story than bovines and eating a hamburger, we must start focusing on all TSE in all species. ...TSS
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html
for those interested, please see full text ;
Friday, January 29, 2010
14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)
""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."
THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!
THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS
USDA 2003 BSE ROUNDTABLE
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/04/bse-mad-cow-testing-usa-2009-figures.html
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW fromTEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla Everett
References: <[log in to unmask]><[log in to unmask] us>
Greetings Carla, still hear a rumor;
Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?
and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up for something, but they forgot a url for update?
I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...
can you confirm??? terry
============================================================
snip...
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/01/14th-international-congress-on.html
NOW, the question to ask yourself, has your country imported feed and or feed by-products from the USA ???
The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.
http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure. ...
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment
January 28, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
Sent: Saturday, August 29, 2009 10:28 AM Subject: BSE MRR POLICY AND THE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS
they call it MRR, the _legal_ trading of all strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, GLOBALLY. and that's all that the MRR was about. hell, the USA covered up 2 cases of mad cow disease just so this stupid policy could get finalized, and 25 years of attempted eradication of this agent got washed down the drain $$$ all we are doing now, is what the UK did when all this BSe first got started, except now, with the MRR, it's simply legal now.
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment
snip...
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure....
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=09000064801f3413
did anyone ever read the MRR 2 ;
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/RiskAssessment06-041-1%20.pdf
Revised assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) risks associated with the importation of certain commodities from BSE minimal risk regions (Canada) Veterinary Services Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service United States Department of Agriculture September
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/risk_assessment_%20final9-2007.pdf
your only fooling yourselves with this stupid ukbsenvcjd only theory, and the BSE mythology of the OIE. most any country that went by those same OIE BSE guidelines all went down with BSE. THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=09000064801e47e1
bottom line, and i say this with full confidence, with the present and past surveillance of BSE/TSE in the USA, and the continued feed violations, in the TONS, no one will ever know the true extent of any strain of mad cow disease in the USA. you don't have to just take my word on it, read the facts. blunder, after blunder, after blunder. they have all been posted here, i would be glad to go over any and or all of them one by one for any that doubts me. i can sum it all up real quick, Canada is looking to find, and the USA has never, EVER, done that. it's been just the opposite for the USA. don't believe me, or the facts, here is what Dr. Paul Brown of the cdc/nih et al ;
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/national-prion-disease-pathology.html
THE bse mrr policy is nothing more than swapping spit. your just accepting what ever disease that country has, and or what ever that country says it has. it's an honor system of sorts. Canada seems to be Honest, and just the opposite has happened here in the USA.
WE did just what the UK did to the globe ;
England worried briefly about infecting other countries 27 Aug 00 confidential correspondence obtained by Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/aug00_last_news.html#fff
Other US BSE risks: the imported products picture 24 Jul 00 Trade Statistics: UK to US Compiled by Terry S.Singeltary Sr of Bacliff, Texas
[Opinion (webmaster): The US has focused for years on tracing, containing, and eradicating live animal imports from the UK or other countries with acknowledged BSE like Belgium, including some 499 cattle and the Vermont sheep. This strategy does not acknowledge imports of rendered bovine products from England during the BSE period nor secondary products such as surgical catgut, which is to say surgical cowgut, or dairy cattle embryos, vaccines for veterinarian and human medicines. What has become of these? Mr. Singeltary, who lost his mother to CJD of unexplained origin a few years back and went on to became a well-known TSE activist, has tracked down voluminous pertinent import data through correspondence with UK officials and searches of government web sites. Imports of such products are frequently cited by Europeans in rating BSE risks in the US and in shutting out US exports.
Many people's eyes glaze over when reviewing reams of sometimes older trade statistics. There is no proof that any of the imported products was contaminated with BSE nor if so, any evidence that any BSE product lead to infection in US livestock, surgical patients, or what not. Nonetheless, the data obtained by Mr. Singeltary establish that an appalling variety and tonnage of products that were imported by the US from the UK and othr BSE-affected countries during the peak of the BSE epidemic years.]
10 January 1990 COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
COMMITTEE ON SAFETY OF MEDICINES WORKING PARTY ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
SURGICAL CATGUT SUTURES
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/sep00_news.html#hhh
40,000 human heart valves a year from BSE herds Sun, 3 Sep 2000. Unpublished Inquiry documents obtained by CJD activist Terry S. Singeltary Sr. of Bacliff, Texas
Opinion (webmaster): Below are some shocking documents. Here is a British company preparing 40,000 heart valves a year from bovine pericardium, primarily for export, and they are not required to source this material from BSE-free herds even in peak epidemic years. It is amazing to watch health "authorities" grovelling on their bellies to wring petty concessions from middle management at obscure little companies. The main worry is not the practise of using 800 potentially infected cows a week for human heart transplant material but that the press or recipients will get wind of it, hurting business. BSE wasn't the problem, it was awkward queries from importing countries like the US. The cows are stunned using brain penetration -- can't do anything about the chunks of bovine brain blasted into the circulatory system, it's the norm. Can't use younger lower-risk animals either, patch would not be big enough. It is fascinating to see the British government worrying about, but doing nothing, with pigs with BSE 10 years ago.
While scrapie was long used as an excuse for continuing with human use of BSE-tainted material, little sheep material was used medically. Bovine transplants, vaccines, insulin doeses, etc. are far more dangerous than dietary material as injections, and are done on a very wide scale. So scrapie was never a valid analogy to BSE, as MAFF knew full well.
The British government deferred to the manufacturer's rep for an opinion on how contaminated pericardium might be, just as this appeared showing that this tissue is extremely dangerous:
CJD in a patient who received homograft [was it really?] tissue for tympanic membrane closure. Eur Arch Otorhinolaryngol 1990;247(4):199-201 Tange RA, Troost D, Limburg M We report the case history of a 54-year-old man who developed a fatal neurological disorder 4 years after a successful tympanoplasty with homograft pericardium... COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE
Miss M Duncan From: Dr E Hoxey Date: 29 January 1990 cc: Mr R Burton Dr N Richardson Ms K Turner Ms J Dhell Mr N Weatherhead
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/sep00_news.html#hhh
Two million children innoculated with BSE vaccines Daily Express May 2, 200 [minor edits by webmaster]
Seven vaccines potentially at risk from BSE and given to millions of children can be identified for the first time by the Daily Express. But alarmingly there is no record of which children received the jabs, produced between 1988 and 1989, at the start of Britain's "mad cow" crisis. The vaccines, using UK-sourced cattle material, were made by two companies, Wellcome and Smithkline, despite warnings that they could pose a risk. The seven vaccines are: 1. Smithkline's MMR (Measles, Mumps, Rubella), finally replaced "by end of 1992 approximately";
2. Wellcome's combined Diphtheria and Tetanus, last issued by the company in June 1991, with a June 1993 expiry date;
3. Wellcome's DTP (Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis) last issued again in June 1991, with a November 1993 expiry date;
4. Wellcome's single component Diphtheria vaccine, last issued in October 1991, with a November 1993 expiry date;
5. Wellcome's Tetanus, last issued in December 1991, with a December 1993 expiry date.
6.[Wellcome's oral polio vaccine, last issue and expiry dates are "not known".
7. Smithkline's inactivated polio vaccine, apparently used only in foreigners.]
Comment (Kelly): "It seems clear that no bovine derivatives are used in FINISHED products, however they are often used in the culture process. Does this also present a possible risk? Below is the packaging insert for one routine vaccine (inactivated injectable polio vaccine)made by Pasteur Merieux S?rums & Vaccins S. A. Lyon, France (now called Aventis):" IPOL?, Poliovirus Vaccine Inactivated, produced by Pasteur M?rieux S?rums Vaccins S.A., is a sterile suspension of three types of poliovirus: Type 1 (Mahoney), Type 2 (MEF-1), and Type 3 (Saukett). IPOL? is a highly purified, inactivated poliovirus vaccine produced by microcarrier culture. This culture technique and improvements in purification, concentration and standardization of poliovirus antigen produce a more potent and consistent immunogenic vaccine than the IPV available in the US prior to 1988. The viruses are grown in cultures of V.R. cells, a continuous line of monkey kidney cells, by the microcarrier technique. The cells are grown in Eagle MEM modified medium, supplemented with newborn calf serum tested for adventitious agents prior to use, originated from countries free of bovine spongiform encephalopathy. For viral growth the culture medium is replaced by M-199, without calf serum. ... Neomycin, streptomycin and polymyxin B are used in vaccine production, and although purification procedures eliminate measurable amounts, less than 5 ng neomycin, 200 ng streptomycin and 25 ng polymyxin B per dose may still be present. The residual calf serum protein is less than 1 ppm in the final vaccine. The vaccine is clear and colorless and should be administered intramuscularly or subcutaneously.
The documents below were provided by Terry S. Singeltary Sr on 8 May 2000. They are optically character read (scanned into computer) and so may contain typos and unreadable parts. TIP740203/l 0424 CONFIDENTIAL
Mr Cunningham CMP3 From: D O Hagger MBI Dr Salisbury MED/IMCD3 Mr Burton PD/STB/PG1B B/17/2 Date: 15.02.1989 Mr Dudley PD/AD4
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/may00_news.html
BSE offals used in cosmetics, toiletry and perfume industry Sun, 3 Sep 2000. Unpublished Inquiry documents obtained by CJD activist Terry S. Singeltary Sr. of Bacliff, Texas Miss Marion Kelly Cosmetic, Toiletry and Perfumery Association 35 Dover Street London W1X3RA
Department of Trade and Industry 10-18 Victoria Street London SW1H ONN Enquiries 01-215 5000 Telex 8811074 DTHQ G 01 215 3324 1 February 1990
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/sep00_news.html#bbb
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/jul00_dont_eat_sheep.html#hhh
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/may00_news.html#aaa
years later, the bush administration made it legal. the body bag count was acceptable for the _documented_ ones. the elderly are expendable, kids and pets are not, and as long as politics plays a role in dictating science i.e. the UKBSEnvCJD ONLY THEORY, we all loose, and the 85%+ of all the other victims, go unaccounted for...officially, but some of us no different, but yet the ignorance of it all, will continue to spread the TSE agent globally, through a multitude of proven routes and sources i.e. friendly fire i.e. and or the pass it forward mode. ...
IN A NUT SHELL ; $$$
(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)
11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............
http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of Canada Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted: 1 July 2004 Summary (0.1Mb)
Report (0.2Mb)
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s.
A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594094.htm
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the USA Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted: 1 July 2004 Summary (0.1Mb)
Report (0.2Mb)
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594180.htm
The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.
http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf
Thursday, January 07, 2010 Scrapie and Nor-98 Scrapie November 2009 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2010 and FISCAL YEAR 2008
November 2009 Monthly Report Fiscal Year 2010
Monday, February 01, 2010
Import Alert 17-04 BSE CJD HIGH RISK TISSUES, Nutritional Supplements and Cosmetics
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/02/import-alert-17-04-bse-cjd-high-risk.html
Monday, February 01, 2010
Import Alert 57-20 and 84-03 Human Dura Mater and risk factors there from due to Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (CJD)
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/02/import-alert-57-20-and-84-03-human-dura.html
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
Import Alert 62-07 Sygen Injectable (Bovine-Extracted GMI Monosialoganglioside) manufactured from bovine brain starting material
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/02/import-alert-62-07-sygen-injectable.html
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
Import Alert 99-25 Detention Without Physical Examination of Animal Feed...BSE...and Not the Subject of a Valid USDA Import Permit Import Alert 99-25
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/02/import-alert-99-25-detention-without.html
BSE prions propagate as either variant CJD-like or sporadic CJD-like prion strains in transgenic mice expressing human prion protein
Emmanuel A. Asante, Jacqueline M. Linehan, Melanie Desbruslais, Susan Joiner, Ian Gowland, Andrew L. Wood, Julie Welch, Andrew F. Hill, Sarah E. Lloyd, Jonathan D.F. Wadsworth, and John Collinge1 MRC Prion Unit and Department of Neurodegenerative Disease, Institute of Neurology, University College, Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK 1Corresponding author e-mail: j.collinge@prion.ucl.ac.ukReceived August 1, 2002; Revised September 24, 2002; Accepted October 17, 2002.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC136957/?tool=pubmed
USA sporadic CJD cases rising ;
There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.
He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf
2008
The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.
http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html
CJD USA RISING, with UNKNOWN PHENOTYPE ;
5 Includes 41 cases in which the diagnosis is pending, and 17 inconclusive cases; 6 Includes 46 cases with type determination pending in which the diagnosis of vCJD has been excluded.
http://www.cjdsurveillance.com/pdf/case-table.pdf
Saturday, January 2, 2010
Human Prion Diseases in the United States January 1, 2010 ***FINAL***
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2010/01/human-prion-diseases-in-united-states.html
my comments to PLosone here ;
http://www.plosone.org/annotation/listThread.action?inReplyTo=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd&root=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fannotation%2F04ce2b24-613d-46e6-9802-4131e2bfa6fd
CJD RISING SWITZERLAND
CJD is a predominantly sporadic disorder but can also occur as a dominantly inherited or infective condition. Only one of the 26 most recent confirmed cases was identified as carrying a disease related mutation of the PRNP gene, none had identifiable iatrogenic exposure, and none resembled variant CJD. Thus 25 of the 26 cases appear to be sporadic cases. Sporadic CJD is distributed worldwide with a reported incidence of about one in a million per year. Raised awareness of the disease in recent years could account for an increase in reported cases of CJD, although neither an increase in the average age of patients nor more frequent recognition of CJD amongst residents of nursing homes (where dementing illness is prevalent and misdiagnosis might be expected) were seen in the Swiss cases. Moreover, improved ascertainment as an explanation for the observed increase would imply levels of under-reporting in countries other than Switzerland, which appear implausible. The authors of the Lancet report suggest that the rise in cases might be due to some form of unidentified iatrogenic transmission or to exposure to a zoonotic source of infection, though cases do not resemble variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD). The ongoing surveillance of CJD in Switzerland and the rest of Europe is essential to monitor the situation to see if this rise is sustained in Switzerland, and if a similar rise occurs in other countries (see http://www.eurocjd.ed.ac.uk).
http://www.eurosurveillance.org/ViewArticle.aspx?ArticleId=1921
Prion data suggest BSE link to sporadic CJD Declan Butler
Predicting the number of cases of Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (CJD) in people as a result of transmission of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) has just got more difficult.Whereas it was thought that BSE only caused a new form of the disease called variant CJD (vCJD), a study in mice from a team led by John Collinge at University College London suggests that it may also cause a disease indistinguishable from the commonest form of classical, or 'sporadic', CJD (E.
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v420/n6915/full/420450a.html
IF we look at sporadic incidence of CJD in UK from 1993 to 2003, the incidence rose from 37 in 1993 to 77 in 2003. THIS seems to show an increase to me? I do not understand the statement ;
However, in the period following the first published description of vCJD in 1996, there was no increasing trend in the reported annual number of U.K. sporadic CJD deaths (52).
IF we go further and look at some of the other documented BSE countries, you will the increase of sporadic CJD there as well ;
Canada from 2 to 25
France from 35 to 108
Germany 21+ to 96
Italy 27 to 76
http://www.eurocjd.ed.ac.uk/sporadic.htm
Switzerland sporadic CJD ;
Swiss rise in CJD raises concerns over possible BSE link [LONDON] THE LANCET
Plaque attack: Swiss patients have spongiform patterns in the brain typical of sporadic CJD. The number of people dying from Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has risen sharply in Switzerland -- sparking fears of a possible link with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE).
BSE is thought to be the cause of a distinctive form of the brain-wasting disease known as variant CJD. The Swiss cases, in contrast, are standard 'sporadic' CJD. Each year between 1997 and 2000, no more than 11 Swiss people developed CJD. But 19 cases were reported in 2001, and seven were recorded in the first quarter of this year. This is some four times higher than the incidence elsewhere, reports a team led by Adriano Aguzzi of the University Hospital Zurich (M. Glatzel et al. Lancet 360, 139-141; 2002).
The increase could be a mere statistical blip, or it may be due to increased awareness of the disease leading to more diagnoses. More disturbing is the possibility that the cases are linked to the consumption of BSE-infected meat products -- which would mean that the BSE agent can cause two distinct forms of CJD.
Possible links between the Swiss CJD cases and BSE will now be explored by strain-typing experiments in which the disease is transmitted to mice. These tests will take at least a year to complete. "It's the best way to establish or exclude any suspected link," says Moira Bruce of the UK Institute for Animal Health's Neuropathogenesis Unit in Edinburgh.
======================================
Experiences in England and Switzerland -- two countries that discovered mad cow disease in their cattle -- have heightened concerns about the possibility some cases of sporadic CJD are due to consuming mad-cow-tainted beef. Both countries have reported increases in sporadic CJD since mad cow was first detected in British herds in 1986.
Switzerland discovered last year its CJD rate was twice that of any other country in the world. Switzerland had been seeing about eight to 11 cases per year from 1997 to 2000. Then the incidence more than doubled, to 19 cases in 2001 and 18 cases in 2002.
http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?StoryID=20030721-102924-4786r
Mouse model sheds new light on human prion disease
snip...
Professor John Collinge said We are not saying that all or even most cases of sporadic CJD are as a result of BSE exposure, but some more recent cases may be the incidence of sporadic CJD has shown an upward trend in the UK over the last decade. While most of this apparent increase may be because doctors are now more aware of CJD and better at diagnosing it, serious consideration should be given to a proportion of this rise being BSE-related. Switzerland, which has had a substantial BSE epidemic, has noted a sharp recent increase in sporadic CJD.
snip...
http://www.mrc.ac.uk/txt/index/public-interest/public-news-4/public-news_archive/public-news-archive_nov_dec_02/public-bse_and_sporadic_cjd.htm
Monday, May 19, 2008
SPORADIC CJD IN FARMERS, FARMERS WIVES, FROM FARMS WITH BSE HERD AND ABATTOIRS
http://bseinquiry.blogspot.com/
Sunday, August 10, 2008
A New Prionopathy OR more of the same old BSe and sporadic CJD
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/08/new-prionopathy-or-more-of-same-old-bse.html
TSS
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
Import Alert 99-25 Detention Without Physical Examination of Animal Feed...BSE...and Not the Subject of a Valid USDA Import Permit
Import Alert 99-25
(Note: This import alert represents the Agency's current guidance to FDA field personnel regarding the manufacturer(s) and/or products(s) at issue.
It does not create or confer any rights for or on any person, and does not operate to bind FDA or the public).
Import Alert # 99-25
Published Date: 10/02/2009
Type: DWPE
Import Alert Name:
"Detention Without Physical Examination of Animal Feed, Animal Feed Ingredients and Other Products for Animal Use Consisting or Containing Ingredients of Animal Origin and Not the Subject of a Valid USDA Import Permit"
Reason for Alert:
On December 7, 2000, USDA/APHIS enacted an immediate prohibition on the importation into the United States of all meat and bone meal (MBM), meat meal, bone meal, blood meal, tankage, offal, or any product containing such, which originated directly from Europe or was rendered/processed in European plants processing animal materials, regardless of species of origin, including poultry and fish meal. This prohibition was deemed necessary by APHIS because of the possibility of cross contamination with the BSE agent.
BSE is the bovine form of a group of uniformly fatal neurological diseases known as TSEs (Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies). BSE appears to be spread in part through feeding of infected material to cattle. At this time, the causative agent is unknown and there is no test for the presence of the agent in animal derived products. There appears to be a link between the bovine TSE, BSE, and a human form of TSE known as vCJD (new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease).
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) regulates the importation of animals and animal-derived materials. More specifically, under 9 CFR 95.4, the USDA does not allow the importation of animal feeds or feed ingredients that contain or consist of processed animal protein (e.g. meat and bone meal) and other animal waste and by product materials that have been derived from animals that have been in specified BSE-affected and BSE-at-risk countries. The USDA may, however, allow for the importation of specific non-ruminant animal-derived products, provided the product is the subject of a valid USDA import permit (VS Form 16-6).
Guidance:
Districts may detain without physical examination shipments of animal feeds (including pet food), animal feed ingredients, and other products for animal use consisting of, or containing, ingredients of animal origin as identified in the Red List from the designated countries if the product is not the subject of a valid USDA import permit (VS Form 16-6).
OASIS Screening Criteria have been loaded to ensure that entries of products that contain or may contain animal protein or by-products will be selected for review by the entry reviewer. As part of the review process, the entry reviewer should contact the filer/importer, request paper entry documents (USDA import permit, VS Form 16-6)), and remind the filer/importer of their requirement to hold the shipment intact pending FDA release. Additionally, the entry reviewer should determine the intended use of the product, the ingredients, and the name and address of the ultimate consignee.
If the filer/importer does not agree to hold the product intact pending FDA release, contact the local office of US Customs and ask that they detain the product.
Products which (from labeling or other documentation) appear to contain animal protein or by-products and which are not the subject of a valid USDA import permit (VS Form 16-6)should either be detained by FDA or recommended to USDA/APHIS for appropriate action. (The location of the APHIS/Plant Protection and Quarantine office can be determined by calling USDA's Veterinary Medical Office.
Products detained and refused under the above reference charge may not be reconditioned or converted to non-FDA regulated use. They must be either destroyed or exported.
Please note that APHIS has received information that shipments of animal-derived products may be offered for entry under descriptions that may be misleading or appear to not be subject to their prohibition, such as fertilizer, adhesive, supplement, nutritional supplement, additive, feed/food additive.
For questions or issues concerning science, science policy, sample collection, analysis, preparation, or analytical methodology, contact the Division of Field Science at (301) 827-7605.
Product Description:
All animal feed (including pet food), animal feed ingredients, and other products for animal use consisting of or containing ingredients of animal origin
Charge:
"The article is subject to refusal of admission pursuant to Section 801(a)(1) in that it appears that such article has been manufactured, processed, or packed under insanitary conditions."
OASIS charge code - MFR INSAN
Countries
(AL) ALBANIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(AD) ANDORRA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(AT) AUSTRIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(BE) BELGIUM
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(BA) BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(BG) BULGARIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(CA) CANADA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(HR) CROATIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(CZ) CZECH REPUBLIC
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(DK) DENMARK
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(FI) FINLAND
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(FR) FRANCE
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(DE) GERMANY
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(GR) GREECE
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(HU) HUNGARY
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(IE) IRELAND
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(IL) ISRAEL
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(IT) ITALY
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(JP) JAPAN
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(LI) LIECHTENSTEIN
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(LU) LUXEMBOURG
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(MK) MACEDONIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(MC) MONACO
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(NL) NETHERLANDS
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(NO) NORWAY
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(OM) OMAN
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(PL) POLAND
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(PT) PORTUGAL
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(RO) ROMANIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(SM) SAN MARINO
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(SK) SLOVAKIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(SI) SLOVENIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(ES) SPAIN
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(SZ) SWAZILAND
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(SE) SWEDEN
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(GB) UNITED KINGDOM
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(YU) YUGOSLAVIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
-
-
-
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cms_ia/importalert_381.html
PLEASE BE AWARE ;
The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.
http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf
Friday, September 4, 2009
FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html
Saturday, August 29, 2009
FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html
C O N F I R M E D
----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To:
Sent: Thursday, November 05, 2009 9:25 PM
Subject: [BSE-L] re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/re-foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html
Thursday, November 12, 2009
BSE FEED RECALL Misbranding of product by partial label removal to hide original source of materials 2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-feed-recall-misbranding-of-product.html
CVM Annual Report Fiscal Year 2008: October 1, 2007-September 30, 2008
PUTTING LIPSTICK ON A PIG AND TAKING HER TO A DANCE...TSS
BSE Feed Rule Enforcement: A Decade of Success OFF TO A FAST START
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/06/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html
Sunday, January 17, 2010
BSE USA feed inspection violations 01/01/2009 to 01/17/2010 FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/01/bse-usa-feed-inspection-violations.html
A band aid approach, to something that needs a tourniquet, like irradiation, and or ammonia, or whatever, same thing, your masking the problem, and in the end, will make it worse, the industry will become more complacent. see below, you can run just the numbers I picked up over the years. i'm talking 100s and 100s of tonnage of mad cow feed. I even remember the token purina mad cow feed mill in Gonzales Texas back in 2001. where the FDA spouted out that ;
''FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.''
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2001/new00752.html
you can take that with how ever many grains of salt you wish, but i read that as saying, it was only 5 1/2 grams, and the old cow ways 600 pounds, so know way that even if the feed was tainted, there was not enough to cause disease. the fda, usda et al, knew at that exact moment when they wrote that statement, they knew then that the 5 1/2 grams was enough to kill a small herd of cows. it was old science. but again, they chose to deceive. THIS WAS 2001, and it's now 2009, and they still are choosing to deceive, and the new administration appears willing to continue the USA mad cow charade. NOW, since the charade at the purina mill in 2001, i am going to list a few figures of suspect, banned mad cow feed that went out into commerce, even in 2008, 2007, 2006, back a few years, and you can compare, what enormous amounts of banned suspect mad cow feed and other products continue to go out. when you consider, and they knew all along, that .005 grams is lethal, my God, how much of this poison was consumed?
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI
REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
snip...SEE ALL THAT I FOUND HERE ;
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html
WE know now, and we knew decades ago, that 5.5 grams of suspect feed in TEXAS was enough to kill 100 cows.
P04.27
Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route
Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany
Background:
In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.
Aims:
The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.
Methods:
Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).
Results:
In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.
Conclusions:
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.
The work referenced was performed in partial fulfillment of the study "BSE in primates" supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).
http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.
snip...
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa
Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as low as 0.01g and 0.001g. .........
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/science-research/pathog.html#dose
It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the dose
levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf
2
6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley’s answer (that it would take less than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within the same species. This information did not become available until the "attack rate" experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the study and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the
dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf
Re: BSE .1 GRAM LETHAL NEW STUDY SAYS via W.H.O. Dr Maura Ricketts
[BBC radio 4 FARM news]
http://www.maddeer.org/audio/BBC4farmingtoday2_1_03.ram
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm
2) Infectious dose:
To cattle: 1 gram of infected brain material (by oral ingestion)
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/bio/bseesbe.shtml
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
CVM's OR Develops New PCR-Based Method for Testing Animal Feed
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/01/cvms-or-develops-new-pcr-based-method.html
NOW that we have established that this infamous part of the USA BSE MAD COW TRIPLE FIRE WALL was a farce, let's look further into the historical myth of no mad cows in the USA (well, they estimate at 1 in a million slip by into the food system), but i dispute that by many more. The BSE surveillance program was/is terribly flawed as well.
bottom line, and i say this with full confidence, with the present and past surveillance of BSE/TSE in the USA, and the continued feed violations, in the TONS, no one will ever know the true extent of any strain of mad cow disease in the USA. you don't have to just take my word on it, read the facts. blunder, after blunder, after blunder. they have all been posted here, i would be glad to go over any and or all of them one by one for any that doubts me. i can sum it all up real quick, Canada is looking to find, and the USA has never, EVER, done that. it's been just the opposite for the USA. don't believe me, or the facts, here is what Dr. Paul Brown of the cdc/nih et al ;
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
PAUL BROWN CDC ET AL COMMENT TO THE MEDIA ON THIS ISSUE ;
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/09/japans-new-leaders-seen-tougher-on-us.html
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/national-prion-disease-pathology.html
Statement on Texas cow with central nervous system symptoms
Main Category: Public Health Article
Date: 05 May 2004 - 0:00 PDT
snip...see full text ;
http://fdafailedus.blogspot.com/2010/01/establishing-fully-integrated-national.html
18.173 page 189
Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE
A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada
Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.
Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions.At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.
Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathogenesis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types. Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.
http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf
http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml
From: xxxx
To: Terry Singeltary
Sent: Saturday, December 05, 2009 9:09 AM
Subject: 14th ICID - abstract accepted for 'International Scientific Exchange'
Your preliminary abstract number: 670
Dear Mr. Singeltary,
On behalf of the Scientific Committee, I am pleased to inform you that your abstract
'Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009'
WAS accepted for inclusion in the INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE (ISE) section of the 14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases. Accordingly, your abstract will be included in the "Intl. Scientific Exchange abstract CD-rom" of the Congress which will be distributed to all participants.
Abstracts accepted for INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE are NOT PRESENTED in the oral OR poster sessions.
Your abstract below was accepted for: INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE
#0670: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009
Author: T. Singeltary; Bacliff, TX/US
Topic: Emerging Infectious Diseases Preferred type of presentation: International Scientific Exchange
This abstract has been ACCEPTED.
#0670: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009
Authors: T. Singeltary; Bacliff, TX/US
Title: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009
Body: Background
An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and feed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.
Methods
12 years independent research of available data
Results
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.
Conclusion
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries.
I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.
Keywords: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Prion
http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/
http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf
Monday, October 19, 2009
Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009
snip...
I ask Professor Kong ;
Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment
''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''
Professor Kong reply ;
.....snip
''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.
Thanks for your interest.''
Best regards,
Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
END...TSS
I look forward to further transmission studies, and a true ENHANCED BSE/atypical BSE surveillance program put forth testing all cattle for human and animal consumption for 5 years. a surveillance program that uses the most sensitive TSE testing, and has the personnel that knows how to use them, and can be trusted. I look forward to a stringent mad cow feed ban being put forth, and then strictly enforced. we need a forced, not voluntary feed ban, an enhanced feed ban at that, especially excluding blood. we need some sort of animal traceability. no more excuses about privacy. if somebody is putting out a product that is killing folks and or has the potential to kill you, then everybody needs to know who they are, and where that product came from. same with hospitals, i think medical incidents in all states should be recorded, and made public, when it comes to something like a potential accidental transmission exposure event. so if someone is out there looking at a place to go have surgery done, if you have several hospitals having these type 'accidental exposure events', than you can go some place else. it only makes sense. somewhere along the road, the consumer lost control, and just had to take whatever they were given, and then charged these astronomical prices. some where along the line the consumer just lost interest, especially on a long incubating disease such as mad cow disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. like i said before, there is much more to the mad cow story than bovines and eating a hamburger, we must start focusing on all TSE in all species. ...TSS
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html
for those interested, please see full text ;
Friday, January 29, 2010
14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)
""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."
THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!
THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS
USDA 2003 BSE ROUNDTABLE
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/04/bse-mad-cow-testing-usa-2009-figures.html
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW fromTEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla Everett
References: <[log in to unmask]><[log in to unmask] us>
Greetings Carla, still hear a rumor;
Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?
and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up for something, but they forgot a url for update?
I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...
can you confirm??? terry
============================================================
snip...
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/01/14th-international-congress-on.html
NOW, the question to ask yourself, has your country imported feed and or feed by-products from the USA ???
The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.
http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure. ...
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment
January 28, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
Sent: Saturday, August 29, 2009 10:28 AM
Subject: BSE MRR POLICY AND THE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS
they call it MRR, the _legal_ trading of all strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, GLOBALLY. and that's all that the MRR was about. hell, the USA covered up 2 cases of mad cow disease just so this stupid policy could get finalized, and 25 years of attempted eradication of this agent got washed down the drain $$$ all we are doing now, is what the UK did when all this BSe first got started, except now, with the MRR, it's simply legal now.
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment
snip...
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure....
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=09000064801f3413
did anyone ever read the MRR 2 ;
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/RiskAssessment06-041-1%20.pdf
Revised assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) risks associated with the importation of certain commodities from BSE minimal risk regions (Canada) Veterinary Services Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service United States Department of Agriculture September
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/risk_assessment_%20final9-2007.pdf
your only fooling yourselves with this stupid ukbsenvcjd only theory, and the BSE mythology of the OIE. most any country that went by those same OIE BSE guidelines all went down with BSE. THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=09000064801e47e1
bottom line, and i say this with full confidence, with the present and past surveillance of BSE/TSE in the USA, and the continued feed violations, in the TONS, no one will ever know the true extent of any strain of mad cow disease in the USA. you don't have to just take my word on it, read the facts. blunder, after blunder, after blunder. they have all been posted here, i would be glad to go over any and or all of them one by one for any that doubts me. i can sum it all up real quick, Canada is looking to find, and the USA has never, EVER, done that. it's been just the opposite for the USA. don't believe me, or the facts, here is what Dr. Paul Brown of the cdc/nih et al ;
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/national-prion-disease-pathology.html
THE bse mrr policy is nothing more than swapping spit. your just accepting what ever disease that country has, and or what ever that country says it has. it's an honor system of sorts. Canada seems to be Honest, and just the opposite has happened here in the USA.
WE did just what the UK did to the globe ;
England worried briefly about infecting other countries 27 Aug 00 confidential correspondence obtained by Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/aug00_last_news.html#fff
Other US BSE risks: the imported products picture 24 Jul 00 Trade Statistics: UK to US Compiled by Terry S.Singeltary Sr of Bacliff, Texas
[Opinion (webmaster): The US has focused for years on tracing, containing, and eradicating live animal imports from the UK or other countries with acknowledged BSE like Belgium, including some 499 cattle and the Vermont sheep. This strategy does not acknowledge imports of rendered bovine products from England during the BSE period nor secondary products such as surgical catgut, which is to say surgical cowgut, or dairy cattle embryos, vaccines for veterinarian and human medicines. What has become of these? Mr. Singeltary, who lost his mother to CJD of unexplained origin a few years back and went on to became a well-known TSE activist, has tracked down voluminous pertinent import data through correspondence with UK officials and searches of government web sites. Imports of such products are frequently cited by Europeans in rating BSE risks in the US and in shutting out US exports.
Many people's eyes glaze over when reviewing reams of sometimes older trade statistics. There is no proof that any of the imported products was contaminated with BSE nor if so, any evidence that any BSE product lead to infection in US livestock, surgical patients, or what not. Nonetheless, the data obtained by Mr. Singeltary establish that an appalling variety and tonnage of products that were imported by the US from the UK and othr BSE-affected countries during the peak of the BSE epidemic years.]
10 January 1990 COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
COMMITTEE ON SAFETY OF MEDICINES WORKING PARTY ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
SURGICAL CATGUT SUTURES
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/sep00_news.html#hhh
40,000 human heart valves a year from BSE herds Sun, 3 Sep 2000. Unpublished Inquiry documents obtained by CJD activist Terry S. Singeltary Sr. of Bacliff, Texas
Opinion (webmaster): Below are some shocking documents. Here is a British company preparing 40,000 heart valves a year from bovine pericardium, primarily for export, and they are not required to source this material from BSE-free herds even in peak epidemic years. It is amazing to watch health "authorities" grovelling on their bellies to wring petty concessions from middle management at obscure little companies. The main worry is not the practise of using 800 potentially infected cows a week for human heart transplant material but that the press or recipients will get wind of it, hurting business. BSE wasn't the problem, it was awkward queries from importing countries like the US. The cows are stunned using brain penetration -- can't do anything about the chunks of bovine brain blasted into the circulatory system, it's the norm. Can't use younger lower-risk animals either, patch would not be big enough. It is fascinating to see the British government worrying about, but doing nothing, with pigs with BSE 10 years ago.
While scrapie was long used as an excuse for continuing with human use of BSE-tainted material, little sheep material was used medically. Bovine transplants, vaccines, insulin doeses, etc. are far more dangerous than dietary material as injections, and are done on a very wide scale. So scrapie was never a valid analogy to BSE, as MAFF knew full well.
The British government deferred to the manufacturer's rep for an opinion on how contaminated pericardium might be, just as this appeared showing that this tissue is extremely dangerous:
CJD in a patient who received homograft [was it really?] tissue for tympanic membrane closure. Eur Arch Otorhinolaryngol 1990;247(4):199-201 Tange RA, Troost D, Limburg M We report the case history of a 54-year-old man who developed a fatal neurological disorder 4 years after a successful tympanoplasty with homograft pericardium... COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE
Miss M Duncan From: Dr E Hoxey Date: 29 January 1990 cc: Mr R Burton Dr N Richardson Ms K Turner Ms J Dhell Mr N Weatherhead
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/sep00_news.html#hhh
Two million children innoculated with BSE vaccines Daily Express May 2, 200 [minor edits by webmaster]
Seven vaccines potentially at risk from BSE and given to millions of children can be identified for the first time by the Daily Express. But alarmingly there is no record of which children received the jabs, produced between 1988 and 1989, at the start of Britain's "mad cow" crisis. The vaccines, using UK-sourced cattle material, were made by two companies, Wellcome and Smithkline, despite warnings that they could pose a risk. The seven vaccines are: 1. Smithkline's MMR (Measles, Mumps, Rubella), finally replaced "by end of 1992 approximately";
2. Wellcome's combined Diphtheria and Tetanus, last issued by the company in June 1991, with a June 1993 expiry date;
3. Wellcome's DTP (Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis) last issued again in June 1991, with a November 1993 expiry date;
4. Wellcome's single component Diphtheria vaccine, last issued in October 1991, with a November 1993 expiry date;
5. Wellcome's Tetanus, last issued in December 1991, with a December 1993 expiry date.
6.[Wellcome's oral polio vaccine, last issue and expiry dates are "not known".
7. Smithkline's inactivated polio vaccine, apparently used only in foreigners.]
Comment (Kelly): "It seems clear that no bovine derivatives are used in FINISHED products, however they are often used in the culture process. Does this also present a possible risk? Below is the packaging insert for one routine vaccine (inactivated injectable polio vaccine)made by Pasteur Merieux S?rums & Vaccins S. A. Lyon, France (now called Aventis):" IPOL?, Poliovirus Vaccine Inactivated, produced by Pasteur M?rieux S?rums Vaccins S.A., is a sterile suspension of three types of poliovirus: Type 1 (Mahoney), Type 2 (MEF-1), and Type 3 (Saukett). IPOL? is a highly purified, inactivated poliovirus vaccine produced by microcarrier culture. This culture technique and improvements in purification, concentration and standardization of poliovirus antigen produce a more potent and consistent immunogenic vaccine than the IPV available in the US prior to 1988. The viruses are grown in cultures of V.R. cells, a continuous line of monkey kidney cells, by the microcarrier technique. The cells are grown in Eagle MEM modified medium, supplemented with newborn calf serum tested for adventitious agents prior to use, originated from countries free of bovine spongiform encephalopathy. For viral growth the culture medium is replaced by M-199, without calf serum. ... Neomycin, streptomycin and polymyxin B are used in vaccine production, and although purification procedures eliminate measurable amounts, less than 5 ng neomycin, 200 ng streptomycin and 25 ng polymyxin B per dose may still be present. The residual calf serum protein is less than 1 ppm in the final vaccine. The vaccine is clear and colorless and should be administered intramuscularly or subcutaneously.
The documents below were provided by Terry S. Singeltary Sr on 8 May 2000. They are optically character read (scanned into computer) and so may contain typos and unreadable parts. TIP740203/l 0424 CONFIDENTIAL
Mr Cunningham CMP3 From: D O Hagger MBI Dr Salisbury MED/IMCD3 Mr Burton PD/STB/PG1B B/17/2 Date: 15.02.1989 Mr Dudley PD/AD4
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/may00_news.html
BSE offals used in cosmetics, toiletry and perfume industry Sun, 3 Sep 2000. Unpublished Inquiry documents obtained by CJD activist Terry S. Singeltary Sr. of Bacliff, Texas Miss Marion Kelly Cosmetic, Toiletry and Perfumery Association 35 Dover Street London W1X3RA
Department of Trade and Industry 10-18 Victoria Street London SW1H ONN Enquiries 01-215 5000 Telex 8811074 DTHQ G 01 215 3324 1 February 1990
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/sep00_news.html#bbb
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/jul00_dont_eat_sheep.html#hhh
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/may00_news.html#aaa
years later, the bush administration made it legal. the body bag count was acceptable for the _documented_ ones. the elderly are expendable, kids and pets are not, and as long as politics plays a role in dictating science i.e. the UKBSEnvCJD ONLY THEORY, we all loose, and the 85%+ of all the other victims, go unaccounted for...officially, but some of us no different, but yet the ignorance of it all, will continue to spread the TSE agent globally, through a multitude of proven routes and sources i.e. friendly fire i.e. and or the pass it forward mode. ...
IN A NUT SHELL ; $$$
(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)
11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............
http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of Canada Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted: 1 July 2004 Summary (0.1Mb)
Report (0.2Mb)
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s.
A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594094.htm
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the USA Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted: 1 July 2004 Summary (0.1Mb)
Report (0.2Mb)
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594180.htm
Monday, February 01, 2010
Import Alert 17-04 BSE CJD HIGH RISK TISSUES, Nutritional Supplements and Cosmetics
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/02/import-alert-17-04-bse-cjd-high-risk.html
Monday, February 01, 2010
Import Alert 57-20 and 84-03 Human Dura Mater and risk factors there from due to Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (CJD)
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/02/import-alert-57-20-and-84-03-human-dura.html
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
Import Alert 62-07 Sygen Injectable (Bovine-Extracted GMI Monosialoganglioside) manufactured from bovine brain starting material
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/02/import-alert-62-07-sygen-injectable.html
The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.
http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf
TSS
(Note: This import alert represents the Agency's current guidance to FDA field personnel regarding the manufacturer(s) and/or products(s) at issue.
It does not create or confer any rights for or on any person, and does not operate to bind FDA or the public).
Import Alert # 99-25
Published Date: 10/02/2009
Type: DWPE
Import Alert Name:
"Detention Without Physical Examination of Animal Feed, Animal Feed Ingredients and Other Products for Animal Use Consisting or Containing Ingredients of Animal Origin and Not the Subject of a Valid USDA Import Permit"
Reason for Alert:
On December 7, 2000, USDA/APHIS enacted an immediate prohibition on the importation into the United States of all meat and bone meal (MBM), meat meal, bone meal, blood meal, tankage, offal, or any product containing such, which originated directly from Europe or was rendered/processed in European plants processing animal materials, regardless of species of origin, including poultry and fish meal. This prohibition was deemed necessary by APHIS because of the possibility of cross contamination with the BSE agent.
BSE is the bovine form of a group of uniformly fatal neurological diseases known as TSEs (Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies). BSE appears to be spread in part through feeding of infected material to cattle. At this time, the causative agent is unknown and there is no test for the presence of the agent in animal derived products. There appears to be a link between the bovine TSE, BSE, and a human form of TSE known as vCJD (new variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease).
The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS), Veterinary Services (VS) regulates the importation of animals and animal-derived materials. More specifically, under 9 CFR 95.4, the USDA does not allow the importation of animal feeds or feed ingredients that contain or consist of processed animal protein (e.g. meat and bone meal) and other animal waste and by product materials that have been derived from animals that have been in specified BSE-affected and BSE-at-risk countries. The USDA may, however, allow for the importation of specific non-ruminant animal-derived products, provided the product is the subject of a valid USDA import permit (VS Form 16-6).
Guidance:
Districts may detain without physical examination shipments of animal feeds (including pet food), animal feed ingredients, and other products for animal use consisting of, or containing, ingredients of animal origin as identified in the Red List from the designated countries if the product is not the subject of a valid USDA import permit (VS Form 16-6).
OASIS Screening Criteria have been loaded to ensure that entries of products that contain or may contain animal protein or by-products will be selected for review by the entry reviewer. As part of the review process, the entry reviewer should contact the filer/importer, request paper entry documents (USDA import permit, VS Form 16-6)), and remind the filer/importer of their requirement to hold the shipment intact pending FDA release. Additionally, the entry reviewer should determine the intended use of the product, the ingredients, and the name and address of the ultimate consignee.
If the filer/importer does not agree to hold the product intact pending FDA release, contact the local office of US Customs and ask that they detain the product.
Products which (from labeling or other documentation) appear to contain animal protein or by-products and which are not the subject of a valid USDA import permit (VS Form 16-6)should either be detained by FDA or recommended to USDA/APHIS for appropriate action. (The location of the APHIS/Plant Protection and Quarantine office can be determined by calling USDA's Veterinary Medical Office.
Products detained and refused under the above reference charge may not be reconditioned or converted to non-FDA regulated use. They must be either destroyed or exported.
Please note that APHIS has received information that shipments of animal-derived products may be offered for entry under descriptions that may be misleading or appear to not be subject to their prohibition, such as fertilizer, adhesive, supplement, nutritional supplement, additive, feed/food additive.
For questions or issues concerning science, science policy, sample collection, analysis, preparation, or analytical methodology, contact the Division of Field Science at (301) 827-7605.
Product Description:
All animal feed (including pet food), animal feed ingredients, and other products for animal use consisting of or containing ingredients of animal origin
Charge:
"The article is subject to refusal of admission pursuant to Section 801(a)(1) in that it appears that such article has been manufactured, processed, or packed under insanitary conditions."
OASIS charge code - MFR INSAN
Countries
(AL) ALBANIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(AD) ANDORRA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(AT) AUSTRIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(BE) BELGIUM
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(BA) BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(BG) BULGARIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(CA) CANADA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(HR) CROATIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(CZ) CZECH REPUBLIC
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(DK) DENMARK
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(FI) FINLAND
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(FR) FRANCE
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(DE) GERMANY
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(GR) GREECE
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(HU) HUNGARY
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(IE) IRELAND
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(IL) ISRAEL
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(IT) ITALY
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(JP) JAPAN
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(LI) LIECHTENSTEIN
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(LU) LUXEMBOURG
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(MK) MACEDONIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(MC) MONACO
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(NL) NETHERLANDS
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(NO) NORWAY
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(OM) OMAN
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(PL) POLAND
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(PT) PORTUGAL
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(RO) ROMANIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(SM) SAN MARINO
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(SK) SLOVAKIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(SI) SLOVENIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(ES) SPAIN
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(SZ) SWAZILAND
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(SE) SWEDEN
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(GB) UNITED KINGDOM
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
(YU) YUGOSLAVIA
(69 - - - --) Medicated Animal Feeds
(70 - - - --) Animal Feed(Non-Medicated)
(71 F - - --) Brewery/Distillery Byprod
(71 G - - --) Corn Prod/Byprod
(71 H - - --) Flour Mill Byprod
(71 I - - --) Rice Mill Byprod
(71 J - - --) Fruit
(71 K - - --) Veg Byprod
(71 L - - --) Oilseed Byprod
(71 - - - --) Byprodcts For Animal Foods
(72 - - - --) Pet/Laboratory Animal Food
-
-
-
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/cms_ia/importalert_381.html
PLEASE BE AWARE ;
The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.
http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf
Friday, September 4, 2009
FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT 429,128 lbs. feed for ruminant animals may have been contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/09/foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html
Saturday, August 29, 2009
FOIA REQUEST FEED RECALL 2009 Product may have contained prohibited materials Bulk Whole Barley, Recall # V-256-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/08/foia-request-feed-recall-2009-product.html
C O N F I R M E D
----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To:
Sent: Thursday, November 05, 2009 9:25 PM
Subject: [BSE-L] re-FOIA REQUEST ON FEED RECALL PRODUCT contaminated with prohibited material Recall # V-258-2009 and Recall # V-256-2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/re-foia-request-on-feed-recall-product.html
Thursday, November 12, 2009
BSE FEED RECALL Misbranding of product by partial label removal to hide original source of materials 2009
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/11/bse-feed-recall-misbranding-of-product.html
CVM Annual Report Fiscal Year 2008: October 1, 2007-September 30, 2008
PUTTING LIPSTICK ON A PIG AND TAKING HER TO A DANCE...TSS
BSE Feed Rule Enforcement: A Decade of Success OFF TO A FAST START
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/06/texas-firm-recalls-cattle-heads-that.html
Sunday, January 17, 2010
BSE USA feed inspection violations 01/01/2009 to 01/17/2010 FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/01/bse-usa-feed-inspection-violations.html
A band aid approach, to something that needs a tourniquet, like irradiation, and or ammonia, or whatever, same thing, your masking the problem, and in the end, will make it worse, the industry will become more complacent. see below, you can run just the numbers I picked up over the years. i'm talking 100s and 100s of tonnage of mad cow feed. I even remember the token purina mad cow feed mill in Gonzales Texas back in 2001. where the FDA spouted out that ;
''FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.''
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2001/new00752.html
you can take that with how ever many grains of salt you wish, but i read that as saying, it was only 5 1/2 grams, and the old cow ways 600 pounds, so know way that even if the feed was tainted, there was not enough to cause disease. the fda, usda et al, knew at that exact moment when they wrote that statement, they knew then that the 5 1/2 grams was enough to kill a small herd of cows. it was old science. but again, they chose to deceive. THIS WAS 2001, and it's now 2009, and they still are choosing to deceive, and the new administration appears willing to continue the USA mad cow charade. NOW, since the charade at the purina mill in 2001, i am going to list a few figures of suspect, banned mad cow feed that went out into commerce, even in 2008, 2007, 2006, back a few years, and you can compare, what enormous amounts of banned suspect mad cow feed and other products continue to go out. when you consider, and they knew all along, that .005 grams is lethal, my God, how much of this poison was consumed?
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI
REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement.
VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
snip...SEE ALL THAT I FOUND HERE ;
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html
WE know now, and we knew decades ago, that 5.5 grams of suspect feed in TEXAS was enough to kill 100 cows.
P04.27
Experimental BSE Infection of Non-human Primates: Efficacy of the Oral Route
Holznagel, E1; Yutzy, B1; Deslys, J-P2; Lasmézas, C2; Pocchiari, M3; Ingrosso, L3; Bierke, P4; Schulz-Schaeffer, W5; Motzkus, D6; Hunsmann, G6; Löwer, J1 1Paul-Ehrlich-Institut, Germany; 2Commissariat à l´Energie Atomique, France; 3Instituto Superiore di Sanità, Italy; 4Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease control, Sweden; 5Georg August University, Germany; 6German Primate Center, Germany
Background:
In 2001, a study was initiated in primates to assess the risk for humans to contract BSE through contaminated food. For this purpose, BSE brain was titrated in cynomolgus monkeys.
Aims:
The primary objective is the determination of the minimal infectious dose (MID50) for oral exposure to BSE in a simian model, and, by in doing this, to assess the risk for humans. Secondly, we aimed at examining the course of the disease to identify possible biomarkers.
Methods:
Groups with six monkeys each were orally dosed with lowering amounts of BSE brain: 16g, 5g, 0.5g, 0.05g, and 0.005g. In a second titration study, animals were intracerebrally (i.c.) dosed (50, 5, 0.5, 0.05, and 0.005 mg).
Results:
In an ongoing study, a considerable number of high-dosed macaques already developed simian vCJD upon oral or intracerebral exposure or are at the onset of the clinical phase. However, there are differences in the clinical course between orally and intracerebrally infected animals that may influence the detection of biomarkers.
Conclusions:
Simian vCJD can be easily triggered in cynomolgus monkeys on the oral route using less than 5 g BSE brain homogenate. The difference in the incubation period between 5 g oral and 5 mg i.c. is only 1 year (5 years versus 4 years). However, there are rapid progressors among orally dosed monkeys that develop simian v CJD as fast as intracerebrally inoculated animals.
The work referenced was performed in partial fulfillment of the study "BSE in primates" supported by the EU (QLK1-2002-01096).
http://www.prion2007.com/pdf/Prion%20Book%20of%20Abstracts.pdf
look at the table and you'll see that as little as 1 mg (or 0.001 gm) caused 7% (1 of 14) of the cows to come down with BSE;
Risk of oral infection with bovine spongiform encephalopathy agent in primates
Corinne Ida Lasmézas, Emmanuel Comoy, Stephen Hawkins, Christian Herzog, Franck Mouthon, Timm Konold, Frédéric Auvré, Evelyne Correia, Nathalie Lescoutra-Etchegaray, Nicole Salès, Gerald Wells, Paul Brown, Jean-Philippe Deslys Summary The uncertain extent of human exposure to bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE)--which can lead to variant Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (vCJD)--is compounded by incomplete knowledge about the efficiency of oral infection and the magnitude of any bovine-to-human biological barrier to transmission. We therefore investigated oral transmission of BSE to non-human primates. We gave two macaques a 5 g oral dose of brain homogenate from a BSE-infected cow. One macaque developed vCJD-like neurological disease 60 months after exposure, whereas the other remained free of disease at 76 months. On the basis of these findings and data from other studies, we made a preliminary estimate of the food exposure risk for man, which provides additional assurance that existing public health measures can prevent transmission of BSE to man.
snip...
BSE bovine brain inoculum
100 g 10 g 5 g 1 g 100 mg 10 mg 1 mg 0·1 mg 0·01 mg
Primate (oral route)* 1/2 (50%)
Cattle (oral route)* 10/10 (100%) 7/9 (78%) 7/10 (70%) 3/15 (20%) 1/15 (7%) 1/15 (7%)
RIII mice (ic ip route)* 17/18 (94%) 15/17 (88%) 1/14 (7%)
PrPres biochemical detection
The comparison is made on the basis of calibration of the bovine inoculum used in our study with primates against a bovine brain inoculum with a similar PrPres concentration that was inoculated into mice and cattle.8 *Data are number of animals positive/number of animals surviving at the time of clinical onset of disease in the first positive animal (%). The accuracy of bioassays is generally judged to be about plus or minus 1 log. ic ip=intracerebral and intraperitoneal.
Table 1: Comparison of transmission rates in primates and cattle infected orally with similar BSE brain inocula
Published online January 27, 2005
http://www.thelancet.com/journal/journal.isa
Calves were challenged by mouth with homogenised brain from confirmed cases of BSE. Some received 300g (3 doses of 100g), some 100g, 10g or 1g. They were then left to develop BSE, but were not subjected to the normal stresses that they might have encountered in a dairy herd. Animals in all four groups developed BSE. There has been a considerable spread of incubation period in some of the groups, but it appears as if those in the 1 and 10g challenge groups most closely fit the picture of incubation periods seen in the epidemic. Experiments in progress indicate that oral infection can occur in some animals with doses as low as 0.01g and 0.001g. .........
http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/science-research/pathog.html#dose
It is clear that the designing scientists must also have shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the dose
levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s145d.pdf
2
6. It also appears to me that Mr Bradley’s answer (that it would take less than say 100 grams) was probably given with the benefit of hindsight; particularly if one considers that later in the same answer Mr Bradley expresses his surprise that it could take as little of 1 gram of brain to cause BSE by the oral route within the same species. This information did not become available until the "attack rate" experiment had been completed in 1995/96. This was a titration experiment designed to ascertain the infective dose. A range of dosages was used to ensure that the actual result was within both a lower and an upper limit within the study and the designing scientists would not have expected all the dose levels to trigger infection. The dose ranges chosen by the most informed scientists at that time ranged from 1 gram to three times one hundred grams. It is clear that the designing scientists must have also shared Mr Bradley’s surprise at the results because all the
dose levels right down to 1 gram triggered infection.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/ws/s147f.pdf
Re: BSE .1 GRAM LETHAL NEW STUDY SAYS via W.H.O. Dr Maura Ricketts
[BBC radio 4 FARM news]
http://www.maddeer.org/audio/BBC4farmingtoday2_1_03.ram
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/03/slides/3923s1_OPH.htm
2) Infectious dose:
To cattle: 1 gram of infected brain material (by oral ingestion)
http://www.inspection.gc.ca/english/sci/bio/bseesbe.shtml
Tuesday, January 19, 2010
CVM's OR Develops New PCR-Based Method for Testing Animal Feed
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2010/01/cvms-or-develops-new-pcr-based-method.html
NOW that we have established that this infamous part of the USA BSE MAD COW TRIPLE FIRE WALL was a farce, let's look further into the historical myth of no mad cows in the USA (well, they estimate at 1 in a million slip by into the food system), but i dispute that by many more. The BSE surveillance program was/is terribly flawed as well.
bottom line, and i say this with full confidence, with the present and past surveillance of BSE/TSE in the USA, and the continued feed violations, in the TONS, no one will ever know the true extent of any strain of mad cow disease in the USA. you don't have to just take my word on it, read the facts. blunder, after blunder, after blunder. they have all been posted here, i would be glad to go over any and or all of them one by one for any that doubts me. i can sum it all up real quick, Canada is looking to find, and the USA has never, EVER, done that. it's been just the opposite for the USA. don't believe me, or the facts, here is what Dr. Paul Brown of the cdc/nih et al ;
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
PAUL BROWN CDC ET AL COMMENT TO THE MEDIA ON THIS ISSUE ;
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/
http://usdameatexport.blogspot.com/2009/09/japans-new-leaders-seen-tougher-on-us.html
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/national-prion-disease-pathology.html
Statement on Texas cow with central nervous system symptoms
Main Category: Public Health Article
Date: 05 May 2004 - 0:00 PDT
snip...see full text ;
http://fdafailedus.blogspot.com/2010/01/establishing-fully-integrated-national.html
18.173 page 189
Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE
A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada
Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.
Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions.At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.
Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathogenesis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types. Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.
http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf
http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml
From: xxxx
To: Terry Singeltary
Sent: Saturday, December 05, 2009 9:09 AM
Subject: 14th ICID - abstract accepted for 'International Scientific Exchange'
Your preliminary abstract number: 670
Dear Mr. Singeltary,
On behalf of the Scientific Committee, I am pleased to inform you that your abstract
'Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009'
WAS accepted for inclusion in the INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE (ISE) section of the 14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases. Accordingly, your abstract will be included in the "Intl. Scientific Exchange abstract CD-rom" of the Congress which will be distributed to all participants.
Abstracts accepted for INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE are NOT PRESENTED in the oral OR poster sessions.
Your abstract below was accepted for: INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE
#0670: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009
Author: T. Singeltary; Bacliff, TX/US
Topic: Emerging Infectious Diseases Preferred type of presentation: International Scientific Exchange
This abstract has been ACCEPTED.
#0670: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009
Authors: T. Singeltary; Bacliff, TX/US
Title: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009
Body: Background
An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and feed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.
Methods
12 years independent research of available data
Results
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.
Conclusion
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries.
I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.
Keywords: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Prion
http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/
http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf
Monday, October 19, 2009
Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009
snip...
I ask Professor Kong ;
Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment
''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''
Professor Kong reply ;
.....snip
''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.
Thanks for your interest.''
Best regards,
Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
END...TSS
I look forward to further transmission studies, and a true ENHANCED BSE/atypical BSE surveillance program put forth testing all cattle for human and animal consumption for 5 years. a surveillance program that uses the most sensitive TSE testing, and has the personnel that knows how to use them, and can be trusted. I look forward to a stringent mad cow feed ban being put forth, and then strictly enforced. we need a forced, not voluntary feed ban, an enhanced feed ban at that, especially excluding blood. we need some sort of animal traceability. no more excuses about privacy. if somebody is putting out a product that is killing folks and or has the potential to kill you, then everybody needs to know who they are, and where that product came from. same with hospitals, i think medical incidents in all states should be recorded, and made public, when it comes to something like a potential accidental transmission exposure event. so if someone is out there looking at a place to go have surgery done, if you have several hospitals having these type 'accidental exposure events', than you can go some place else. it only makes sense. somewhere along the road, the consumer lost control, and just had to take whatever they were given, and then charged these astronomical prices. some where along the line the consumer just lost interest, especially on a long incubating disease such as mad cow disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. like i said before, there is much more to the mad cow story than bovines and eating a hamburger, we must start focusing on all TSE in all species. ...TSS
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html
for those interested, please see full text ;
Friday, January 29, 2010
14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)
""These 9,200 cases were different because brain tissue samples were preserved with formalin, which makes them suitable for only one type of test--immunohistochemistry, or IHC."
THIS WAS DONE FOR A REASON!
THE IHC test has been proven to be the LEAST LIKELY to detect BSE/TSE in the bovine, and these were probably from the most high risk cattle pool, the ones the USDA et al, SHOULD have been testing. ...TSS
USDA 2003 BSE ROUNDTABLE
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2009/04/bse-mad-cow-testing-usa-2009-figures.html
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW fromTEXAS ???
Date: Mon, 22 Nov 2004 17:12:15 -0600
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Carla Everett
References: <[log in to unmask]><[log in to unmask] us>
Greetings Carla, still hear a rumor;
Texas single beef cow not born in Canada no beef entered the food chain?
and i see the TEXAS department of animal health is ramping up for something, but they forgot a url for update?
I HAVE NO ACTUAL CONFIRMATION YET...
can you confirm??? terry
============================================================
snip...
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/01/14th-international-congress-on.html
NOW, the question to ask yourself, has your country imported feed and or feed by-products from the USA ???
The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.
http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary
Comment 2006-2007 USA AND OIE POISONING GLOBE WITH BSE MRR POLICY
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure. ...
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8151
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0028.1 Public Submission Title Attachment to Singletary comment
January 28, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/contentStreamer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
Sent: Saturday, August 29, 2009 10:28 AM
Subject: BSE MRR POLICY AND THE GBR RISK ASSESSMENTS
they call it MRR, the _legal_ trading of all strains of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy, GLOBALLY. and that's all that the MRR was about. hell, the USA covered up 2 cases of mad cow disease just so this stupid policy could get finalized, and 25 years of attempted eradication of this agent got washed down the drain $$$ all we are doing now, is what the UK did when all this BSe first got started, except now, with the MRR, it's simply legal now.
Docket APHIS-2006-0041 Docket Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived from Bovines Commodities Docket Type Rulemaking Document APHIS-2006-0041-0001 Document Title Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions; Importation of Live Bovines and Products Derived From Bovines Public Submission APHIS-2006-0041-0006 Public Submission Title Comment from Terry S Singletary Sr Views Add Comments How To Comment
snip...
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure....
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f8152&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&d=APHIS-2006-0041-0006
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=09000064801f3413
did anyone ever read the MRR 2 ;
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/RiskAssessment06-041-1%20.pdf
Revised assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) risks associated with the importation of certain commodities from BSE minimal risk regions (Canada) Veterinary Services Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service United States Department of Agriculture September
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/risk_assessment_%20final9-2007.pdf
your only fooling yourselves with this stupid ukbsenvcjd only theory, and the BSE mythology of the OIE. most any country that went by those same OIE BSE guidelines all went down with BSE. THE OIE has now shown they are nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
http://www.regulations.gov/search/Regs/home.html#documentDetail?R=09000064801e47e1
bottom line, and i say this with full confidence, with the present and past surveillance of BSE/TSE in the USA, and the continued feed violations, in the TONS, no one will ever know the true extent of any strain of mad cow disease in the USA. you don't have to just take my word on it, read the facts. blunder, after blunder, after blunder. they have all been posted here, i would be glad to go over any and or all of them one by one for any that doubts me. i can sum it all up real quick, Canada is looking to find, and the USA has never, EVER, done that. it's been just the opposite for the USA. don't believe me, or the facts, here is what Dr. Paul Brown of the cdc/nih et al ;
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2009/04/national-prion-disease-pathology.html
THE bse mrr policy is nothing more than swapping spit. your just accepting what ever disease that country has, and or what ever that country says it has. it's an honor system of sorts. Canada seems to be Honest, and just the opposite has happened here in the USA.
WE did just what the UK did to the globe ;
England worried briefly about infecting other countries 27 Aug 00 confidential correspondence obtained by Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/aug00_last_news.html#fff
Other US BSE risks: the imported products picture 24 Jul 00 Trade Statistics: UK to US Compiled by Terry S.Singeltary Sr of Bacliff, Texas
[Opinion (webmaster): The US has focused for years on tracing, containing, and eradicating live animal imports from the UK or other countries with acknowledged BSE like Belgium, including some 499 cattle and the Vermont sheep. This strategy does not acknowledge imports of rendered bovine products from England during the BSE period nor secondary products such as surgical catgut, which is to say surgical cowgut, or dairy cattle embryos, vaccines for veterinarian and human medicines. What has become of these? Mr. Singeltary, who lost his mother to CJD of unexplained origin a few years back and went on to became a well-known TSE activist, has tracked down voluminous pertinent import data through correspondence with UK officials and searches of government web sites. Imports of such products are frequently cited by Europeans in rating BSE risks in the US and in shutting out US exports.
Many people's eyes glaze over when reviewing reams of sometimes older trade statistics. There is no proof that any of the imported products was contaminated with BSE nor if so, any evidence that any BSE product lead to infection in US livestock, surgical patients, or what not. Nonetheless, the data obtained by Mr. Singeltary establish that an appalling variety and tonnage of products that were imported by the US from the UK and othr BSE-affected countries during the peak of the BSE epidemic years.]
10 January 1990 COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
COMMITTEE ON SAFETY OF MEDICINES WORKING PARTY ON BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
SURGICAL CATGUT SUTURES
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/sep00_news.html#hhh
40,000 human heart valves a year from BSE herds Sun, 3 Sep 2000. Unpublished Inquiry documents obtained by CJD activist Terry S. Singeltary Sr. of Bacliff, Texas
Opinion (webmaster): Below are some shocking documents. Here is a British company preparing 40,000 heart valves a year from bovine pericardium, primarily for export, and they are not required to source this material from BSE-free herds even in peak epidemic years. It is amazing to watch health "authorities" grovelling on their bellies to wring petty concessions from middle management at obscure little companies. The main worry is not the practise of using 800 potentially infected cows a week for human heart transplant material but that the press or recipients will get wind of it, hurting business. BSE wasn't the problem, it was awkward queries from importing countries like the US. The cows are stunned using brain penetration -- can't do anything about the chunks of bovine brain blasted into the circulatory system, it's the norm. Can't use younger lower-risk animals either, patch would not be big enough. It is fascinating to see the British government worrying about, but doing nothing, with pigs with BSE 10 years ago.
While scrapie was long used as an excuse for continuing with human use of BSE-tainted material, little sheep material was used medically. Bovine transplants, vaccines, insulin doeses, etc. are far more dangerous than dietary material as injections, and are done on a very wide scale. So scrapie was never a valid analogy to BSE, as MAFF knew full well.
The British government deferred to the manufacturer's rep for an opinion on how contaminated pericardium might be, just as this appeared showing that this tissue is extremely dangerous:
CJD in a patient who received homograft [was it really?] tissue for tympanic membrane closure. Eur Arch Otorhinolaryngol 1990;247(4):199-201 Tange RA, Troost D, Limburg M We report the case history of a 54-year-old man who developed a fatal neurological disorder 4 years after a successful tympanoplasty with homograft pericardium... COMMERCIAL IN CONFIDENCE
Miss M Duncan From: Dr E Hoxey Date: 29 January 1990 cc: Mr R Burton Dr N Richardson Ms K Turner Ms J Dhell Mr N Weatherhead
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/sep00_news.html#hhh
Two million children innoculated with BSE vaccines Daily Express May 2, 200 [minor edits by webmaster]
Seven vaccines potentially at risk from BSE and given to millions of children can be identified for the first time by the Daily Express. But alarmingly there is no record of which children received the jabs, produced between 1988 and 1989, at the start of Britain's "mad cow" crisis. The vaccines, using UK-sourced cattle material, were made by two companies, Wellcome and Smithkline, despite warnings that they could pose a risk. The seven vaccines are: 1. Smithkline's MMR (Measles, Mumps, Rubella), finally replaced "by end of 1992 approximately";
2. Wellcome's combined Diphtheria and Tetanus, last issued by the company in June 1991, with a June 1993 expiry date;
3. Wellcome's DTP (Diphtheria, Tetanus, Pertussis) last issued again in June 1991, with a November 1993 expiry date;
4. Wellcome's single component Diphtheria vaccine, last issued in October 1991, with a November 1993 expiry date;
5. Wellcome's Tetanus, last issued in December 1991, with a December 1993 expiry date.
6.[Wellcome's oral polio vaccine, last issue and expiry dates are "not known".
7. Smithkline's inactivated polio vaccine, apparently used only in foreigners.]
Comment (Kelly): "It seems clear that no bovine derivatives are used in FINISHED products, however they are often used in the culture process. Does this also present a possible risk? Below is the packaging insert for one routine vaccine (inactivated injectable polio vaccine)made by Pasteur Merieux S?rums & Vaccins S. A. Lyon, France (now called Aventis):" IPOL?, Poliovirus Vaccine Inactivated, produced by Pasteur M?rieux S?rums Vaccins S.A., is a sterile suspension of three types of poliovirus: Type 1 (Mahoney), Type 2 (MEF-1), and Type 3 (Saukett). IPOL? is a highly purified, inactivated poliovirus vaccine produced by microcarrier culture. This culture technique and improvements in purification, concentration and standardization of poliovirus antigen produce a more potent and consistent immunogenic vaccine than the IPV available in the US prior to 1988. The viruses are grown in cultures of V.R. cells, a continuous line of monkey kidney cells, by the microcarrier technique. The cells are grown in Eagle MEM modified medium, supplemented with newborn calf serum tested for adventitious agents prior to use, originated from countries free of bovine spongiform encephalopathy. For viral growth the culture medium is replaced by M-199, without calf serum. ... Neomycin, streptomycin and polymyxin B are used in vaccine production, and although purification procedures eliminate measurable amounts, less than 5 ng neomycin, 200 ng streptomycin and 25 ng polymyxin B per dose may still be present. The residual calf serum protein is less than 1 ppm in the final vaccine. The vaccine is clear and colorless and should be administered intramuscularly or subcutaneously.
The documents below were provided by Terry S. Singeltary Sr on 8 May 2000. They are optically character read (scanned into computer) and so may contain typos and unreadable parts. TIP740203/l 0424 CONFIDENTIAL
Mr Cunningham CMP3 From: D O Hagger MBI Dr Salisbury MED/IMCD3 Mr Burton PD/STB/PG1B B/17/2 Date: 15.02.1989 Mr Dudley PD/AD4
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/may00_news.html
BSE offals used in cosmetics, toiletry and perfume industry Sun, 3 Sep 2000. Unpublished Inquiry documents obtained by CJD activist Terry S. Singeltary Sr. of Bacliff, Texas Miss Marion Kelly Cosmetic, Toiletry and Perfumery Association 35 Dover Street London W1X3RA
Department of Trade and Industry 10-18 Victoria Street London SW1H ONN Enquiries 01-215 5000 Telex 8811074 DTHQ G 01 215 3324 1 February 1990
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/sep00_news.html#bbb
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/jul00_dont_eat_sheep.html#hhh
http://www.mad-cow.org/00/may00_news.html#aaa
years later, the bush administration made it legal. the body bag count was acceptable for the _documented_ ones. the elderly are expendable, kids and pets are not, and as long as politics plays a role in dictating science i.e. the UKBSEnvCJD ONLY THEORY, we all loose, and the 85%+ of all the other victims, go unaccounted for...officially, but some of us no different, but yet the ignorance of it all, will continue to spread the TSE agent globally, through a multitude of proven routes and sources i.e. friendly fire i.e. and or the pass it forward mode. ...
IN A NUT SHELL ; $$$
(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)
11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries.The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to then Central Bureau............
http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of Canada Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted: 1 July 2004 Summary (0.1Mb)
Report (0.2Mb)
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in Canada, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in Canada. This scientific report addresses the GBR of Canada as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into the country middle of the eighties and could have reached domestic cattle in the early nineties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early 90s. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into Canada reached domestic cattle and led to an internal challenge in the early 90s.
A certain risk that BSE-infected cattle entered processing in Canada, and were at least partly rendered for feed, occurred in the early 1990s when cattle imported from UK in the mid 80s could have been slaughtered. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of Canada is III, i.e. it is confirmed at a lower level that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as the system remains unstable, it is expected that the GBR continues to grow, even if no additional external challenges occur.
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594094.htm
Scientific Report of the European Food Safety Authority on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE Risk (GBR) of the USA Question number: EFSA-Q-2003-083
Adopted: 1 July 2004 Summary (0.1Mb)
Report (0.2Mb)
Summary
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90’s when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/EFSA/efsa_locale-1178620753812_1211902594180.htm
Monday, February 01, 2010
Import Alert 17-04 BSE CJD HIGH RISK TISSUES, Nutritional Supplements and Cosmetics
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/02/import-alert-17-04-bse-cjd-high-risk.html
Monday, February 01, 2010
Import Alert 57-20 and 84-03 Human Dura Mater and risk factors there from due to Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease (CJD)
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2010/02/import-alert-57-20-and-84-03-human-dura.html
Wednesday, February 3, 2010
Import Alert 62-07 Sygen Injectable (Bovine-Extracted GMI Monosialoganglioside) manufactured from bovine brain starting material
http://bseusa.blogspot.com/2010/02/import-alert-62-07-sygen-injectable.html
The most recent assessments (and reassessments) were published in June 2005 (Table I; 18), and included the categorisation of Canada, the USA, and Mexico as GBR III. Although only Canada and the USA have reported cases, the historically open system of trade in North America suggests that it is likely that BSE is present also in Mexico.
http://www.oie.int/boutique/extrait/06heim937950.pdf
TSS
Labels:
ANIMAL FEED,
bse,
cjd,
IMPORT ALERT,
MRR,
PRION USA
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